South Sudan at the Brink of Relapse

Escalating Militarization, Collapse of the Peace Architecture, and Early Warning of Renewed Civil War

– Strategic Warning Update
Status: High Risk | Escalation Likely | Civilian Impact Severe

Strategic Executive Assessment

South Sudan is no longer operating within the stabilizing logic of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The country has entered a pre-relapse phase, characterized by widespread armed mobilization, erosion of political trust, systematic weakening of opposition participation, and increasing tolerance for violence against civilians as a tactical instrument.

As of today, indicators point toward a high probability of further escalation over the next 30 to 90 days, with Jonglei State functioning as the primary ignition zone and Juba increasingly exposed to indirect military and political pressure. The conflict is transitioning from fragmented insecurity into coordinated confrontation, with national-level implications.

From an ASA early-warning standpoint, South Sudan now meets multiple thresholds associated with renewed civil war:
– generalized ceasefire violations
– breakdown of political power-sharing
– mass displacement under active military operations
– shrinking international deterrence capacity

Current Security Environment: Escalation Beyond Containment

Military confrontations between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), alongside allied and splinter groups, have expanded to eight of the country’s ten states, a scale unseen since before 2018. These are no longer sporadic clashes but sustained engagements involving air assets, ground maneuvers, and mobilization orders.

Jonglei State remains the epicenter. Fighting across Nyirol, Uror, Ayod, Duk, and surrounding counties has intensified, with the SPLA-IO’s seizure of Pajut altering the strategic geometry of the conflict. This development places Bor, the state capital, within closer operational reach, creating a direct threat to a major urban and administrative center.

The SPLA-IO’s public call for mobilization toward Juba in January represents a significant escalation in intent, even if immediate execution remains uncertain. In parallel, statements attributed to government-aligned commanders instructing forces not to spare civilians signal a dangerous normalization of mass violence rhetoric, sharply increasing atrocity risk.

Government-imposed no-fly zones and evacuation orders for civilians, humanitarian actors, and UNMISS personnel in parts of Jonglei further confirm that authorities anticipate major confrontation, not de-escalation.

Humanitarian and Civilian Impact: Accelerating Collapse

The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate rapidly. As of the most recent assessments, over 180,000 civilians have been displaced in Jonglei alone, with additional displacement expected as fighting expands. Aid delivery is severely constrained by insecurity, aerial operations, and deliberate interference.

Looting of health facilities, seizure of humanitarian assets, and forced relocation of aid personnel have been reported across multiple counties. These actions indicate not merely collateral disruption but instrumentalization of humanitarian deprivation as part of conflict dynamics.

ASA assesses that humanitarian access will continue to shrink precisely as needs escalate, creating conditions for localized famine, disease outbreaks, and civilian mortality spikes, particularly among displaced populations.

Political Trajectory: Collapse of the Peace Framework

Politically, South Sudan is undergoing accelerated centralization of power under President Salva Kiir Mayardit. Continued unilateral reshuffles within the ruling SPLM and the removal of opposition-linked officials from state institutions have hollowed out the power-sharing logic of R-ARCSS.

Amendments approved in December 2025, severing the link between elections and completion of a permanent constitution, fundamentally altered the agreement’s sequencing and legitimacy. The dismissal of SPLA-IO legislators and their replacement with figures aligned to splinter factions represents a deliberate strategy of opposition fragmentation, not reconciliation.

The removal of Interior Minister Angelina Teny, a key opposition figure and spouse of First Vice-President Riek Machar, further undermined confidence that political participation provides protection or influence. From an ASA analytical perspective, these actions have closed peaceful pathways for dispute resolution, increasing the rationality of armed options for excluded actors.

UNMISS Under Constraint: Deterrence at Risk

UNMISS remains a critical, though increasingly constrained, stabilizing actor. Financial pressures linked to UN-wide budget reductions, combined with host-government restrictions on movement, base operations, and flight clearances, have reduced the mission’s operational flexibility.

Government pressure to close UNMISS bases in Wau, Bentiu, and Tambura, alongside conditional flight approvals, has weakened protective coverage in already volatile regions. Any further contraction of UNMISS presence will directly elevate civilian risk and reduce early-warning and mediation capacity.

ASA assesses that the erosion of UNMISS operational space is a key accelerant of conflict relapse, as it removes one of the last remaining deterrents to mass violence.

Early Warning Alert – Near-Term Outlook (30–90 Days)

Scenario 1: High-Likelihood Escalation (Most Likely)

Fighting in Jonglei intensifies, with SPLA-IO consolidating gains around Pajut and extending pressure toward Bor. SSPDF responds with increased air operations and mobilization of allied militias. Civilian displacement accelerates, humanitarian access contracts further, and UNMISS presence becomes increasingly symbolic rather than protective.

Indicators:
– continued airstrikes
– mass evacuations
– inflammatory command rhetoric
– obstruction of humanitarian operations

Scenario 2: Strategic Spillover and Political Shock (Moderate Risk)

Escalation in Jonglei triggers parallel instability in Upper Nile or Equatoria regions, stretching SSPDF capacity. Political tensions in Juba intensify, including arrests or further dismissals of opposition figures, raising the risk of violence closer to the capital.

Indicators:
– opposition mobilization rhetoric
– troop movements toward Juba corridors
– emergency security measures in the capital

Scenario 3: Temporary Containment without Resolution (Low but Possible)

International pressure, combined with regional mediation, produces a temporary pause in major operations without restoring trust or addressing structural drivers. Violence subsides briefly but remains latent, with high relapse probability.

Indicators:
– renewed mediation announcements
– limited ceasefire declarations
– continued political deadlock

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Warning

South Sudan is approaching a critical inflection point. Without urgent political recalibration, credible enforcement of the permanent ceasefire, and protection of UNMISS operational space, the country risks sliding into a renewed cycle of generalized civil war, with devastating consequences for civilians and regional stability.

Delayed action will not preserve stability; it will only reduce leverage.