Why the FARDC–UPDF Coalition Struggles Against ADF/ISCAP

Introduction

Since the launch of Operation Shujaa in November 2021, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda have engaged in a formal military partnership aimed at dismantling the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—also known as the Moudjahidines of the Holy City of Madina (MTM)—and their regional affiliate, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). Four years into this joint operation, the strategy has yet to yield conclusive results. The persistent gap between military ambition and security realities reveals structural limits in force coordination, ambiguous political agendas, and an evolving terrorist threat that continues to entrench itself in local populations.

Initial Goals and Operational Dynamics

Launched amid increasing pressure in North Kivu and Ituri, the objective of Shujaa was clear: dismantle ADF strongholds along the DRC-Uganda border, disrupt weapon flows and financial networks, and restore security in strategic areas. Officially, this cooperation was framed as a counterterrorism effort targeting a transnational jihadist group. However, unofficially, geoeconomic and infrastructural interests—particularly Uganda’s investment in DRC road projects—also played a role in shaping the operation's contours.

An Embedded and Evolving Threat

Unlike conventional armed conflicts, the fight against ADF/ISCAP involves a highly adaptive, asymmetrical enemy. Initially external to the region, the ADF has evolved into a fragmented yet deeply embedded force. Their strategy includes the recruitment of minors, social infiltration, and the use of informal financial systems (e.g., hawala, mobile money) to sustain operations. In certain villages, ADF-affiliated operatives provide community services, distribute basic goods like medicine or sewing machines, and blend into local society through soft power tactics, making them harder to detect or isolate.

This “social hybridization” creates an environment in which conventional counterinsurgency tactics become ineffective or even counterproductive.

Tactical Limitations and Structural Deficits

Militarily, the joint strategy suffers from several critical weaknesses. Aerial bombings, often based on questionable intelligence, have scattered jihadist cells without neutralizing them. Both FARDC and UPDF maintain largely static postures, with minimal deployment of mobile, specialized units. In a conflict where agility and unpredictability define enemy behaviour, such rigidity undermines strategic efficacy.

A major shortfall remains intelligence collection. The lack of credible human sources within affected communities, combined with limited technological surveillance assets such as drones or signals intelligence, results in blind operations. Additionally, logistical bottlenecks—fragmented chains of command, slow decision-making, irregular supply lines, and chronic underfunding—impede momentum and cohesion.

Political Frictions and Regional Ambiguities

This military cooperation cannot be understood in isolation from its political environment. Long-standing rivalries between Kinshasa, Kampala, and Kigali inject strategic ambiguity into every phase of the operation. While Uganda plays an active role in targeting ADF militants, it is frequently accused of maintaining covert links to the M23 rebellion, which is also active in the eastern DRC and is widely perceived to operate under Rwandan influence.

The role of General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Uganda’s powerful military commander and son of President Yoweri Museveni, adds another layer of complexity. His public allegiance to the Rwandan leadership casts doubts on Uganda's neutrality, especially given the M23’s operational presence in areas like Lubero—precisely where Shujaa is expected to expand.

How can a joint military operation claim to neutralize terrorism while one of its key partners is politically aligned with a separate armed group considered terrorist by Kinshasa?

Partial Results, Fragile Progress

Despite isolated tactical successes—including the destruction of some ADF camps, rescue of abductees, and targeted strikes against certain commanders—the strategic picture remains bleak. The ADF/ISCAP retains its ability to recruit (especially among marginalized youth), relocate, and reconstitute in peripheral zones.

Many areas temporarily “secured” by joint forces are swiftly re-infiltrated. In some cases, retaliatory violence against civilians has increased. The group’s flexibility, reliance on bush terrain, and mastery of local infiltration ensure that any security gains are temporary without sustained presence and pressure.

Comparative Perspective: African Counterterrorism Coalitions

Shujaa is not an isolated case. It mirrors other regional anti-terror efforts across Africa, which face similar dilemmas:

• In the Sahel, France’s Operation Barkhane, despite its superior military capabilities, failed to neutralize jihadist expansion due to weak local governance, poor integration with local populations, and complex ethnic dynamics.
• In the Lake Chad Basin, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) scored some victories against Boko Haram, yet remains dependent on the political will and logistics of its member states. Gains are often short-lived as insurgents retreat and regroup in ungoverned territories.
• The G5 Sahel Joint Force, despite international backing, suffered from inadequate coordination, budgetary uncertainty, and weak state institutions in conflict-affected areas.

The shared denominator across these cases is the absence of an integrated framework combining intelligence, flexible military tactics, robust local governance, and cohesive regional diplomacy.

Assessing the Viability of the FARDC–UPDF Partnership

While the principle of cooperation remains valid, its current configuration is undermined by divergent agendas, mutual distrust, and tactical rigidity. Without a clearly defined regional framework and equitable power balance, such a partnership risks becoming a crisis management tool rather than a strategic counterterrorism mechanism.

Importantly, military force alone is insufficient. Disrupting ADF/ISCAP networks requires a multi-front approach: strategic intelligence reform, disruption of illicit financing, security sector overhaul, local community engagement, and integration of non-military tools.

The presence of a growing number of local militias, known collectively as “Wazalendo,” further complicates the landscape. Some of these groups are suspected of being co-opted by actors with ties to ADF/ISCAP, creating a blurred battlefield where insurgents and irregulars sometimes overlap. Uganda insists on the full disarmament of these actors, but Kinshasa faces political and operational limits in pursuing that objective.

Conclusion

Operation Shujaa represents a necessary but incomplete attempt to forge regional resilience against a fluid and deeply embedded terrorist threat. It has contributed to maintaining pressure on the ADF/ISCAP network but has failed to alter the strategic equation in eastern DRC.

In line with other African counterterrorism experiences, this case illustrates that tactical cooperation cannot substitute for political clarity, intelligence superiority, and community-based stabilization. Without these pillars, the FARDC–UPDF partnership risks becoming yet another well-intentioned yet ultimately ineffective regional initiative.

Sustainable success requires a transition from reactive operations to a holistic doctrine grounded in flexibility, coordination, and shared accountability. Absent such a shift, the operation may merely prolong a status quo that continues to drain resources, erode trust, and leave civilians at risk.