Fall of Uvira: Operational Collapse, Regional Repercussions, and New Strategic Axes for the AFC/M23 Advance

General Situation: Uvira Has Fallen

As African Security Analysis (ASA) had forecast*, Uvira fell during the night of 9 December 2025 into the hands of the AFC/M23 after a disorderly retreat by FARDC, Wazalendo militias, and Burundian forces.

*(read ASA report: "Imminent Fall of Uvira: Strategic Collapse, Regional Shockwaves, and a New War Phase in Eastern DRC")

The collapse did not occur through a massive rebel assault but through a complete internal breakdown:
– FARDC command disintegration,
– violent FARDC–Wazalendo clashes,
– the sudden withdrawal of Burundian units,
– widespread panic within regular forces.

By 20:00 local time, Uvira was entirely undefended. The provincial governorate was looted, and the civil administration had already evacuated. The city effectively ceased functioning as a state-controlled territory.

Burundi Withdrawal and Strategic Repositioning

Burundian troops stationed inside Uvira pulled out during the night and regrouped in Nyabimungu, where a small airstrip is being used to airlift the contingent back to Bujumbura on Wednesday, 10 December.

Burundian units previously based in Shabunda are awaiting similar extraction.
This marks a full cessation of Burundi’s direct involvement in defending Uvira and leaves a complete security vacuum along the Uvira–Bujumbura axis.

Internal FARDC–Wazalendo Confrontations: Collapse of the Defensive Line

Beginning early on 9 December, heavy confrontations erupted between FARDC and Wazalendo groups, following a bloody night of fighting around Sange.

The Panther Special Forces, who arrived overnight in Bujumbura before being deployed forward, clashed directly with Wazalendo fighters, resulting in more than 30 fatalities across both sides, including civilians.

These events triggered:
– total rupture of FARDC–militia coordination,
– fragmentation of forces,
– inability to organize any structured defence,
– loss of operational control across the Ruzizi Plain.

By afternoon, certain Bafuliiru youth militias reportedly threw grenades into a crowd, causing additional civilian casualties and contributing to complete urban chaos.

In Uvira, FARDC elements attempting to withdraw to Kalundu port for evacuation toward Kalemie were blocked by Wazalendo groups demanding that the army surrender their weapons first. Other FARDC units dispersed toward Makobola and Fizi in an attempt to establish improvised defensive positions.

Role of Wazalendo – PAPCO and the Helicopter Crash

The Wazalendo faction known as PAPCO (Parti des Artisans de la Paix au Congo) continues to play an active role in Mwenga territory. The group is commanded by General-Major Daniel Nikiriba, with Cyprien Kabuka overseeing operations.

PAPCO fighters were among the first to reach the site of last weekend’s helicopter crash between Ulindi and Kigogo.

The aircraft involved, Mil Mi-8 registration 9T-HM27, is a Soviet/Russian medium twin-turbine transport helicopter acquired during the Kabila era. FARDC uses these aircraft primarily for troop transport and logistical missions in conflict zones (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu). These helicopters are notoriously poorly maintained and typically overused, significantly increasing failure risks.

The surviving pilot, “Denis”, a foreign national—likely Ukrainian—contracted to fly FARDC helicopters, was extracted and secured by PAPCO fighters operating in the Yungu–Kigogo zone. PAPCO remains one of the few pro-government armed groups still active along secondary lines, although Uvira’s fall severely undermines their capacity to support FARDC on any significant scale.

Strategic Axis After Uvira: Kalemie, Then Kindu (Maniema), Then Katanga

The fall of Uvira opens a fully accessible corridor for the AFC/M23 to push south and west. The critical axis now exposed is:

Uvira → Kalemie → Nyunzu → Kabalo → Kindu (Maniema) → Lubumbashi (Haut-Katanga)

Kalemie: The next major strategic objective

If Kalemie falls, the DRC will lose:
– its largest active disarmament centre,
– the lake–rail logistical hub connecting Katanga to the northeast,
– the last major FARDC staging base north of the Tanganyika corridor.

The fall of Kalemie would trigger a total military collapse across northern Katanga.

Kindu (Maniema): A plausible next objective

The AFC/M23 may move toward Kindu for two strategic reasons:

Prevent FARDC reinforcement from Maniema toward Katanga.

Expand control westward, limiting Kinshasa’s operational depth.

Seizing Kindu would:
– neutralize the province’s strategic airport,
– block any FARDC airlift into the southern front,
– place the Kindu–Lubumbashi corridor at immediate risk.

This would transform the conflict from a regional war into a national military crisis.

North Kivu Outlook: Likely AFC/M23 Push Toward Pinga (Walikale)

To secure the northern flank and prevent FARDC from reorganizing in the central areas of North Kivu, the AFC/M23 may attempt to capture Pinga, in Walikale territory.

Strategic value of Pinga:

– functional airfield used by FARDC for transport of troops and equipment,
– last protective barrier for Walikale-centre,
– gateway to controlling the strategic triangle Masisi – Walikale – Rutshuru.

If Pinga falls, FARDC will lose:
– local air mobility,
– the ability to reinforce Walikale,
– its last western projection capability in North Kivu.

Major Risk: Escalation into Communal Violence in Katanga

The most severe threat after Uvira may not be strictly military but social and communal.

Tensions between Katangese communities and Kasaïen populations—already strained—could explode into:
– pogroms,
– retaliatory cycles of violence,
– mass displacement,
– potentially genocidal dynamics if the security vacuum expands.

A southward rebel advance will intensify these identity-based tensions in provinces already destabilized by economic and political grievances.

Conclusion: A Political Agreement Is Now Critical to Prevent State and Regional Collapse

The fall of Uvira marks a historic turning point in the eastern DRC conflict:

– The path toward Kalemie–Kindu–Katanga is open.
– The North Kivu front could widen toward Pinga.
– FARDC cohesion is collapsing.
– Wazalendo factions are increasingly uncontrollable.
– Burundi is withdrawing.
– Civilians have been abandoned.

Under these conditions, minimal political dialogue between Kinshasa and the AFC/M23 becomes indispensable to prevent:

– complete FARDC military disintegration,
– communal violence in Katanga,
– de facto territorial fragmentation,
– a broader regional crisis involving multiple states.

Beyond the battlefield, the survival of populations and the integrity of the region are at stake.