Escalation and Atrocity in Sudan: Strategic Outlook from the UN Security Council

UN Security Council Briefing on Sudan

Analytical report

Meeting Context and Background

On 22 December 2025, the United Nations Security Council convened an open meeting on the crisis in Sudan. The session was requested by the Sudanese transitional government amid a dramatic escalation of the nearly three-year conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Delegations gathered to address the spiralling violence and humanitarian catastrophe. The meeting took place under the Slovenian presidency of the Council. It followed a formal invitation extended to Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, who attended and presented his government’s proposals. The Council’s agenda cantered on the intensifying war that began in April 2023 as a power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the SAF and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) of the RSF. By year-end 2025, Sudan’s fragile state was teetering on collapse: government institutions had been severely weakened, and civilian rule was largely supplanted by military confrontation. Prior UN warnings about mass atrocities and state fragmentation had given way to reality as urban warfare, sieges, and scorched-earth tactics expanded from Darfur into central Sudan, especially the Kordofan region. The Transitional Government’s request signalled Khartoum’s alarm: a 13 December letter from the government warned of a marked intensification of RSF attacks, calling on the Security Council to intervene before the situation became irreversible.

Briefings and Participants

The open briefing was designed to gather the perspectives of UN officials, humanitarian agencies, and diplomatic representatives. It was chaired by Slovenia’s UN Ambassador (as Council President for December), and participants included Security Council members and representatives of affected states and organizations. Key presentations were made by UN officials: Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari (for the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations) delivered a comprehensive overview of the political-military situation. He was joined by senior agency representatives, including the World Health Organization’s Sudan representative and humanitarian coordinators, who detailed the human impact. These briefers painted a bleak picture of intensifying fighting and civilian suffering. Prime Minister Kamil Idris of Sudan addressed the Council, outlining his government’s peace proposal. Independent experts also spoke; most prominently, veteran analyst Cameron Hudson testified as an invited expert, warning of state collapse and regional destabilization. Several Council members then gave statements, voicing condemnation of the violence and urging specific actions. The United States representative presented an alternative “Quad” ceasefire initiative (backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE), focusing on humanitarian pauses and corridors. China’s Ambassador echoed calls for a halt to hostilities and respect for Sudanese sovereignty. Other members expressed growing alarm at attacks on civilians and peacekeepers. Russia, Pakistan, and others signalled cautious support for the meeting. Throughout, delegates emphasized the need to protect civilians, open aid routes, and pursue both immediate relief and longer-term political solutions.

Conflict Dynamics: SAF–RSF War and Atrocities

The Sudanese conflict has entered an especially deadly phase. What began as a rapid April 2023 mutiny by the RSF against the SAF has transformed into a fully “internationalized” war deploying modern weaponry. Major shifts in late 2025 underscored the brutality: the RSF in October captured El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, after an extended siege. Witnesses report that of roughly one million inhabitants a year earlier, only 70,000–100,000 remain; the rest have fled, and an estimated 150,000 are now unaccounted for. Satellite imagery and field reports indicate mass graves and burned bodies, as the RSF tried to conceal the scale of killings in the city. In the weeks following, RSF forces redirected their campaign into the neighbouring Kordofan states. They seized Babanusa on 1 December and the strategic oil hub of Heglig (in South Kordofan) on 8 December, disrupting Sudan’s oil exports. Key towns like Dilling and Kadugli were placed under siege. The RSF bombarded these cities with drones and heavy weapons, even as civilians starved; both Dilling and Kadugli were officially in a state of famine by mid-December. A recent drone strike on the northern city of Atbara disabled power to large regions, illustrating how front-line clashes now impact distant civilian centres. Meanwhile, the SAF recaptured territory elsewhere: on 22 December, Sudanese forces announced taking al-Rahad in North Kordofan.

Both sides have embraced advanced technology. Kamikaze and fibre-optic drones, precision-guided munitions, and electronic jamming systems have proliferated, altering the war’s character. Analysts note that although such weapons promise accuracy, in practice civilians have borne the brunt. Urban neighbourhoods across Darfur, Kordofan, and even Khartoum states have endured “unrelenting barrages” from rival drones and missiles. Hospitals, schools, mosques and markets have been struck. A UN compound and a kindergarten in South Kordofan were hit in recent weeks, killing dozens, nearly half of them children. By some accounts, RSF drones attacked an SAF airbase in Atbara, unintentionally depriving much of eastern Sudan of electricity for days. Conversely, Sudanese military strikes have also hit civilian areas; for example, a hospital and market in North Darfur were struck by what appeared to be SAF drones late in December. Notably, six Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers in Abyei (UNISFA) were killed by a drone strike in late November, highlighting that even UN personnel have not been spared.

Arms flow to both sides have accelerated. Weapons from a dozen or more countries have turned up among the combatants, breaching the 2004 UN arms embargo on Darfur. Analysts pointed to an extensive “air bridge” allegedly orchestrated by the United Arab Emirates, flying arms to the RSF via allied states in Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and beyond. Reports emerged of hundreds of foreign mercenaries – in particular, battle-hardened Colombians – being deployed to reinforce RSF units. Precision artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and modern rocket systems have thus replaced many of the pickup trucks and antiquated tanks used earlier in the conflict. Many of these weapons are believed to have come from countries that publicly decry the warfare’s carnage. The upshot is a wider, deadlier battlefield. Far from being confined to Darfur, heavy fighting now stretches from Kordofan to the northern border. A UN political adviser warned that “every corner of the country is now under threat.” Without decisive international pressure or a new truce, a massive battle for El Obeid (the capital of North Kordofan, with over one million inhabitants) is expected in the coming weeks – likely the largest and most destructive yet.

Such intense combat has produced widespread atrocities. Human rights observers report systematic killings during village raids, execution of detainees, and massacres of civilians, particularly by RSF fighters. The RSF takeover of Geneina (West Darfur) in mid-2023 resulted in mass murder and sexual violence that U.S. officials termed “genocide.” Similar patterns emerged at El Fasher and other towns. Thousands of civilians have been killed – exact counts are impossible under blackout conditions, but even conservative UN tallies run into tens of thousands – and independent monitors estimate total fatalities could be many times higher. The RSF has also forcibly displaced entire communities. For instance, the Zamzam IDP camp near El Fasher was attacked in April 2025, with reports of up to a thousand residents slaughtered and hundreds more dragged away into captivity. One UN official described the horror: bodies being burned and buried in haste. Both sides are accused of summary executions during house-to-house fighting. Aid organizations have documented cases of starvation being used as a weapon: besieged cities are starved of food, fuel and water until civilian’s collapse. In Kordofan, whole villages (often of particular ethnic groups) have been looted or destroyed. Forced disappearances, sexual slavery and rape have been widely reported, especially in Darfur and Khartoum. Doctors Without Borders notes that health infrastructure has been almost entirely decimated; an estimated 80% of hospitals in front-line areas are out of service. In short, the war is characterized by widespread breaches of the laws of war and by intentional brutality against civilians.

Humanitarian Catastrophe and Aid Response

The fighting has triggered one of the worst humanitarian disasters on record. Sudan, once a regional breadbasket, now sees widespread famine and disease. Aid agencies report that over 21 million people – roughly half the population – face high levels of acute malnutrition and food insecurity. Nearly 26 million Sudanese are officially classified as hungry, and pockets of famine have been declared in multiple locations. Health representatives emphasized that Sudan today ranks among the worst in the world for acute malnutrition rates. Children are dying of starvation-related illnesses; outbreaks of measles and cholera have flared in displaced camps. Hospitals that remain partly functional are inundated with trauma patients and lack basic supplies and staff. The World Health Organization warned that preventable diseases are surging in war-torn zones. One nutrition assessment highlighted that 45% of Sudan’s population is in a crisis food security phase (IPC 3 or above), with some areas in IPC 4 or 5 (indicative of famine and catastrophe). Rural farmers have fled their lands, markets lie empty, and food imports are constrained as the Nile corridors become unsafe.

Displacement is overwhelming every receiving location. Within Sudan, some 12 million people are now internally displaced – more than in any other country and fully half of the population. Large cities and camps are swamped. For example, the city of Tawila in North Darfur was reported to host over 65,000 newly arrived IDPs from El Fasher in a matter of weeks. Aid agencies say some neighbourhoods near Tawila are operating at over five times normal capacity, with families sleeping in schools and streets. About 1700 people from Kordofan recently fled to an ad hoc site near Kosti in White Nile State, only to find rudimentary tents and hardly any food or water. Aid workers describe scenes of desperation: whole families, many of them women and children, trekking dozens of miles with merger belongings, only to face starvation at arrival.

Refugee flows to neighbouring countries have spiked. The Darfur conflict prompted earlier waves to Chad and South Sudan, and now new clashes in Kordofan and central Sudan have generated fresh outflows. In mid-December alone, Chad recorded a new influx of over 2,400 Sudanese refugees, many reporting attacks in Kordofan. UNHCR data shows well over 4 million Sudanese have fled abroad since April 2023 – mostly to Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda – making it the largest refugee crisis on the continent. Thousands more are migrating irregularly toward Libya and Egypt, threatening further instability and humanitarian strain in those transit countries.

Humanitarian responders are racing to keep pace but are severely constrained. The UN and NGOs have appealed for hundreds of millions of dollars to sustain aid operations, but funding has lagged. The World Food Programme reported a $700 million shortfall to maintain emergency food aid over the coming months. In response to funding gaps, WFP announced that beginning in January it would cut rations for famine-stricken communities to 70% and those at risk to 50%. Logistics are also a nightmare: convoys to Darfur must navigate sporadic frontlines and red tape, often requiring dozens of separate military clearances. Attacks on aid trucks are reported frequently, and the RSF has been accused of looting and diverting food shipments. UN humanitarian coordinators emphasize that relief efforts cannot break the long-term cycle of devastation on their own; they warn that without ceasefires or guaranteed access, millions more could perish.

Despite these challenges, aid agencies and Sudanese civil groups are sustaining what relief they can. Local volunteer networks, often affiliated with doctors’ associations and community leaders, have organized feeding points and makeshift clinics in refugee settlements. Sudan’s civil society is playing a heroic role, salvaging supplies and sharing scarce water. Some speakers at the meeting urged the international community to channel more direct support to these grassroots responders, offering flexible funding so they can address immediate and longer-term needs simultaneously. Meanwhile, the UN has appealed for increased humanitarian funding, noting the UN’s Sudan and regional refugee plans remain woefully underfunded. Several delegations, including China, pressed fellow member states to honor their aid pledges and expand relief operations. But as one UN official grimly noted, “the humanitarian response is simply not keeping up with needs,” with malnutrition and sickness spreading faster than food and medicine.

Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Almost every dimension of this conflict is marked by apparent war crimes and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Both the SAF and RSF have engaged in tactics that deliberately endanger civilians and non-combatants. The siege of cities like El Fasher, Kadugli and Dilling – cutting off food, fuel and water until people starve – is a form of collective punishment forbidden under the Geneva Conventions. Indiscriminate drone attacks on markets, schools and hospitals violate the principle of distinction (civilian vs. military targets). The killing of humanitarian aid workers and attacks on UN facilities gravely infringe the protected status of relief operations. Reports of mass execution and summary killings of civilians in places like Geneina, Zamzam camp, and El Fasher, if confirmed, would constitute crimes against humanity or genocide. Widespread use of sexual violence and enforced disappearances also point to systematic abuses. The widespread looting and burning of villages, as well as documented cases of abducting women and children into slavery, further underscore that the fighting has involved gross abuses.

The meeting highlighted mounting calls for accountability. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented thousands of civilian deaths and the discovery of mass graves in multiple states, and rights groups are urging international justice. Sudan’s own national and international mandate investigators have struggled to operate safely on the ground. In Khartoum’s meeting letter, the government had asked the Council to urge compliance with IHL and the 2004 Darfur arms embargo. Several Council members echoed that, condemning all attacks on civilians. China's representative notably emphasized that targeting civilians, schools, hospitals and UN personnel poses “a grave challenge to international humanitarian law,” and called for full investigations to bring perpetrators to justice. There were also discussions of the International Criminal Court (ICC): Sudan’s government and supporters reiterated their commitment to ICC cooperation on Darfur-era warrants, but independent analysts at the meeting urged the ICC to expand its remit to include war crimes outside Darfur.

In sum, speakers unanimously decried the near-total impunity enjoyed by those committing atrocities. Calls for sanctions and arms embargo enforcement grew louder. One delegate noted that countries supplying weapons must bear responsibility if those arms are used to kill civilians. The Council was reminded that its own resolutions (e.g. Resolution 2778 from April 2023) demand a ceasefire and respect for human rights. Yet with fighting intensifying, many Council members warned that much stronger measures – including potential targeted sanctions and proactive enforcement of the arms embargo – would be needed to halt violations of IHL. The message was clear: the laws of war are being shattered on Sudan’s battlefields, and international oversight and pressure are urgently needed to halt a slide into unrestrained violence.

Political and Diplomatic Dimensions (UNSC Dynamics)

Diplomacy around Sudan has been in high gear as the fighting escalated. The presence of Prime Minister Kamil Idris at the Security Council was a notable political development. Idris, appointed by the military-dominated government, outlined a multi-point peace plan. He proposed an immediate ceasefire monitored by the UN, African Union and Arab League; the disarmament of RSF fighters via cantonment and eventual reintegration (excluding those indicted for atrocities); and free elections after a transitional period. His pitch was framed not as a victory for any faction, but as a way to “end a cycle of violence.” Idris urged the Council to back this proposal as a historic opportunity for peace.

Parallel to the Sudanese plan, the United States – together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (the so-called “Quad”) – has been pushing a different initiative. This proposal calls for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, along with unfettered humanitarian access and a parallel political process for a civilian transition. The U.S. representative insisted that both warring sides should accept this plan immediately, without preconditions. In early November the RSF announced agreement to the Quad’s terms, though in practice clashes have continued unabated. The U.S. underscored that its focus remained on tangible progress toward a ceasefire and better aid delivery, even as it noted the importance of eventual political solutions.

Council members commented on these proposals. China’s envoy welcomed the Sudanese plan and emphasized that Sudan’s conflict “must be resolved by the Sudanese themselves” through dialogue, while also urging the parties to halt fighting at once. Russia’s position was not publicly detailed, but Moscow has generally aligned with calls for respecting Sudan’s sovereignty and has abstained on measures seen as targeting the government. European and African members – although not publicly quoted in the sources – have informally expressed frustration that ceasefire deals keep collapsing and advocated for tangible leverage to enforce peace.

Importantly, the request for the Council meeting itself showcased diplomatic consensus around concern for Sudan. It was backed by China, Russia, Pakistan and the bloc of African Council members (the A3 plus group), indicating that even some permanent members are united in condemning the violence. This broad support helped convene the session and likely prevented any veto on discussing the crisis. Yet behind the scenes, divisions remain on how best to act. The U.S. has pushed for stronger language on accountability and stepped-up sanctions, while some African and Arab countries have been more cautious about pressuring the Sudanese military. There was also a diplomatic emphasis on protecting regional relationships: the Chinese ambassador reminded attendees that no external solutions should be imposed and that Sudan’s sovereignty and unity must be respected.

The Council’s own unity was tested by these dynamics. Some diplomats noted with concern that key measures, like expanding the arms embargo (currently limited to Darfur) nationwide, have long been on the table but not enacted. China and others explicitly called for such expansion, arguing the old measures predate the current war. There were calls to ensure that arms providers on the Council consider their responsibilities. Several members also urged that the Security Council move beyond mere condemnation and take actions – sanctioning warlords and enforcers, ensuring enforcement of the embargo, and empowering humanitarian agencies.

Throughout, the meeting reflected a dual-track pressure: one track insisting on immediate de-escalation and aid corridors, the other demanding accountability and political reform. This mirrored conversations in capitals: for example, U.S. and European governments are reportedly considering targeted sanctions on foreign entities supplying the RSF. African Union mediators, for their part, have quietly engaged with Sudanese and Arab partners, though results remain modest. In sum, the diplomatic environment is one of urgent alarm, with many countries calling the situation “unconscionable” and stressing that failure to respond effectively would undermine the Council’s credibility on international security.

Strategic Implications for the Region

The stakes of Sudan’s war extend far beyond its borders. Multiple speakers and analysts warned that a Sudan collapse would ripple across the entire Horn of Africa and Sahel. Refugees already stream into neighbouring Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan; millions more are waiting at the frontier. One analyst told the Council that the conflict threatens to “send shockwaves” of migrants and fighters throughout the Sahel, Red Sea and even into the Mediterranean migration routes. Security experts note that extremist groups (such as Darfuri Islamist factions, or even transnational jihadist networks) could exploit the chaos. Indeed, the Council was reminded that Sudan’s war has already generated a fertile recruitment ground for armed groups and a corridor for illicit weapons.

Neighbouring countries fear direct spillover. The RSF’s alliances in Chad and Central African Republic could pull those states into proxy conflicts. The UN meeting highlighted how the UAE’s logistic network for Sudan stretched through Chad, Libya, and CAR – dragging those governments into the conflict’s orbit. South Sudan, which relies on Sudan’s oil pipeline and hosts large Sudanese populations, could face renewed insurgencies or economic collapse if oil flows dry up or refugees flood in. Tensions with Ethiopia and Egypt over Nile water and border security could also flare if Sudan’s military focus shifts. Even more, there is a strategic worry that if foreign backers perceive the conflict as winding down, they will simply re-channel their attention and resources to the next hot spot – the Southern Sudanese state, neighbouring Ethiopia, or across the Sahara.

Global powers have quietly signalled their concern with such regional dynamics. The Chinese statement before the Council emphasized Sudan’s “sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity,” implying that any partition of Sudan (say, de facto RSF control of part of Darfur or Kordofan) would be unacceptable. In practical terms, this means international actors want to avoid a scenario where Russia, the Gulf states, or others pick their “side” and carve spheres of influence across Africa. Similarly, Western diplomats note that instability in Sudan can undermine their own strategic interests, such as counterterrorism and counter-smuggling efforts.

Thus, the Security Council debate carried significant geopolitical overtones. Many delegates explicitly connected the fate of Sudan to regional conflict dynamics. One warned that if the Council fails to act decisively now, “Sudan’s war will be only the prelude to wider bouts of regional instability.” The implication is stark: unchecked, the civil war could destabilize multiple fragile states, allowing armed networks to grow unchecked, and potentially drawing more outside powers into a broader proxy struggle. Given the involvement of foreign actors already (from the Middle East to Western arms suppliers), the Council’s decisions on Sudan are being watched as a barometer of its ability to manage complex conflicts that straddle peace and security interests.

Final Analysis and Conclusion

The 22 December Security Council briefing underscored a critical juncture for Sudan and the region. The country stands at a historic precipice: state institutions are eroding, its territory effectively fragmented by rival armies, and millions of civilians are suffering in a man-made catastrophe. The presentations and discussions revealed a unanimous sense of urgency. On one hand, the Security Council was presented with new political openings – the Sudanese government’s peace plan and a rival humanitarian ceasefire proposal. On the other, the human cost continued to mount by the day, with famine spreading and massacres occurring.

Key insights emerged from the briefing. The first is that the conflict has entered a deadlier, more technologically advanced phase. Modern arms and drones have broadened the battleground to include civilians far from traditional front lines. The talk of war crimes and “genocide” reflects that this is no ordinary civil war – it is a deeply polarized power struggle now bolstered by global and regional dynamics. The second insight is that the humanitarian situation is now catastrophic. Basic survival in many areas is at stake; international aid alone cannot alter that calculus without a cessation of hostilities. The third is that a purely military outcome is increasingly infeasible and undesirable. Neither side can claim a clear victory without devastating the country; partition would shatter Sudan irreparably and likely invite war with neighbours. Therefore, diplomacy – risky as it is – remains the only realistic alternative to total collapse.

From the Security Council’s perspective, several conclusions were implicit. First, the crisis demands a comprehensive response: ceasefire enforcement, humanitarian relief, and accountability. Merely condemning attacks is no longer sufficient. Council members themselves noted the mismatch between rhetoric and action. If the Council is to fulfil its mandate, it may have to consider bold steps: possibly tightening or expanding sanctions on those enabling the war, strengthening the UN arms embargo nationwide, and taking a firmer stand on violations of IHL. At the same time, there was recognition that external powers must be on board. Calls for restraint by the UAE and other states supplying weapons signalled a rare moment of accountability for outsiders.

Second, the briefing highlighted the need to protect civilians as the highest priority. All delegations emphasized that immediate cessation of attacks on non-combatants is imperative. The focus on expanding humanitarian corridors and supporting local relief actors suggests the Council is beginning to view protection of civilians not just as a legal obligation but as a practical necessity. Some participants urged that Sudanese social structures and voluntary organizations be empowered and funded, pointing out that these local actors have been delivering critical services under fire. This shift – to acknowledging and bolstering indigenous relief efforts – could shape future humanitarian strategy.

Third, there was a clear warning that inaction is not an option. Multiple speakers said in effect that delaying will only compound the tragedy. The notion that the crisis “cannot wait” was a recurrent theme: whether preventing more lives lost or staving off the collapse of Sudan itself. The meeting also underscored the interconnectedness of Sudan’s problems. Diplomats recognized that any solution must address governance (preventing military domination of politics), ensure justice, and rebuild institutions – not just sign a temporary truce.

Finally, the Council’s handling of this briefing has strategic implications. A constructive outcome – such as backing a ceasefire agreement or coordinating a multinational mission – could stabilize Sudan and the Horn. Conversely, a continued stalemate risks a regional contagion. The warnings from analysts and the Sudanese Prime Minister were alike in urgency: Sudan’s war is no longer an isolated problem. It is a focal point for transnational rivalries and a likely magnet for extremism if left unchecked.

In conclusion, the December 22 briefing painted a dire but clear portrait: Sudan’s civil war is intensifying into a bloodletting that endangers not only its own people but peace in much of Africa. The situation calls for the Security Council and the international community to move beyond expressions of concern and toward decisive, coordinated action. Saving Sudan from collapse will require bridging the gap between political proposals and the brutal realities on the ground – by imposing a ceasefire, ramping up life-saving aid, and ensuring accountability for the crimes committed. The window for such action is narrowing rapidly. The Council’s response in the coming days and weeks will test its ability to reconcile its authority and moral responsibility with the complex geopolitics at play. Only with unified and assertive measures can the worst outcomes be averted.