Guinea-Bissau: Military Command Claims Full Control of the State

Situation Overview

Guinea-Bissau has entered a state of military takeover.
On 26 November 2025, a formation calling itself the “Haut commandement militaire pour la restauration de l’ordre” (High Military Command for the Restoration of Order) announced that it has assumed control of the country “until further notice.”
The declaration was delivered at the Armed Forces Headquarters by General Denis N’Canha, the head of the Military House of the Presidency.

This announcement came just 24 hours before the official release of the results of the presidential and legislative elections held on 23 November. It follows the arrest of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and the detention of three central security figures.

The crisis has now escalated from a contested transfer of power to a formal military custodianship, with immediate consequences for state legitimacy, internal stability, and regional dynamics.

Key Military Measures Declared

The High Command issued two binding decisions:

a) Suspension of the ongoing electoral process
→ This effectively nullifies the presidential and legislative outcomes, regardless of political claims or partial counts.

b) Suspension of media broadcasting and programming
→ This places the national information environment under direct military control, restricting civilian communication and narrative competition.

Additionally, the officers urged the population to “remain calm.”
This language is a direct signal of order enforcement and coercive intent.

Arrests and Disappearance of the Head of State

Prior to the military announcement, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló personally contacted reporters, stating he had been arrested around midday TU in his office at the presidential palace.

Simultaneously, the following figures were detained:

• Botché Candé — Minister of the Interior
• General Biague Na Ntan — Chief of General Staff (CEMGA)
• General Mamadou Touré — Deputy Chief of Staff

They represent the core vertical of the national security apparatus.

Hours later, Embaló became unreachable, with no official confirmation of his location.
This introduces a risk of fragmentation, rumour warfare, and factional mobilization.

Underlying Structural Drivers of the Crisis

The present breakdown is not accidental or temporary. It is rooted in four decades of militarized politics, where the army has repeatedly acted as the final arbiter of state power. Elections in Guinea-Bissau often serve as moments of vulnerability rather than continuity. The 2019 post-electoral crisis established a precedent in which civilian legitimacy is constantly negotiable, and victory is reversible by force.
The current atmosphere was further destabilized by deep political polarization—exacerbated by exclusion of major actors like Domingos Simões Pereira—combined with weak institutional frameworks, especially regarding the electoral commission and constitutional safeguards.
Alongside these political fractures, a criminalized economy anchored in Atlantic narcotrafficking provides financial autonomy to military elites and civilian power brokers. The illicit economy is not a side effect; it is a governing mechanism.
Finally, external actors—CEDEAO, Portugal, Senegal—operate as post-event mediators rather than structural stabilizers, often arriving after the damage is done.
Together, these factors produce a state in which a coup is not a rupture, but a recurring method of redistribution of authority.

Nature of the Takeover

Initial indicators suggested a surgical intra-elite coup aimed at neutralizing the presidency and key security figures.
The announcement by General Denis N’Canha changes the equation.
The coup has shifted from covert stabilization to open systemic control:

• Suspension of elections
• Control of national media
• Declaration of military authority over the state

This is not a temporary correction.
It is a full-scale military custodial governance.

Territorial Risk Zones

Immediate high-risk areas include:

• Presidential palace perimeter
• Access routes to Armed Forces HQ
• National Electoral Commission sites
• Government administrative zones
• Port facilities (commerce + criminal networks)

These zones are likely to host military deployments, road closures, or selective repression.
Secondary risks exist in urban partisan environments where loyalists of Embaló or rival factions may mobilize rapidly.

Scenario Outlook (72–96 hours)

S1 — Consolidated military rule (60–75% likelihood)

• De facto dissolution of institutions
• Creation of a transitional command authority
• Delayed diplomatic recognition, but operational stability

S2 — Negotiated elite settlement (15–25%)

• PAIGC leverage over military
• Embaló sidelined
• Civilian façade over military dominance

S3 — Fragmented dual power (5–10%)

• Embaló resurfaces publicly
• Armed units or provincial commands refuse compliance
• Local clashes, roadblocks, urban instability

Immediate Trigger Points to Monitor

• Couvre-feu declaration
• Closure of borders or airport
• Arrests of political party leadership (Madem-G15 / PAIGC)
• Military communication targeting civil society or youth groups
• Appearance of Embaló in exile, protected location, or allied territory

Any of these signals → rapid escalation within hours.

Priority Recommendations

Diplomatic Missions

• Restrict movement; shelter-in-place protocols
• Maintain political neutrality in all communications
• Avoid institutional recognition of any actor in the first 72h
• Prepare low-visibility extraction routes via northern sectors

Private Sector / NGOs

• Freeze payments to governmental entities
• Avoid port-based operations
• Limit field presence and reduce physical footprint
• Use secure communications only

Intelligence Services

• Map loyalties down to battalion level
• Track funding pathways around N’Canha
• Monitor CEDEAO reaction + Portuguese diplomatic posture

Strategic Assessment

Guinea-Bissau has transitioned from constitutional uncertainty to a fully militarized governance scenario.
The decisive factor is no longer electoral legitimacy, but operational control:

• Whoever controls the armed command
• Whoever controls information
• Whoever controls access to the head of state
  controls the country.

The next 72–96 hours will determine whether this becomes a stable junta, a negotiated elite settlement, or the trigger of a new wave of factional conflict.

Classification: URGENT / EXTREME RISK / HIGH IMPACT