Mass Abduction in Kebbi and Heightened ISWAP Activity in Borno

Overview

Nigeria is facing a dual-front security crisis, characterized by:

• the mass abduction of 25 schoolgirls in Kebbi State, signalling the consolidation of armed criminal syndicates across the northwest; and
• a renewed jihadist offensive in the northeast, marked by an ISWAP ambush that killed Brigadier General M. Uba.

These incidents underscore the systemic erosion of state authority, as federal forces struggle to maintain control over rural areas and contain hybrid armed threats—economic, ideological, and opportunistic in nature.

Kebbi State – Renewed Wave of Abductions

The Attack

On the night of 16–17 November, approximately thirty armed men stormed the Government Girls Secondary School Maga in Kebbi State.
Attackers scaled the perimeter fence, fired sporadically into the air, and entered the dormitories.

Initial toll:

• 25 schoolgirls abducted,
• one teacher wounded,
• Vice Principal Hassan Yakubu Makuku killed while defending the students.

Witnesses reported a coordinated, well-executed assault, conducted by armed men familiar with local terrain and supported by motorcycles and pickup trucks.

Threat Profile

Authorities attribute the attack to armed bandit groups operating from the Kainji Forest, a long-standing criminal sanctuary.
These groups have evolved from profit-driven gangs into hybrid insurgent actors, blending economic motives with intermittent jihadist cooperation for arms and logistics.

Key trends:

• growing access to weapons through ransom and smuggling networks,
• cell-based fragmentation with mobile subunits,
• adoption of Boko Haram–style tactics, particularly school abductions as leverage for ransom and propaganda.

Such kidnappings have become an economic and psychological weapon, designed to humiliate the state, generate income, and attract media attention.

Government Response

A joint military–police–vigilante operation was launched to pursue the perpetrators, with search operations focused on Koko-Besse and Argungu forest zones.
However, the response remains hindered by:

• limited night surveillance capability,
• slow deployment of reinforcements,
• intelligence leaks at the local level,
• and terrain conditions favouring the attackers.

Federal promises of reinforcement and regional coordination have yet to translate into effective ground results. The response remains reactive rather than preventive.

Northeast Escalation – ISWAP Ambush in Borno

The Incident

On 15 November, an ISWAP ambush targeted a convoy from the 25th Task Force Brigade near Wajiroko, Borno State.

• Four soldiers were killed.
• Brigadier General M. Uba, commanding officer, was captured and later executed according to a video released by ISWAP’s Amaq News Agency.

Initial military statements denied the abduction, dismissing reports as misinformation, but verified footage later confirmed the incident—revealing serious operational and intelligence failures.

Last Communications

The General’s final transmissions highlight a breakdown in air–ground coordination:

“Are they going to pick me or direct me?”
“My battery is 31%.”
“Once I see the aircraft, I can raise my cap.”

These last messages portray a commander isolated in the field, with no effective extraction support or real-time communication with air assets.

Implications

The ambush demonstrates:

• ISWAP’s growing capacity to target senior command elements,
• enhanced battlefield intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities,
• and persistent coordination failures between Nigerian ground and air forces.

The incident has severely impacted military morale and exposed vulnerabilities at the leadership level in asymmetric warfare contexts.

Strategic Interpretation – Dual Crises, One Systemic Breakdown

Northwest – Criminal Insurgency

Armed bandit networks have transformed into territorial insurgent actors, exercising control over vast rural zones and establishing parallel governance structures.

Core dynamics include:

• systematic targeting of schools for ransom,
• illegal taxation and roadblock extortion,
• forced recruitment and use of minors,
• state absence in border areas with Niger.

Their operations reflect a hybrid criminal–insurgent economy, sustained by terror, profit, and mobility.

Northeast – Evolving Jihadist Threat

ISWAP continues to demonstrate tactical sophistication through:

• coordinated ambushes and precision strikes,
• increased use of IEDs and drones,
• intelligence-driven operations,
• and expanding territorial influence around the Lake Chad Basin.

The killing of Brigadier General Uba signifies a qualitative leap in ISWAP’s operational confidence and its strategy to erode military command cohesion.

Threat Convergence

Nigeria’s two principal threats—banditry and jihadism—are now mutually reinforcing:

• exchanging logistics and intelligence,
• operating across overlapping zones of influence,
• exploiting weak governance structures and porous borders.

Schools have become economic and symbolic targets.
The army has become a strategic target.
Civilians are instruments of coercion and control.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Assessment & Strategic Outlook

Key Assessment

Nigeria is experiencing a systemic security collapse on two fronts:

• In the northwest, a criminal insurgency that exploits rural power vacuums and weak governance.
• In the northeast, a professionalized jihadist insurgency with expanding tactical reach and psychological impact.

Federal forces lack unified command, actionable intelligence, and inter-service coordination. The risk of progressive territorial fragmentation is high, exacerbated by declining public trust and the proliferation of community-based militias.

Expanded Risk Analysis

ASA identifies the following critical risk dimensions:

1. School Abductions – Very High Risk
These incidents undermine national stability, provoke domestic outrage, and draw international condemnation, eroding government legitimacy.

2. Banditry Activity – Very High Risk
Armed groups now dominate rural economies, causing widespread displacement and humanitarian pressure on urban centres.

3. State Response Capability – Low to Moderate
Security operations remain fragmented, slow, and often compromised by corruption, with limited tactical intelligence and inadequate logistics.

4. ISWAP Activity – Very High Risk
ISWAP remains the most significant direct military threat, capable of executing targeted operations against command elements and holding peripheral territories.

5. Civilian Morale – Low
Public confidence in the armed forces continues to deteriorate, fuelling the rise of vigilante movements and increasing the likelihood of localized communal violence.

Collectively, these factors signal a multi-layered national security erosion, where state institutions lose authority, responsiveness, and credibility simultaneously.

Conclusion

The Kebbi school abduction and the killing of Brigadier General Uba are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a deep structural security failure.

Nigeria is now facing a hybrid war environment, where the boundaries between criminality, insurgency, and governance are blurred.
Armed groups have effectively filled the power vacuum, functioning as de facto authorities in multiple rural zones.

Without urgent reforms in intelligence, command structure, and inter-regional coordination, Nigeria risks entering a prolonged phase of fragmented insecurity by 2026—marked by simultaneous criminal, jihadist, and communal violence.

Prepared by:
African Security Analysis (ASA) – West Africa Desk
Sources: MNJTF field reports, Nigerian intelligence contacts, ASA regional networks