Libya at a Strategic Standstill

Prolonged Political Deadlock, Institutional Fragmentation, and Warning Indicators of Renewed Instability

Status: Medium–High Risk | Political Blockage Persistent | Security Volatility Latent

Executive Strategic Assessment

Libya remains locked in a protracted political and institutional stalemate, with rival authorities entrenched in competing governance structures and no credible pathway yet established toward national elections or unified state institutions. The deadlock between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), continues to paralyse decision-making at the national level.

From an African Security Analysis (ASA) analytical perspective, Libya is not in active nationwide conflict, but it is operating in a state of suspended resolution, where political paralysis, unresolved security sector fragmentation, and economic contestation create persistent latent instability. The absence of progress on elections since their indefinite postponement in 2021 has entrenched rival legitimacy claims and increased incentives for obstruction rather than compromise.

This assessment should also be read against emerging reporting of a high-profile political-security shock in Zintan in early February 2026, which may act as a destabilizing trigger even if it does not immediately translate into nationwide conflict.

Political Landscape: Dual Governments and the Entrenchment of the Status Quo

The political impasse remains structured around two rival centres of authority. In the west, the GNU led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, supported by elements of the High State Council (HSC), continues to assert international legitimacy and control over Tripoli and key western institutions. In the east, the GNS led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad, backed by the HoR and militarily underpinned by General Khalifa Haftar’s LNA, maintains parallel governance structures and territorial influence.

The core point of contention continues to be the sequencing and framework for elections. The eastern bloc favours the formation of a new unified interim government to oversee elections, arguing that the GNU lacks neutrality and credibility. The GNU and allied HSC figures oppose this approach, viewing it as a mechanism to displace them politically before elections take place. This disagreement has become structural rather than procedural, blocking consensus on electoral legislation and institutional unification.

ASA assesses that the prolonged stalemate increasingly benefits entrenched elites on both sides, reducing incentives to compromise while raising public frustration and long-term legitimacy risks.

UNSMIL Political Roadmap: Progress in Process, Not in Outcomes

During the Security Council briefing of December 2025, Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh acknowledged the lack of tangible progress in implementing the political roadmap announced in August 2025. The roadmap’s three pillars—an electoral framework, unification of institutions under a new government, and a structured national dialogue—remain conceptually intact but operationally stalled.

Two critical prerequisites for elections remain unresolved:
– agreement on the reconstitution of the High National Election Commission
– passage of a constitutional amendment establishing the legal basis for presidential and legislative elections

Without these steps, credible elections remain unattainable. Tetteh’s indication that she may present an alternative mechanism to the Council in February reflects mounting concern within UNSMIL that the current roadmap risks becoming politically inert.

Structured Dialogue: Incremental Engagement amid Structural Resistance

The launch of the Structured Dialogue in December 2025 represents one of the few areas of forward momentum. Facilitated by UNSMIL, the dialogue is designed as an inclusive consultative mechanism rather than a decision-making body, with thematic tracks covering governance, economy, security, reconciliation, and human rights.

The initial governance track discussions in January identified key fault lines, including the mandate of a pre-election executive authority, electoral integrity, and the relationship between state and local governance. While these discussions have generated technical proposals and modest confidence-building, ASA assesses that their impact remains indirect and fragile, as implementation depends entirely on political actors who continue to benefit from the status quo.

The dialogue’s success will depend on whether it can translate deliberation into politically binding compromises, a threshold not yet reached.

Security Context: Contained Tensions, Persistent Fragmentation

Libya’s security environment remains volatile but largely contained through informal deterrence and territorial balance rather than genuine stabilization. Armed groups continue to operate with significant autonomy, particularly in Tripoli and the south, while the LNA maintains disciplined control over eastern territories.

The death of General Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Haddad, Chief of the General Staff of the Libyan Army, in a plane crash near Ankara in December 2025 constitutes a symbolic shock to Libya’s military establishment. Although Turkish authorities have stated that no terrorist links have been identified, the loss of senior military leadership introduces uncertainty within an already fragmented security architecture.

ASA assesses that Libya’s security equilibrium is negative-stable: violence is limited not by reconciliation or reform, but by mutual deterrence and fear of escalation. This equilibrium remains vulnerable to political shocks, elite fragmentation, or external interference.

Political-Security Shock: Reported Killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (Zintan)

Recent reporting on 3–4 February 2026 indicates that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was killed in Zintan during an armed intrusion at his residence. Accounts converge on a targeted attack by assailants who reportedly disabled CCTV coverage before the shooting, while official investigative steps have been initiated.

From an ASA analytical perspective, the incident is significant less for immediate nationwide escalation and more because it constitutes a symbolic and strategic shock within Libya’s fragmented deterrence-based security equilibrium. Zintan has long been treated as a controlled node within western Libya’s militia landscape; a successful operation there suggests security penetration, insider facilitation, or shifting local alignments, each of which increases the risk of miscalculation.

Politically, Saif al-Islam remained a high-recognition and polarizing figure: former heir apparent, post-2011 detainee in Zintan, later released under amnesty, and a controversial would-be presidential contender during the stalled 2021 electoral process. His reported death may fragment pro-Gaddafi constituencies, or conversely catalyse martyrdom narratives and localized mobilization, with secondary effects on reconciliation efforts and elite bargaining.

Accountability and Justice: Signals of International Reach

The surrender of Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri by German authorities to the International Criminal Court in December 2025 represents a significant accountability milestone. As a former senior official in the Special Deterrence Forces and Mitiga Prison, El Hishri’s case underscores growing international willingness to pursue accountability for crimes committed during Libya’s conflict years.

From an ASA perspective, such actions carry dual effects: they reinforce norms of accountability while also heightening anxiety among armed actors who fear future prosecution, potentially influencing their political calculations and willingness to obstruct or cooperate with national processes.

UNSMIL Capacity and Strategic Constraints

UNSMIL continues to operate under financial and operational pressure linked to broader UN budgetary constraints and reform initiatives. The mission’s strategic review recommended prioritizing political engagement and maintaining a visible presence in eastern and southern Libya, including Benghazi and Sabha.

Council members may increasingly scrutinize whether UNSMIL can implement these recommendations without eroding its political leverage. ASA assesses that perceived contraction or imbalance in UNSMIL presence could undermine confidence among Libyan stakeholders and reinforce narratives of exclusion, particularly in the east and south.

Security Council Dynamics: Consensus with Underlying Divergence

Security Council members remain broadly aligned in support of a Libyan-led, Libyan-owned political process and UNSMIL’s mediation role. However, underlying differences persist regarding process design and representativeness. While most members welcomed the Structured Dialogue, Russia has questioned whether such formats can produce durable agreements, citing concerns about representation from eastern and southern Libya.

These divergences, while currently manageable, limit the Council’s ability to exert unified pressure on Libyan actors to compromise.

30-Day Early Warning Indicator Analysis (ASA)

Over the next thirty days, Libya will remain in a high-sensitivity equilibrium, where political inertia coexists with latent destabilization triggers that could rapidly shift the security and governance landscape. The most immediate early-warning indicators centre on the political track. Any continued failure to agree on the reconstitution of the High National Election Commission or to pass a constitutional amendment establishing a clear legal basis for elections will reinforce perceptions that the political roadmap has reached functional exhaustion. Should Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh formally signal to the Security Council that the existing roadmap is no longer viable and propose an alternative mechanism, this may provoke resistance from entrenched political actors, particularly those benefiting from the current dual-government configuration. Such resistance would likely manifest through public delegitimization campaigns, procedural obstruction, or renewed insistence on parallel political processes.

Security-wise, the risk profile is characterized by localized escalation rather than nationwide conflict. Armed groups in Tripoli and surrounding areas may increase visible mobilization, checkpoint activity, or coercive signalling in response to political uncertainty, particularly if dialogue outcomes threaten existing power balances. In the east and south, any perception that UNSMIL’s engagement is diminishing—whether due to financial constraints or uneven geographic presence—could embolden unilateral security postures by the Libyan National Army or local armed actors, subtly eroding the negative-stable deterrence that currently limits violence.

The reported killing of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi adds an additional short-term volatility driver. Early warning signals would include retaliatory rhetoric or mobilization among pro-Gaddafi constituencies, changes in checkpoint posture and armed deployments in the western corridor, and accelerated blame narratives that could prompt pre-emptive security moves by rival actors.

Another critical indicator is elite fragmentation. The sudden loss of senior military figures, such as the late Chief of the General Staff Mohammed Ali Ahmed al-Haddad, has introduced an element of uncertainty within Libya’s already fragmented command structures. Any signs of contested succession, internal rivalry, or public disagreement among military leadership—particularly within eastern forces—would increase the probability of recalibrated alliances or tactical posturing on the ground.

Judicial and accountability developments also warrant close monitoring. The surrender of Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri to the International Criminal Court has heightened sensitivity among armed group leaders and political figures alike. In the short term, this may trigger defensive behaviour, including the consolidation of armed protection, obstruction of cooperation with international mechanisms, or rhetorical escalation against perceived external interference. If additional arrest warrants or cooperation requests emerge, the likelihood of retaliatory political obstruction or security incidents increases.

Economically, while Libya’s oil production has remained relatively stable, early-warning signals would include renewed threats to energy infrastructure, manipulation of oil revenues, or disputes over budget allocations between rival authorities. Such actions would serve as pressure tools rather than end goals, but they carry high destabilization potential if sustained.

From an ASA forecasting perspective, the most probable 30-day outcome is continued political paralysis with incremental security signalling, rather than open confrontation. However, the accumulation of unresolved political blockages, elite anxiety linked to accountability processes, and perceptions of international fatigue creates a narrow margin for error. Libya’s stability in the coming month will depend less on progress and more on the absence of triggering events. The system is stable by inertia, not by design, and therefore remains vulnerable to sudden shock.

ASA Early Warning Conclusion:
In the next 30 days, Libya is unlikely to move decisively toward resolution, but it is equally unlikely to remain entirely static. The principal risk lies in miscalculation by entrenched actors who underestimate how quickly localized signalling, political obstruction, or elite fragmentation could cascade into broader instability. Continuous monitoring and calibrated international engagement remain essential to prevent the standstill from tipping into crisis.