Al-Shabaab Resurgence in Somalia – Strategic Shifts and Implications

Compiled by African Security Analysis (ASA)

Overview

African Security Analysis (ASA) has observed a renewed surge in Al-Shabaab’s operational tempo and territorial consolidation in Somalia between July 1 and August 5, 2025. The militant group, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, continues to exploit political disunity, weakened military capacity, and humanitarian vulnerabilities to extend its influence across strategic corridors in central and southern Somalia.

This briefing provides a situational analysis of Al-Shabaab’s recent activities, territorial gains, and strategic posture, and outlines the broader security, political, and humanitarian implications for Somalia and regional stability.

Contextual Background

Al-Shabaab (Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin) has remained a persistent insurgent force in Somalia since its emergence in 2006. Despite sustained military campaigns by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), supported by the African Union and international partners such as the United States and Türkiye, the group has proven resilient.

The transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the newly formed AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in January 2025 has created both operational uncertainty and strategic openings for the group. Coupled with internal political disputes—particularly between the FGS and federal member states such as Puntland and Jubaland—these conditions continue to undermine unified national counterinsurgency efforts.

Territorial Consolidation

Al-Shabaab launched a coordinated offensive in July 2025, regaining control over key areas in Lower Shabelle, Hiran, and Middle Shabelle regions:

• July 20: The capture of Sabiid and Anole, located 40km southwest of Mogadishu, followed the withdrawal of Somali and AU forces. ASA assesses this as part of a broader strategy to isolate the capital and disrupt key supply routes.
• In central Somalia, Al-Shabaab established a stronghold within a strategic triangle formed by Moqokori, Tardo, and Buq-Aqable. The recapture of Moqokori after complex suicide car bombings marked a significant tactical success, with the group claiming 47 SNA and militia casualties and seizing weapons.
• By August 4, hundreds of pro-government Macawisley fighters had retreated from rural posts in Hiran and Galgaduud, creating vacuums rapidly filled by Al-Shabaab.

High-Profile and Symbolic Attacks

Al-Shabaab has intensified asymmetric operations aimed at undermining the FGS’s legitimacy:

• A March 2025 assassination attempt on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud via IED near Villa Somalia highlighted the group’s continued ability to strike at the heart of government.
• In Burjeed (Bay region), the group overran an SNA base in July, capturing large stockpiles of military equipment, including AK-47s, and broadcasting footage as a propaganda tool.
• July 26: In Sabiid-Anole, Al-Shabaab claimed to have thwarted a joint AU-FGS operation, resulting in 19 militant casualties. The operation underscores the contested control in newly regained territories.

Shadow Governance and Financial Infrastructure

ASA notes that Al-Shabaab continues to employ a hybrid insurgency-governance model in captured territories:

• Tax collection and checkpoints have been reinstated in areas like Moqokori, indicating efforts to embed parallel administrative systems.
• According to the UN Panel of Experts, Al-Shabaab remains one of Al-Qaeda’s most financially autonomous affiliates, relying on extortion, illicit trade, diaspora remittances, and sophisticated third-party financial intermediaries.
• Recruitment is reportedly increasing, with both domestic and foreign fighters joining ranks—particularly in Puntland’s Bari region, where Al-Shabaab competes with ISIL-Somalia for influence.

National and Regional Implications

Security Consequences

The current trajectory reverses many of the gains made during the 2022 offensive, which reclaimed over 215 locations in cooperation with clan militias and international allies.

Key concerns include:

• Military overstretch due to AU force drawdowns, notably Ugandan contingents.
• Retreats by local militias, leaving rural populations exposed.
• Disruption of strategic corridors in central Somalia that are vital for troop mobility and supply chains.

Political Fragility

The FGS’s push for a one-person, one-vote system ahead of the 2025–2026 elections have exacerbated tensions with regional states. ASA assesses that continued fragmentation within the federal system creates space for Al-Shabaab to manoeuvre both militarily and ideologically.

Humanitarian Fallout

The renewed conflict has worsened humanitarian access and outcomes:

• An estimated 6.9 million Somalis require humanitarian assistance, with 4 million facing crisis-level food insecurity.
• Al-Shabaab’s control has restricted humanitarian corridors, especially in newly contested regions.
• Between January and September 2024, 560 civilian casualties were attributed to Al-Shabaab operations—a trend likely to rise if current hostilities persist.

International Support and Strategic Outlook

While international backing for the FGS continues, primarily through AUSSOM and bilateral partnerships, ASA identifies the following concerns:

• The transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM is underfunded and lacks clarity in force deployment mandates.
• The UN Security Council’s scheduled February 2025 review of sanctions and the Panel of Experts’ mandate offers a critical opportunity to recalibrate international pressure mechanisms.

Prospects for Dialogue

Though controversial, calls for conditional engagement with Al-Shabaab are gaining traction among regional analysts. President Mohamud has signaled openness to dialogue under specific terms, but the group’s non-negotiable stances—such as the imposition of Shariah law and removal of all foreign forces—remain substantial barriers to any meaningful negotiation track.

Conclusion

African Security Analysis (ASA) assessment underscores that Al-Shabaab’s recent resurgence is not merely a military phenomenon, but part of a broader political and social struggle for legitimacy and control in Somalia. The group’s territorial advances, governance structures, and financial resilience point to a long-term strategic posture that current military operations alone cannot fully address.

A sustained and coordinated response—blending security operations, political reconciliation, governance reform, and targeted economic interventions—will be essential in reversing Al-Shabaab’s momentum. The coming months will be decisive in determining whether Somalia can stabilize or slide further into protracted insurgency.

African Security Analysis (ASA) continues to monitor developments across Somalia and the Horn of Africa, providing timely and policy-relevant insights for stakeholders in peace, security, and development.