Sudan Conflict Update

Auxiliary Force Mobilisation, Civilian Harm from Aerial Strikes, and External Accountability Pressure

Executive summary

Sudan’s conflict continues to evolve along three interlinked lines: (1) the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are expanding reliance on a broad ecosystem of allied armed groups and volunteer formations; (2) aerial and drone warfare in RSF-controlled areas is generating acute civilian harm and damaging survival-critical infrastructure; and (3) international actors are tightening targeted sanctions against Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanders accused of mass atrocities in Darfur, increasing the political cost of RSF leadership while producing limited immediate battlefield constraint.

Key developments

1) Expansion and normalisation of SAF-aligned auxiliary forces

Pro-SAF mobilisation has intensified and is increasingly framed by Islamist and pro-army figures as a wartime necessity rather than a structural shift in Sudan’s security architecture. Prominent movement-linked voices argue that these formations represent time-bound “volunteer” mobilisation under SAF direction, formed in response to perceived threats to state sovereignty and community security.

At the operational level, several SAF-aligned forces appear to be functioning as semi-organised brigades with training structures and communications capabilities. While supporters present these groups as temporary and subordinated to SAF command, command-and-control relationships remain opaque, raising longer-term questions around accountability, integration, and demobilisation once active hostilities subside.

This mobilisation trend is not limited to one faction. It includes Islamist-associated units, tribal and regional armed formations, and armed groups that previously fought the state but are now aligned with SAF against the RSF. The cumulative effect is a widening irregular security landscape that may increase SAF manpower and local reach in the short term, but risks complicating post-conflict security sector consolidation.

Assessment: The continued growth of auxiliary forces may improve SAF tactical flexibility, but it also increases the probability of fragmented armed authority after the war—particularly if units develop independent political interests, retain arms, or gain autonomous financing.

2) Civilian casualties linked to drone strikes in West Kordofan and Darfur trade corridors

Recent drone strike reporting from West Kordofan indicates significant civilian fatalities, including children, in at least one incident involving a water collection point in a rural village area under RSF control. Civilian gatherings around water access points are especially exposed, as these sites concentrate people and livestock and are among few reliable resources in rural localities.

Additional strike reporting indicates a pattern of attacks affecting markets and displacement shelters in Kordofan, alongside incidents reported along trade routes in Darfur near cross-border commercial hubs. Civilian protection actors and local monitors attribute these strikes to SAF-operated aerial systems. SAF did not publicly confirm details of the reported incidents in the material provided.

Competing claims are present in the information environment: some pro-SAF social media narratives describe strikes as attempts to interdict RSF logistics—particularly fuel and supply movements—while local witnesses and monitoring groups describe impacts in civilian areas with no confirmed military presence at the point of strike.

Assessment: Regardless of intent, repeated incidents affecting water sources, markets, and displacement shelters indicate a deteriorating protection environment in areas outside direct SAF ground control. This trend may accelerate displacement, deepen local grievances, and expand recruitment pools for armed actors.

3) Intensified international sanctions on RSF commanders tied to Darfur atrocities

The United States has imposed sanctions on three named RSF commanders associated with the siege and capture of El Fasher (North Darfur), citing involvement in executions, detentions, torture, sexual violence, and post-capture abuses. The designations align with prior measures by European partners, signalling growing convergence among Western actors on attributing responsibility to identifiable RSF field leadership.

The same reporting also references findings by an international UN investigative mechanism describing violence patterns around El Fasher as consistent with severe international crimes, including ethnically targeted abuses against specific communities, alongside siege tactics that deprived civilians of food, water, medical care, and humanitarian access.

Assessment: While sanctions may have limited immediate operational impact on commanders operating primarily inside RSF-held territory, they increase diplomatic and legal pressure, constrain future cross-border financial engagement, and reinforce documentation trails relevant to eventual accountability pathways.

Strategic implications

Security sector fragmentation risk (medium-to-high):
The broadening network of SAF-aligned auxiliaries may entrench parallel armed structures. Even if formally “temporary,” wartime legitimacy, battlefield experience, and local authority can persist after conflict phases shift. Without credible demobilisation frameworks, Sudan may face a post-war landscape of armed pluralism rather than unified security governance.

Civilian harm and economic disruption (high):
Strikes affecting water points and markets undermine survival systems and local commerce. In rural Kordofan and Darfur, these hubs are not only civilian lifelines but also essential to livestock economies. Damage to such infrastructure amplifies food insecurity, displacement pressures, and inter-communal tension.

External pressure asymmetry (medium):
International punitive tools are currently more visible against RSF commanders in the El Fasher theatre than against other perpetrators or theatres. This may shape perceptions of legitimacy and bias among local constituencies, even where the intent is accountability. At the same time, sanctions can signal deterrence and support future legal processes.

Outlook (next 4–8 weeks)

• Auxiliary forces are likely to remain central to SAF operations, particularly in contested zones where manpower, local knowledge, and irregular tactics are valuable.
• Drone and aerial strike activity in RSF-held territories is likely to continue, with ongoing risk of civilian casualties where targeting intelligence is weak, dual-use areas are struck, or strikes occur near survival infrastructure.
• International measures will likely expand incrementally (additional listings, coordinated partner actions, or evidence-focused reporting), but battlefield effects will remain limited unless paired with effective enforcement on regional supply chains and financial facilitators.