Sudan’s War and Somalia’s Political Conflict

Similarities, critical differences, and the risk of military fragmentation

ASA KEY JUDGMENT

African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses that Somalia is experiencing recurrent armed political confrontation alongside substantial regional security autonomy. The evidence reviewed does not yet establish a unified, independently financed opposition military coalition comparable to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. The critical warning is therefore a process, not an institutional equivalence: disputed political authority could progressively produce durable rival commands, financing networks and external alignments. The direction of this process remains contingent, but its consequences for counter-insurgency cooperation would be serious.

Executive summary

Sudan and Somalia differ fundamentally in the structure and stage of their conflicts. Sudan’s war developed from a struggle between two nationally consequential coercive organisations, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Somalia instead faces contested federal authority, recurrent localised armed political disputes and an enduring Al-Shabaab insurgency. ASA assesses that the most relevant Sudan lesson is how political disagreement can harden into self-sustaining military competition—not that Somalia already possesses a SAF–RSF equivalent.

• In both states, contested authority, incomplete political settlements, multiple armed structures and outside involvement create incentives for factional competition.
• In Somalia, the immediate concern is the use—or perceived use—of federal, regional and clan-aligned forces to determine disputed political outcomes.
• A two-sided SAF–RSF-type war is not the most likely model for Somalia. A more credible escalation pathway consists of interacting local confrontations, changing military loyalties and independently sustained armed networks.
• The most immediate strategic consequence of further fragmentation would be erosion of federal–regional counter-insurgency coordination, creating exploitable gaps for Al-Shabaab.

ASA assesses that political accommodation, and security governance must advance together. A constitutional bargain will remain fragile without agreed restrictions on the use of force; security integration undertaken without political consent may itself become a catalyst for conflict.

Conflict backgrounds

Sudan: a struggle between rival military centres

Sudan’s war began on 15 April 2023 following a struggle over command, political authority and the proposed integration of the RSF into a unified national force. The stalled transition left the SAF and RSF with separate coercive structures rather than one accountable chain of command. The subsequent war has damaged state institutions, infrastructure and civilian livelihoods, while causing widespread displacement and humanitarian suffering.

The SAF inherited the formal status of the national military. The RSF maintained a distinct leadership, armed structure, sources of finance and territorial networks. Their earlier cooperation did not eliminate the underlying rivalry over sovereign authority. ASA judges this institutional duality to be central to understanding how political competition escalated into war.

Somalia: federal contestation amid persistent insurgencies

Somalia’s political confrontation concerns constitutional rules, elections, resource allocation, security responsibilities and the balance of power between the Federal Government and Federal Member States. Puntland, Jubaland and opposition actors have questioned reforms they consider insufficiently consensual; the federal government presents central reforms as necessary for state-building and national elections. These positions should not be treated as legally resolved by their assertion alone.

Somalia’s security landscape includes federal and regional forces, clan and community militias, international security support and Al-Shabaab. The structure is more dispersed than Sudan’s pre-war SAF–RSF duality, but disagreement over lawful political authority can draw these formations into competing alignments.

Key similarities

Contested legitimacy and unfinished political settlements

Neither conflict can be understood solely as a battlefield contest. Political actors dispute the distribution and exercise of authority and the institutions empowered to make binding decisions. In Sudan, the transitional framework failed to establish a single civilian-accountable security order. In Somalia, unresolved federal questions and disputed reform procedures preserve opportunities for political escalation.

Multiple security structures

Sudan’s experience illustrates the danger of a powerful organisation with independent command, finance and political authority. Somalia’s regional security forces do not by themselves represent a comparable threat. Public reporting from Gedo has described the recruitment of clan fighters and Jubaland defectors into federally supported formations under regional intelligence chief Abdirashid Janan, including promises of salaries and equipment. ASA assesses that this may indicate the use of state institutions for political-military brokerage. It does not, however, establish that recruitment or deployment occurred outside formal command. The distinction depends on actual orders, appointment records, personnel registers and control over operations.

External sponsorship and regionalisation

External security assistance is an established feature of Somalia’s security environment, but its implications depend on the recipient, purpose and degree of operational control. Turkey’s military training relationship with Mogadishu is established. Publicly reported allegations of Turkish fighter-jet involvement near Baidoa have not been confirmed by Ankara, and direct intervention against Somali political opponents remains unverified. Historical studies document UAE involvement in the Puntland Maritime Police Force, while published assessments describe US and UAE air support for Puntland’s operations against Islamic State. Such assistance demonstrates external engagement and regional military capacity, not, without further evidence, sponsorship of war against Mogadishu. Separate reports have alleged Ethiopian involvement in Gedo and competing accounts of Ethiopian and Kenyan conduct in regional confrontations; key details remain contested or uncorroborated. ASA judges that external support could harden domestic divisions, but the evidence does not justify portraying Somalia as divided into fixed foreign-backed military blocs.

War economies and control of revenue

Independent military capacity must be distinguished from an independently financed domestic war. Published assessments describe Puntland’s operational autonomy in its campaign against Islamic State, while historical research documents earlier external support to Puntland’s maritime force. Neither establishes current funding arrangements or an intention to fight Mogadishu. Reporting from Gedo has described promised salaries and equipment for recruits but promises should not be confused with verified payments. Available material does not demonstrate a shared opposition payroll, pooled logistics or traceable diversion of port, customs or business revenues into sustained anti-federal operations. ASA considers this gap central to the Sudan comparison: control over revenue may create military leverage, but it is not proof that a self-sustaining war economy already exists.

Civilian vulnerability and governance vacuums

Weak or divided authority enables coercive taxation, competing local justice systems and territorial control by armed actors. Civilians face displacement, interrupted services, abuses and reduced protection. In Somalia, prolonged division between legitimate authorities would also create opportunities for Al-Shabaab to exploit gaps in governance and security.

Armed clan–government clashes in Southwest State and Hiiraan

Political militarisation is uneven across Somalia, and the available evidence does not support treating each regional dispute as equivalent. Recent published analysis describes armed confrontation near Baidoa between government forces and fighters aligned with former South West State president Abdiaziz Laftagareen. This points to an organised armed political struggle, but available reporting does not fully establish the forces’ unit-level command arrangements or settle the legal dispute surrounding electoral procedures. Claims that particular elections were unconstitutional remain contested positions rather than independently established legal findings.

In Hiiraan, public reporting in September 2026 described opposition to the Hirshabelle electoral process and allegations that Macawiisley fighters were being mobilised. The number of fighters involved, whether mobilisation took place and who directed it remained unverified. Reports also described elders announcing restrictions on visits by Hirshabelle officials and military aircraft, but an announced restriction is not itself evidence of an enforced armed blockade. ASA therefore regards Hiiraan as an area of potential escalation, not as an equally verified instance of clan–government warfare. The decisive developments would be confirmed deployments, commander defections, sustained recruitment or wider armed political alignments.

Critical differences

Sudan entered its present war with two nationally consequential forces that had already exercised sovereign power together. Somalia has no exact equivalent. Its military and political alignments are decentralised and vary significantly by region. The danger is therefore less a binary, nationwide SAF–RSF-style confrontation than multiple localised clashes that become connected through politics, patronage and resources.

The RSF’s autonomous resources and record of territorial warfare differ from the constitutional and political positions of Somali Federal Member State security forces, even where relations with Mogadishu are strained. Portraying each regional force as an RSF analogue would misrepresent Somalia’s federal context and could itself increase mistrust.

Somalia also faces an active, nationwide Al-Shabaab threat. Fighting between federal, regional or clan forces would risk disrupting intelligence sharing, force deployment and civilian protection. ASA judges this opportunity cost to be among the clearest strategic distinctions from the Sudan comparison.

How a Sudan-like trajectory could develop in Somalia

ASA assesses that any serious deterioration would more probably take the form of cumulative escalation than a single national rupture. The sequence below is an illustrative risk pathway, not a forecast that each stage will occur.

1. Political deadlock: constitutional or electoral disputes persist, and competing authorities challenge one another’s mandates.

2. Security alignment: leaders prioritise personally or regionally loyal commanders, mobilise clan forces and curtail cooperation.

3. Parallel financing: rival centres of power obtain customs receipts, taxation, private backing or foreign support outside shared oversight.

4. Military coercion: security forces are deployed to shape elections, remove officials or control strategically valuable sites.

5. Trigger incident: an arrest, disputed electoral event, clash over a port or airport, or attempted disarmament results in casualties.

6. Alliance expansion: clan, regional and political actors align around opposing sides, widening an initially local confrontation.

7. Institutional rupture: civilian administrators and security personnel split, negotiations fail and rival authorities claim legitimacy.

Risk assessment and early-warning indicators

ASA assesses that militarisation is no longer merely hypothetical: recurring armed political confrontations have been reported in more than one area. However, the available evidence does not establish a unified anti-federal command, shared military finances or a self-sustaining national war economy. The table below identifies developments requiring monitoring, not a catalogue of verified current conditions.

Evidence assessment | 1 November 2026

Documented pattern: Publicly reported fighting between federal and Jubaland forces at Ras Kamboni in December 2024 followed a disputed regional election. Federal authorities said their troops were replacing departing African Union forces, while Jubaland alleged that its forces had been attacked. The fighting itself is established in the available reporting, but responsibility for initiating it and the deployment’s precise purpose remain disputed. Further reported federal–Jubaland clashes in Gedo in August 2025, together with accounts of recruitment there and armed confrontation in South West State, indicate that military involvement in political disputes is recurring rather than isolated. They do not establish a coordinated nationwide campaign.

Unresolved structural question: Puntland’s operational autonomy during its campaign against Islamic State, and its history of externally supported security structures, demonstrate that significant capabilities can exist outside day-to-day federal direction. This should not be equated with an RSF-style organisation preparing to wage war against the federal government. The available material does not establish a unified opposition command, enduring cross-regional logistics, verified shared payrolls or independent financing for sustained domestic warfare.

Priority intelligence requirements: Identify signed deployment orders and authorising commanders; current appointment and reporting lines; recruitment registers and retention; actual salary payments; logistics and procurement links; and traceable revenues or foreign funding supporting armed action against domestic political rivals. These distinctions must be resolved before ASA attributes organisational intent or predicts an enduring nationwide military coalition.

Indicator: Security deployments in electoral disputes

Strategic significance: May convert legal-political disagreement into a coercive fait accompli

Priority response: Verified de-escalation and immediate mediation

–

Indicator: Separate recruitment and command

Strategic significance: Institutionalises factional loyalty and decreases joint operational capacity

Priority response: Personnel registration, agreed command rules and oversight

–

Indicator: Competition over ports, airports or customs

Strategic significance: Creates opportunities for autonomous military financing

Priority response: Transparent revenue arrangements and independent scrutiny

–

Indicator: Foreign military assistance to rival parties

Strategic significance: Can increase operational capacity and reduce incentives for settlement

Priority response: Coordinate assistance within mutually recognised frameworks

–

Indicator: Inflammatory clan rhetoric

Strategic significance: Facilitates mobilisation and raises civilian-protection risks

Priority response: Public restraint, monitoring and accountability

–

Indicator: Breakdown in anti-Al-Shabaab coordination

Strategic significance: Allows insurgents to exploit gaps and divided security priorities

Priority response: Maintain protected deconfliction and intelligence channels

Recommendations for Somalia

Reach a minimum political compact

Federal leadership, Federal Member States and recognised opposition actors should seek a limited agreement on electoral timing, constitutional procedures, division of powers and credible dispute resolution. The immediate requirement is not consensus on every political objective, but acceptance of rules under which disagreements can be managed peacefully.

Keep security forces out of political succession

Authorities at all levels should commit publicly to refrain from using armed forces to decide elections, depose civilian officeholders or capture institutions during constitutional disagreements. Alleged violations should initiate rapid, independently supported mediation and verification.

Build security integration through incentives

An abrupt programme of forced disarmament or command centralisation could increase resistance. Gradual arrangements built on verified personnel registers, common training, regular salaries, interoperable command and clear federal–state responsibilities are more likely to secure durable cooperation.

Control autonomous war financing

Negotiated transparency in customs, resource income, aid and security financing would reduce the capacity of rival political actors to sustain separate military structures. External security assistance should be disclosed where feasible and subject to safeguards against domestic political misuse.

Protect counter-insurgency cooperation

Federal and regional authorities should preserve intelligence-sharing, operational deconfliction and civilian-protection channels even when constitutional talks stall. These channels should be insulated from electoral bargaining to the maximum practical extent.

Strengthen civilian early warning

Elders, religious leaders, women’s organisations, business associations and civil society can help identify armed movements, threatening rhetoric, recruitment and resource seizures. Reporting will matter only if linked to credible decision-makers able to intervene before local incidents escalate.

Strategic outlook and ASA bottom line

ASA judges that continued federal–regional political contestation and episodic armed incidents remain more probable in the near term than a nationwide SAF–RSF-style confrontation. The episodes in Jubaland, Gedo and South West State demonstrate that political disputes can already turn violent; evidence from Hiiraan is less definitive. The principal strategic risk is cumulative: repeated deployments and recruitment could gradually establish rival chains of command and resource networks that outlast individual crises. A breakdown in counter-Al-Shabaab coordination could precede any broader political-military rupture.

ASA EARLY WARNING 

The most consequential change would be convergence of verified politically directed deployments, enduring independent recruitment and payroll systems, cross-regional command coordination, and traceable financing of domestic confrontation. Any credible evidence that external military assistance is being redirected against Somali political rivals would further increase concern. These indicators should be investigated, not assumed.

ASA BOTTOM LINE 

Sudan offers a warning about the institutional consequences of unresolved political legitimacy and autonomous coercive power. Somalia has already experienced recurrent armed political clashes, but the available record falls short of demonstrating the military and financial structures that made Sudan’s rupture possible. ASA assesses that Somalia’s more plausible danger is dispersed, mutually reinforcing local conflicts that weaken state cohesion and create room for Al-Shabaab. The decisive issue is whether episodic armed politics consolidate into durable, independently commanded and financed coalitions.