Mandate Without Unity: Somalia, Al-Shabaab, and the Security Council’s Strategic Dissonance

Executive Summary: Fragile Gains and Diverging Expectations

On 23 December, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) until 31 December 2026. The decision, while procedurally routine, comes at a strategic inflection point. Somalia’s security environment remains precarious, Al-Shabaab is resurging, donor fatigue is rising, and multilateral coordination is increasingly fragile.

Behind the technical language of the resolution lies a deeper contestation: between African stakeholders prioritizing sovereignty and realism, and external actors focused on process, conditionality, and visibility. The drawn-out negotiations and persistent disagreements—especially from the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Guyana)—reveal fractures in international stabilization approaches.

AUSSOM Mandate Renewal: The Structural Core

The draft resolution under consideration extends AUSSOM's deployment for another year, keeping the troop ceiling at 11,826 (including 680 police). AUSSOM is intended to serve as the stabilizing successor to ATMIS, with a conceptual emphasis on enabling Somali Security Forces (SSF), expanding state control, and ensuring compliance with international humanitarian norms.

The renewal affirms support for AUSSOM’s four strategic benchmarks:

• Facilitating the post-ATMIS transition;
• Direct operational support to SSF;
• Territorial consolidation by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS);
• Strengthened accountability mechanisms under IHRL and IHL.

Yet, critics argue that the benchmarks remain loosely defined and under-monitored, and that AUSSOM's capacity to fulfil its mandate is constrained by persistent funding and political ambiguities.

Critical Flashpoint: UNTMIS and the Question of Mandate Creep

A key controversy during negotiations stemmed from the UK's decision to embed UNTMIS (UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia) reporting and termination language into the AUSSOM resolution. This approach was rejected by A3 Plus and others—including Slovenia and France—on two grounds:

1. Mandate Clarity: UNTMIS is governed by its own resolution (2753), with a discrete transition timeline ending October 2026.

2. Procedural Integrity: Using an AUSSOM resolution to address another mission's fate was viewed as inappropriate and potentially precedent setting.

Despite pushback, the UK inserted text confirming UNTMIS’ operational conclusion by 31 October 2026. While this offers bureaucratic certainty, critics warn that this manoeuvre may erode trust and reinforce perceptions of strategic overreach by penholders.

Reporting Requirements: Oversight vs. Overreach

The draft calls for two key reports in 2026—by 31 May and 31 October—focused on:

• UN logistical support to AUSSOM (via UNSOS);
• Financial and operational developments;
• Coordination updates affecting mandate implementation.

A major fault line was whether these reports should include assessments of Somalia’s internal political and security environment. The A3 Plus bloc, joined by China and Russia, argued against such language, perceiving it as an infringement on Somalia’s sovereignty and a veiled attempt at external auditing.

Conversely, European states stressed the importance of political reporting to track mandate efficacy and guide Security Council responses.

The final text represents a compromise: eliminating terms like “national” and “peace”, while retaining the intent to monitor coordination and stability impacts—albeit in muted language.

Financing and Operational Viability: An Unresolved Structural Gap

The resolution acknowledges, but does not resolve, AUSSOM’s chronic underfunding. UNSOS, the logistical backbone supporting AU forces, is suffering from the UN’s liquidity crisis and ongoing budget reductions. The Secretary-General is requested to propose adaptation measures in the May 2026 report.

However, no concrete donor commitments are secured. The European Union is expected to clarify its position in early 2026, but the broader funding model—based on voluntary contributions—remains unsustainable for the scale of stabilization needed.

This financial fragility undermines both the credibility of the mandate and the morale of deployed forces.

Strategic Context: Al-Shabaab, State Fragility, and External Gaps

The AUSSOM renewal arrives amid deteriorating conditions on the ground. Al-Shabaab continues to launch high-impact operations against government and international targets. The Somali National Army remains overstretched, and liberated areas risk recapture due to weak state presence and limited-service delivery.

Moreover, the FGS is still struggling to implement security sector reform, and relations between federal and member states remain tense. In this context, a stabilization force like AUSSOM can provide tactical support—but without clear exit mechanisms or political cover, its role risks becoming open-ended and reactive.

Political Optics: Fragmented Multilateralism and Competing Narratives

The renewal process has exposed deeper geopolitical fault lines within the Council:

• African states prioritize sovereignty, national ownership, and demand clarity on mandate scope and mission reporting.
• Western actors seek enforceable reporting lines, political oversight, and benchmarks tied to financial support.
• Somalia oscillates between asserting autonomy and appealing for international assistance.

This triangulation weakens cohesion. The decision to push through UNTMIS language despite objections further alienates key African stakeholders and could hamper future consensus on Somali stabilization.

Strategic Risks and Future Scenarios

If AUSSOM continues under current conditions, three scenarios emerge:

1. Limited Stabilization (Best Case):

• Security gains in Mogadishu and key corridors.
• Improved coordination with SSF and increased donor flexibility.
• Limited insurgent rollback.

2. Mandate Drift (Baseline):

• Tactical holding pattern with minor gains.
• Delayed political reform and stagnant security transition.
• Rising local discontent due to unfulfilled expectations.

3. Collapse of Momentum (Worst Case):

• Funding shortfalls degrade operational capacity.
• Al-Shabaab regains key territories.
• Council deadlock over future international posture.

Each scenario hinges on three levers: political alignment within the Council, Somali institutional reforms, and donor commitment.

ASA Recommendations: Grounded Mandates, Realistic Metrics, and Inclusive Architecture

African Security Analysis (ASA) recommends:

• Mandate Structuring: Ensure clear demarcation between missions. Avoid using AUSSOM texts to resolve UNTMIS ambiguities.
• Financial Reforms: Push for a hybrid funding model combining assessed contributions and voluntary support, with transparent budget tracking.
• Security Transition Metrics: Link mandate renewal to measurable governance and force development indicators, not rhetorical milestones.
• Political Dialogue: Foster FGS–Federal Member State cohesion with third-party facilitation to secure rear-area governance in liberated zones.
• Regional Alignment: Ensure AU, IGAD, and donor coordination is institutionalized—not personality-based or episodic.

Conclusion: A Cautious Step in a High-Stakes Arena

The AUSSOM renewal is both necessary and insufficient. It maintains a security floor for Somalia but does not yet build a durable ceiling for political and governance gains. The Security Council’s internal rifts and Somalia’s institutional volatility together limit the resolution’s transformative potential.

AUSSOM will remain a pivotal but fragile asset. Its success will depend less on its size or duration, and more on clarity of purpose, depth of coordination, and honesty about what international missions can—and cannot—achieve in Somalia’s complex political terrain.