Converging Threat Vectors and Strategic Breakdown

Threat and Risk Assessment of West Africa and the Sahel

By African Security Analysis (ASA) - December 2025

Strategic Overview: A Region Crossing the Threshold of Systemic Risk

West Africa and the Sahel are facing a systemic risk environment as multiple security and governance crises converge into a single regional emergency. Over the past few years, an unprecedented wave of instability has swept through the region, undermining decades of fragile progress. Five interlocking threat vectors are driving this dangerous inflection point:

• Military Coups and Political Upheaval: A surge of military takeovers has eroded constitutional governance across the region.
• Expanding Jihadist Insurgencies: Islamist militant groups are intensifying their operations and employing economic warfare tactics that cripple state functions.
• Transnational Organized Crime: Criminal networks – from narco-traffickers to arms smugglers – are increasingly intertwined with terror groups, amplifying corruption and violence.
• Fragmented Regional Security Architecture: The collapse of unity between regional blocs (notably ECOWAS and the breakaway Alliance of Sahel States) has paralyzed collective security responses.
• Humanitarian and Climate Crises: Record levels of displacement, food insecurity, and climate shocks are fuelling grievances and conflict at the community level.

These threats do not exist in isolation – they feed off one another in a vicious circle that threatens to overwhelm state capacities. For example, the recent attempted coup in Benin (December 2025) and the successful military coup in Guinea-Bissau (November 2025) illustrate how worsening security conditions embolden militaries to seize power.

Each new coup further weakens regional deterrence against insurrection, creating fertile ground for jihadist expansion and criminal exploitation. At the same time, extremist violence and economic sabotage deepen public despair, which in turn is used to justify more military interventions. The net effect is a shift from episodic crises to a potential systemic breakdown of regional stability – a tipping point where conflict and governance failure could spread unchecked across national borders. In this strategic overview, we examine each of these threat dimensions in depth, followed by scenario forecasts for the coming year and key indicators that African Security Analysis (ASA) will monitor to provide early warning of further escalation or potential stabilization.

Coup Dynamics and Political-Military Stress

The resurgence of coups d'état has fundamentally destabilized political order in West Africa and the Sahel. Since 2020, at least seven governments in the region have been overthrown by their own militaries, reversing years of democratic gains. This pattern has given rise to what analysts call a growing “coup belt” stretching across the Sahel and now creeping toward coastal states. The attempted putsch in Benin in December 2025, following on the heels of the November coup in Guinea-Bissau, shows how fragile even historically stable countries have become. Military officers increasingly cite domestic insecurity and terrorism as justification for seizing power – positioning themselves as “saviours” amid public frustration with civilian authorities.

Security as a pretext for power: In the Benin case, junior officers pointed to escalating jihadist incursions in the north as a rationale for their coup attempt. This sets a worrisome precedent: using legitimate security grievances to legitimize extra-legal power grabs. Although loyalist forces and swift condemnation by ECOWAS thwarted that coup, the underlying drivers – unchecked insurgent threats and governance shortfalls – remain unresolved. Each successful coup in the region further erodes the norm of civilian control and emboldens other ambitious officers, raising the risk of coup contagion.

Erosion of constitutional order: Guinea-Bissau’s military takeover exemplifies an advanced breakdown in civil-military relations. There, the armed forces interrupted an ongoing electoral process and detained the president, effectively nullifying constitutional governance. This signifies a shift from episodic instability to a more structural erosion of deterrence against coups. In previous years, regional bodies like ECOWAS managed to discourage or reverse isolated putsches (as seen in Gambia in 2017 and in a foiled 2022 attempt in Guinea-Bissau). However, with multiple juntas now in power concurrently, traditional deterrence is faltering. There is a palpable strain between political leaders and security forces across several states – a political-military stress that leaves governments perpetually vulnerable to the next coup plot.

Regional implications: The coup wave undermines collective security initiatives and distracts militaries from counterinsurgency operations. Resources are diverted toward regime survival rather than battling militants. Moreover, the proliferation of juntas complicates diplomacy: ECOWAS faces internal division over how hard to sanction or engage member regimes that took power by force. Nigeria, as ECOWAS chair, has led calls for restoring civilian rule, but its leverage is limited when nearly one-third of ECOWAS states are under military regimes. The result is a vicious cycle: weak governance and insecurity breed coups, and coups in turn deepen governance vacuums and insecurity. Without a concerted effort to re-establish constitutional norms and address the grievances that soldiers exploit, the region risks a cascading breakdown of state authority.

Expanding Insurgent Operations and Economic Warfare

Across the Sahel, militant Islamist insurgencies are broadening their reach and evolving their tactics in ways that further destabilize states. The Al-Qaeda-linked coalition Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and affiliates of the Islamic State group have shifted toward strategies of economic warfare designed to paralyze governments rather than merely win battlefield victories. For instance, in Mali, JNIM imposed a months-long fuel blockade around the capital Bamako in 2025, strangling the city’s economic life without a direct assault. Jihadist fighters have increasingly targeted critical economic arteries – attacking supply convoys, sabotaging roads and bridges, and raiding gold mining sites – to choke off state revenues and undermine public confidence. By making everyday life unaffordable and insecure, they aim to erode the legitimacy of governments and exhaust national militaries.

Asymmetric tactics and strategic paralysis: These insurgent groups avoid pitched battles where state forces have superior firepower. Instead, they favour hit-and-run raids, ambushes, and sieges that impose disproportionate costs on the authorities. The goal is to stretch national armies thin and create “no-go” zones where government presence vanishes. In parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, militants now effectively control large rural swathes, enforcing blockades that limit the flow of fuel, food, and commerce to government-held cities. Such tactics have a cascading impact: economic hardship in besieged areas fuels civilian anger at the government’s inability to provide security or basic services, potentially driving some communities to tolerate or support the insurgents as an alternative power.

Encroachment toward coastal states: Worryingly, the insurgency threat is no longer confined to the interior Sahel. Jihadist operations are gradually pushing southward into the northern borderlands of coastal West African states such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. These border regions – from Benin’s Atakora department to northern Togo’s Savanes region – suffer from limited state presence, porous frontiers, and local grievances similar to those that enabled militant recruitment in the Sahel. Taking advantage of these gaps, groups like JNIM have mounted cross-border incursions and established clandestine cells in border communities. Several deadly attacks in northern Benin and Togo since 2021 underscore this southward spread. Coastal governments are alarmed at the prospect of Sahelian extremist violence “spilling over” into their territories. Joint security initiatives such as the Accra Initiative (which facilitates intelligence sharing and coordinated operations among threatened coastal states) reflect a growing recognition of the threat. Nevertheless, if insurgents continue to expand and link up across borders, they could open a new front of instability along the Gulf of Guinea, with dire economic and security consequences for the wider region.

Economic warfare and state resilience: The use of economic disruption as a weapon has exposed weaknesses in state resilience. Many Sahelian governments depend on fragile supply chains and a few key economic sectors (for example, artisanal gold mining, cash crop exports, or single ports of entry). Insurgents exploit this by targeting exactly those choke points – whether it is a remote mining area that generates vital export revenue, or a convoy bringing fuel and food to landlocked capitals. The more the militants demonstrate an ability to halt commerce and starve governments of resources, the more they undermine the credibility of counterterrorism campaigns. In turn, prolonged economic distress in conflict-affected zones can drive unemployed youth to join armed groups for livelihood, perpetuating the insurgency. This expanding insurgent campaign thus not only threatens immediate security but also hollows out the economic foundations of national stability in West Africa and the Sahel.

Transnational Organized Crime and Convergence with Terror Networks

West Africa has become a major hub in the global web of transnational organized crime, and this illicit activity is acting as a dangerous force multiplier for conflict and instability. Smuggling networks thrive amid the region’s porous borders and weak governance, moving everything from narcotics and weapons to illegal minerals and people. The illicit profits generated – often measured in billions of dollars – seep into political systems and economies, weakening state authority from within.

Narcotics, illicit finance, and state infiltration: In recent years, West African countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria have been used as corridors for cocaine shipments from Latin America to Europe. Analysts estimate that a significant and growing share now transits through West Africa. For example, in late 2025, a French naval patrol seized nearly 10 tonnes of cocaine on a vessel off the West African coast – a single haul worth billions in street value. Such staggering volumes of drug money fuel corruption at the highest levels. Criminal syndicates bribe officials, penetrate security services, and even sponsor political candidates, resulting in elite capture of state institutions. Guinea-Bissau has infamously been labelled a “narco-state” in the past, and similar patterns of narco-corruption threaten other fragile states in the region. Illicit financial flows – whether from drug trafficking, smuggling of gold and diamonds, or massive theft of public funds – find safe haven in poorly regulated banks and informal financial networks, blurring the line between licit and illicit economies.

Crime-terror nexus: A growing convergence has emerged between organized crime groups and violent extremist organizations, creating a crime–terror pipeline that benefits both. Jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel increasingly finance their operations through criminal ventures: levying “taxes” on drug and arms convoys crossing their territory, smuggling locally mined gold and contraband, and engaging in kidnapping-for-ransom. In turn, transnational traffickers exploit the lawless zones carved out by insurgents as secure routes for moving goods. The traditional boundaries between ideologically driven militants and profit-driven criminals are dissolving. We now see hybrid groups that operate like mafias but espouse extremist narratives, or militants who provide protection services to trafficking rings. This cross-pollination greatly complicates counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. Security forces find themselves confronting a multifaceted threat – not just insurgents with guns, but well-funded networks that can bribe, intimidate, or outmanoeuvre authorities.

Chronic instability through corruption and violence: The influence of organized crime entrenches systemic corruption and violence, undermining citizens’ trust in government. When trafficking kingpins can buy impunity and criminal gangs outgun the police, public institutions lose credibility. This erosion of governance creates a fertile ground for extremist recruitment, as people lose faith in the state’s justice and economic systems. Meanwhile, the influx of illegal weapons – from assault rifles to explosives – feeds both criminal violence (such as banditry and urban crime) and militant attacks. Arms smuggling from conflict zones like Libya and the Black Sea region has poured sophisticated weaponry into West African black markets, equipping both gangs and jihadist cells. The net result is a self-reinforcing cycle: corruption and organized crime weaken states, weak states become havens for terrorists, and terrorist activity further boosts criminal enterprises. If left unchecked, this convergence of crime and terror networks threatens to entrench a state of perpetual insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel, where lawlessness and militancy sustain each other.

Fragmentation of Regional Security Architecture (ECOWAS vs. AES)

The political upheavals have triggered a schism in West Africa’s security architecture, pitting the established regional bloc against a new alliance of coup-led states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), long the linchpin of regional conflict resolution and collective defence, is now grappling with the emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after their 2023 coups. This breakaway alliance – born out of resentment toward ECOWAS sanctions and foreign pressure – represents a parallel axis of cooperation among the Sahel’s military regimes. The result is an unprecedented fragmentation: instead of one unified framework to address threats, West Africa now has competing security alignments with divergent interests.

ECOWAS under strain: ECOWAS still enjoys broad diplomatic legitimacy and includes most coastal and some Sahelian countries. It has a history of coordinated peacekeeping deployments and mediation successes. However, its influence has been badly dented by the coup wave. Following the 2023 Niger coup, ECOWAS threatened military intervention to restore the elected government – a stance that was ultimately not carried out, damaging the bloc’s credibility. Several member states hesitated to enforce the ultimatum, revealing internal divisions. Now, with three key Sahel states (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) effectively outside ECOWAS processes and under suspension or self-withdrawal, the organization’s operational reach is limited. ECOWAS forces cannot enter these countries for peacekeeping or counterterrorism assistance, and diplomatic leverage over their juntas is minimal. Coordination on issues like border security, counter-terrorism patrols, and intelligence sharing has broken down at precisely the moment a united front is most needed.

Rise of the AES bloc: The Alliance of Sahel States formalized in late 2023 by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is positioning itself as a sovereign alternative to ECOWAS, emphasizing non-interference and mutual defence among its members. The AES members have even discussed joint military operations and signed agreements for collective security, essentially pledging to come to each other’s aid in the event of external intervention (such as an ECOWAS military action). This creates a confrontational dynamic: ECOWAS and AES view each other with open distrust. When ECOWAS announced sanctions and a possible standby force for Niger’s coup leaders, Mali and Burkina Faso (as AES partners) warned they would resist any such intervention with force. This standoff has paralyzed regional crisis response mechanisms. Efforts by neutral parties and the African Union to bridge the gap have so far yielded little progress.

Security vacuum and exploitation: The fragmentation of regional cooperation directly benefits insurgents and criminal networks. Shared initiatives like the G5 Sahel Joint Force – once meant to pool military efforts against jihadists – have unravelled as member states fell into discord. Intelligence that used to flow between Sahelian capitals and coastal partners has slowed, creating blind spots. Extremist groups can exploit these gaps by relocating across borders knowing pursuit may stop at the new fault lines between alliances. The rivalry also distracts from long-term strategy: instead of collaborating on a comprehensive approach to terrorism and trafficking, each bloc is preoccupied with its own legitimacy and survival. There are diplomatic gestures toward reconciliation – for instance, ECOWAS leaders periodically signal openness to dialogue if juntas commit to election timelines, and some intermediaries (like Togo or Ghana) maintain communication with both sides. But until trust is rebuilt and a framework for reintegration is found, West Africa’s security architecture remains weakened and fragmented. This disunity represents a critical strategic vulnerability: without a coordinated regional defence, even well-intentioned national efforts risk being isolated and undermined by hostile actors operating in the seams.

Humanitarian Crisis and Climate-Driven Instability

The region’s humanitarian emergency has become one of the central drivers of instability, not merely a side effect. Across West Africa and the Sahel, conflict and climate shocks have left tens of millions in need of life-saving assistance. Chronic insecurity has displaced entire communities: by late 2025, an estimated over 6 million people are internally displaced within the Sahel countries, and more than 2 million are refugees fleeing across borders. These displaced populations often end up in overcrowded camps or struggling host communities, straining resources and social cohesion. Food insecurity has reached alarming levels in conflict-affected zones; in total, some 30+ million Sahelians face acute food shortages and require humanitarian aid.

Yet humanitarian responses are dangerously under-resourced. International aid funding has not kept pace with the growing needs. Key UN appeals in 2024–2025 for Sahel relief were barely half-funded, forcing agencies to cut rations and scale back programs. This funding gap means that millions receive little to no assistance, exacerbating their desperation. Crucially, humanitarian stress is no longer just a humanitarian issue – it acts as a conflict accelerant. When young men cannot find jobs or food to feed their families, the allure of armed groups that offer income (or the promise of loot) increases. When communities feel abandoned by their government and the international community, they may be more receptive to extremist messaging or to tolerating criminal economies as alternative livelihoods. In this way, unchecked human misery directly feeds the cycle of violence.

Climate change as a threat multiplier: The Sahel is one of the regions most affected by climate variability, and environmental change is intertwining with conflict dynamics. Severe droughts followed by unseasonal torrential floods have become more frequent, destroying crops, killing livestock, and displacing residents. For instance, the shrinking of Lake Chad over past decades – combined with erratic rainfall in the Lake Chad Basin – has devastated fisheries and agriculture, fuelling competition between herders and farmers for dwindling water and fertile land. Such resource competition has ignited local conflicts that jihadist groups skilfully exploit, positioning themselves as protectors or avengers for one side or the other. Similarly, in Mali and Niger, extended drought periods push rural families into cities or across borders, where grievances over land and aid can spark ethnic clashes that militant recruiters seize upon.

Furthermore, climate disasters often cut off remote villages, providing openings for insurgents to step in as providers of aid or order. In some areas, extremist militants have banned or heavily taxed international aid groups, using starvation as a tool of war and controlling access to water and food to subjugate communities. Meanwhile, governments, stretched thin by security spending, struggle to invest in climate adaptation or rural development that could mitigate these pressures. The result is a dangerous convergence of climate and conflict: each bad harvest and each flood wave can translate into new fighting or a new wave of displacement. Over time, the inability to buffer populations from environmental shocks erodes the social contract. The humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the Sahel is not only a tragedy in human terms – it also directly threatens any prospects for peace and stability. Without urgent measures to address humanitarian needs and build climate resilience, these pressures will keep accelerating the region’s slide into instability.

Strategic Outlook: Scenarios for the Next 6–12 Months

Looking ahead, Africa Security Analysis (ASA) has developed three plausible scenarios for how the security situation in West Africa and the Sahel could evolve over the next 6 to 12 months. These scenarios – best-case, baseline, and worst-case – are defined by different trajectories in political stability, insurgent activity, regional cooperation, and humanitarian conditions. Decision-makers should consider the triggers that could lead to each outcome and the implications for regional security under each scenario.

Scenario 1: Managed Containment (Best Case)

• Probability: Low to Moderate (an optimistic but challenging outcome).
• Key Conditions: No new successful coups occur in the coming year, halting the “coup contagion.” Existing military regimes commit to transition plans, and there are no further ruptures in constitutional order. ECOWAS maintains a united front and credible deterrence against any coup attempts, demonstrating that regional norms against seizures of power still hold. At the same time, the AES bloc in the Sahel refrains from provocative actions – in fact, some modest improvement in ECOWAS-AES dialogue or coordination on common threats takes place. Jihadist insurgencies continue their pressure but do not significantly expand their territory or reach into new countries, and ongoing counterterrorism operations prevent any major terrorist spectacular or major economic sabotage beyond current levels. Humanitarian conditions, while dire, do not dramatically worsen from current baselines; increased international aid or better rainy seasons prevent famine and alleviate the most extreme suffering.
• Implications: In this scenario, the region remains unstable but avoids all-out collapse. The containment of new coups preserves a core of relatively stable governments that can cooperate. Insurgencies remain a serious challenge, but militaries – possibly with external support – manage to protect key urban centres and infrastructure from falling into militant hands. Economic activity, though strained, continues with high security costs. Managed Containment means Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remain under military rule for now, but gradually face pressure or incentives to pursue transitions, while coastal states bolster their defences and avoid being drawn fully into the conflict. The overall strategic trajectory is one of stalemate: high operational costs for governments and allies to keep extremists at bay, but a prevention of any dramatic expansion of instability.
• Triggers/Enablers: Achieving this best-case outcome would likely require strong, unified political leadership within ECOWAS – for example, Nigeria (the region’s heavyweight) consistently rallying neighbours around a zero-tolerance stance on coups and providing security assistance to vulnerable states. Equally important is coherent messaging that the international community backs legal governments, combined with targeted financial support to address root causes (such as unemployment and poor services that coups and insurgencies exploit). A concerted diplomatic effort to quietly engage the Sahel juntas on common interests (like fighting terrorists) could reduce animosity and open channels for re-integration. These factors, if in place, could set the conditions for a fragile stability and prevent worst-case spirals.

Scenario 2: Baseline Degradation (Status Quo Trend)

• Probability: High (the most likely scenario if current trends continue with no major interventions).
• Key Conditions: The region experiences further political turbulence, though not a dramatic meltdown. One or two additional coup attempts may occur – for instance, protracted instability in Guinea-Bissau’s transition could continue, or new plots surface in other fragile states – but these do not fundamentally alter the regional balance. Insurgent activity expands gradually: jihadist groups make inroads toward coastal states’ northern regions, maybe causing occasional deadly attacks or enabling local insurgent cells, but full-scale insurgencies in coastal countries do not yet materialize in the next year. The ECOWAS–AES rift persists; no side gives ground, and coordination on security issues remains minimal. Humanitarian conditions continue to worsen incrementally: displacement rises, food insecurity deepens, and climate disasters hit communities, but these crises deepen at roughly the same rate as previous years (no sudden famine or massive new disaster beyond expectations).
• Implications: Under this baseline “degradation” scenario, the overall security situation continues to slowly deteriorate. The cumulative effect of continued insurgent raids, frequent but localized governance breakdowns, and unresolved regional divisions is a further erosion of investor confidence and international patience. More areas of the Sahel slip out of government control as militants expand, though national capitals and major economic assets remain under state authority. The prevalence of military regimes leads to democratic backsliding becoming normalized, and crackdowns on dissent in those countries could fuel more internal unrest. ECOWAS remains hamstrung, able to issue statements and sanctions but unable to reverse the trend of coups. The humanitarian crisis becomes a chronic background condition – millions are in need with insufficient aid, causing a slow-burning tragedy that occasionally spikes but largely goes under-addressed. In essence, Baseline Degradation is a continuation of the slow crisis: no dramatic tipping point occurs within the year, but each passing month sees security indicators worsen slightly, governance quality decline, and the effort needed to reverse course grows larger.

Scenario 3: Cascading Destabilisation (Worst Case)

• Probability: Moderate (a plausible scenario if multiple adverse events coincide, even if not the most likely by default).
• Key Conditions: This worst-case scenario sees the region tip into a self-perpetuating downward spiral. Coup contagion spreads into one or more major coastal states – for example, a successful military takeover in a country previously deemed stable (such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, or Senegal) shocks the region. This would shatter any remaining confidence in democratic norms and could prompt further copycat putsches. Simultaneously, jihadist insurgents significantly expand their operational reach: they not only entrench further in the Sahel hinterlands but manage to carry out high-impact attacks on coastal economic centres or trade routes (e.g., attacking a major port, disrupting key highways, or causing prolonged closure of a border crossing vital for commerce). The ECOWAS deterrence completely fails – the regional bloc either splinters over disagreements or simply stands by as constitutional orders collapse. Rival external powers might step up involvement, turning West Africa into a ground for proxy competition (for instance, a heightened Russian presence backing certain juntas vs. Western or neighbouring powers backing their opponents). Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation worsens dramatically: a combination of extreme climate events and escalating conflict leads to mass displacement, potentially in the millions within a short span, overwhelming all coping mechanisms.
• Implications: In this dire scenario, a cascading destabilisation takes hold. The breakdown of order in one state spills into others in a domino effect. Regional trade and travel could become severely restricted due to insecurity – for example, if ports and key roads face regular attacks, both regional economies and global supply lines (like critical mineral exports) suffer. A regional system breakdown would strain even countries that remain nominally stable, as they would be swamped by refugee flows and economic shocks. With ECOWAS paralyzed, ad-hoc self-defence arrangements or foreign interventions become the default: neighbouring countries might unilaterally seal borders or even intervene militarily next door out of self-preservation, and international actors (the UN, or coalitions of concerned powers) might contemplate large-scale stabilization missions akin to past interventions in Liberia or Mali, but on a broader scale. Long-term, the region could face a lost decade of development and governance, as institutions collapse under the pressure and extremist networks entrench themselves. Recovering from such systemic failure would be exceedingly difficult, likely requiring intensive external support and a generational timeframe to rebuild governance and trust. In short, the worst-case scenario would leave West Africa and the Sahel in a state of profound fragility and chaos that threatens international peace and security.

ASA Monitoring Priorities and Early-Warning Indicators

The overall outlook for West Africa and the Sahel is highly fluid and fraught with risk. The region is effectively in a high-risk transition period where positive developments (such as political reform or successful peace initiatives) could stabilize the situation, but negative triggers could just as easily tip it into deeper crisis. To anticipate changes and inform proactive responses, African Security Analysis (ASA) will monitor a set of key indicators and trends in the coming months. These early-warning indicators span the political, security, and socio-economic domains identified in this assessment:

• Military Politicization and Coup Indicators: Signs of growing friction between governments and their armed forces – such as public dissent from military officers, sudden reshuffles in military leadership, or soldiers expressing grievances over insecurity – will be watched closely. An uptick in rumours or reports of coup plotting, or military involvement in politics (e.g. “refereeing” disputes or demanding policy changes), would signal elevated risk of further government overturns.
• Insurgent Tactics and Economic Disruption: ASA will track changes in the modus operandi of jihadist and militia groups, especially any expansion of economic warfare tactics. Early warnings could include new blockade efforts (e.g. cutting off a major highway or border post), attacks on critical infrastructure (bridges, telecom networks, energy supply lines), or movement of insurgent operations into previously quiet areas (like deeper into coastal territories). Such shifts may indicate the militants are escalating or broadening the conflict, requiring urgent countermeasures.
• Civil-military risk markers: arrears in pay/benefits, unusual redeployments into capitals, elite guard reshuffles, arrests within officer corps, and “security failures” tied to public blame games.
• Logistics disruption markers: repeated attacks on the same corridor/bridge/market chain (recurrence is more predictive than single incidents).
• External security posture shifts: sudden changes in foreign basing/access, new “security partnership” announcements, or rapid increases in external contractor presence.
• Information environment markers: coordinated narratives that frame civilian governments as “traitors” or “incapable,” especially when amplified by in-country influencers plus cross-border channels (these often precede coup legitimization attempts).
• ECOWAS–AES Relations and Regional Diplomacy: Any major moves in the standoff between ECOWAS and the AES bloc will serve as bellwethers for regional stability. Positive signs – such as dialogue on transitional timelines, security cooperation against common threats, or mediation by neutral parties – would suggest the fragmentation might be repairable. Conversely, negative indicators would include hardline statements (for example, threats of intervention or alliance expansion), new sanctions or countersanctions, or additional countries moving to formally align with one side or the other. The degree of unity (or discord) within ECOWAS itself is another factor: if ECOWAS members start to split in their approach to the juntas, it could undermine collective security guarantees.
• Humanitarian and Displacement Trends: Given the potent role of human security in the conflict cycle, ASA monitors data on food prices, malnutrition rates, displacement figures, and aid delivery in critical zones. Early warning flags might be rapid increases in displacement from any particular area (signalling a surge in violence or climate disaster), or reports of looming famine conditions if rains fail or aid pipelines are cut. Additionally, announcements of major funding shortfalls for humanitarian operations are important to watch – as they may presage a deterioration in stability on the ground.
• Climate Stress Events: Finally, ASA keeps an eye on climate and environmental indicators that can spark conflict. Forecasts or early signs of extreme drought, heatwaves, or flooding in already fragile regions are taken seriously, as these events can act as catalysts for unrest and migration. Water levels in key rivers and lakes, crop forecasts, and pastoral conditions are tracked to anticipate resource competition flashpoints. For example, warnings of a poor growing season in the Sahel or abnormal rains could help predict where communal tensions might flare or where militants might exploit the hardship.

By closely tracking these interconnected indicators, ASA aims to provide timely alerts to policymakers as to whether the region is edging towards containment and stabilization or sliding further into crisis. Rapid shifts in any of these metrics – a coup rumour that gains traction, a sudden mass displacement, a diplomatic breakdown, a spike in terrorist sabotage, or a climate shock – would warrant immediate analysis and potentially preventative action. In the volatile landscape of West Africa and the Sahel, such early warning and agile response will be critical to averting the worst outcomes and steering the region toward a more secure trajectory.