Sudan: El Obeid, Drone Warfare and the Collapse of Civilian Protection

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sudan has entered the most dangerous phase of its war since fighting began in April 2023. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has become a wider national crisis marked by state fragmentation, systematic violence against civilians, drone attacks on civilian infrastructure, the weaponisation of humanitarian access and the weakening of the institutions that once held the Sudanese state together.

The most urgent flashpoint is El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan. African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses El Obeid as the most consequential urban theatre in Sudan as of June 2026. This is not because it is the only city under threat, but because its fall, siege or sustained assault could combine military, humanitarian and atrocity risks on a scale comparable to, and potentially worse than, the fall of El Fasher in October 2025.

El Obeid is a strategic corridor linking Darfur, Kordofan, central Sudan and the Nile Valley. It is also a humanitarian hub and a shelter city for large numbers of internally displaced people. Reported RSF and allied force build-ups around the city, combined with drone strikes on power, water, fuel and communications systems, have created the conditions for a predictable civilian catastrophe. The warning signs are visible. Prevention remains possible, but only if international actors move from documentation and concern to deterrence and consequence.

The Sudan war is being sustained by three overlapping logics. The first is military: both SAF and RSF continue to believe that battlefield gains will strengthen their negotiating position. The second is economic: control over territory, gold flows, trade corridors, border crossings and humanitarian access generates the resources that keep armed mobilisation alive. The third is political: civilian actors remain divided and marginalised, while military institutions dominate negotiations and external states pursue competing regional interests under the language of peace.

Until these three logics are addressed together, the war will continue regardless of how many diplomatic meetings are held.

Core findings of this assessment:

• El Obeid faces an imminent atrocity risk with warning indicators similar to those that preceded the fall of El Fasher.
• Drone warfare has changed the conflict by extending the battlefield into civilian infrastructure and urban daily life.
• Conflict-related sexual violence has become systematic in several theatres and is being used as a tool of population control, humiliation, displacement and terror.
• The impact on children is a generational crisis, including killing, maiming, recruitment, sexual violence, school closures and attacks on medical facilities.
• Humanitarian access has collapsed in large parts of Kordofan and Darfur and is increasingly being used as a weapon of war.
• External support, including weapons, drone technology, finance and diplomatic protection, is one of the main reasons the war continues.
• The Quintet and Quad are useful diplomatic frameworks, but their pressure is fragmented and not yet strong enough to change the calculations of the parties.
• The 1591 Sudan sanctions regime is outdated and does not match the economic and technological reality of the current war.
• Sudan does not lack diplomacy, evidence or concern. It lacks unified, consequence-backed pressure on the military parties, their external backers and the networks that make continued war profitable.

Note on Attribution and Analytical Balance

African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses that, while both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have caused serious civilian harm and committed violations during the war, the available pattern of documented atrocities indicates that RSF-linked forces have been responsible for the most extensive and systematic violence against civilians in several major theatres. This includes mass killings, ethnic targeting, conflict-related sexual violence, looting, forced displacement, and post-advance violence in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

Recognising this imbalance is not a departure from objectivity. It is a requirement of objective analysis. A balanced report should not artificially equalise responsibility where the documented pattern of conduct is not equal. The analytical task is to describe the conduct of each party accurately, distinguish between verified facts and assessed patterns, and identify where the scale, frequency, and systematic character of violations differ between actors.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF EL OBEID

El Obeid matters because of what it connects and what its loss would trigger. The city sits at the centre of key corridors linking Darfur to Kordofan, central Sudan and the Nile Valley. It supports humanitarian supply routes across some of the most food-insecure areas of the country. It also anchors the SAF position between Darfur and central Sudan.

For the SAF, El Obeid is not a secondary front. Losing it would open space for the RSF to project pressure toward central Sudan and would weaken the SAF's claim to remain the national military authority. It would also damage SAF morale and could disrupt humanitarian supply operations at a moment when civilian needs are already extreme.

For the RSF, El Obeid is the next logical target in a campaign of territorial consolidation across Darfur and Kordofan. Capturing or isolating the city would strengthen the RSF's negotiating position, connect areas under its influence, and demonstrate that it can still conduct major offensive operations.

The civilian dimension is what makes El Obeid a protection emergency. The city hosts hundreds of thousands of civilians, including displaced people who fled earlier violence and have limited options for safe movement. Those who flee may pass through armed zones where extortion, sexual violence, ethnic targeting and looting have been documented. Those who remain face siege, infrastructure collapse and direct attack.

The comparison with El Fasher is central. After the RSF seized El Fasher in October 2025, widespread reports described mass killings, summary executions, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, forced displacement and targeted ethnic violence. These violations followed a pattern already visible in previous theatres. El Obeid now shows a similar warning profile. The question is whether international actors will act before mass violence occurs, or only document it afterwards.

I. WHY THE WAR CONTINUES

ASA assesses that the war has not reached a point where either party sees compromise as preferable to continued fighting. Both SAF and RSF still believe that further military gains are possible and useful.

The SAF's logic is defensive at the strategic level and offensive at the operational level. It seeks to preserve its identity as Sudan's legitimate state military, prevent the RSF from consolidating a rival territorial order, and retain the cities that give it administrative and symbolic authority. To do this, it has used artillery, air power and ground operations that have imposed severe costs on civilians in urban areas.

The RSF's logic is expansionary and consolidation’s. After major gains in Darfur and parts of Kordofan, it seeks to secure those areas, protect supply routes and identify new targets that can change the balance of power. El Obeid fits this logic because it would strengthen RSF control in Kordofan and increase pressure on central Sudan.

This shared belief in military advantage is the main obstacle to diplomacy. Peace frameworks cannot work if the parties see them as a pause between operations rather than as a pathway to settlement. The calculation will change only if continued war becomes more costly than compromise. That requires stronger military, economic and diplomatic pressure than currently exists.

II. DRONE WARFARE AND CIVILIAN EXPOSURE

Drone warfare has changed the character of the Sudan conflict. Both SAF and RSF have used drones with growing frequency for surveillance, targeting, strike coordination and attacks on infrastructure. The result is a battlefield that reaches deep into civilian life.

The most serious effect is not only the direct killing caused by strikes. It is the destruction of the systems that keep cities alive: power grids, water networks, fuel supplies, communications infrastructure, hospitals and medical supply chains. In and around El Obeid, reported drone strikes have damaged or threatened several of these systems.

When water infrastructure is hit, disease risk rises quickly, especially for infants, older people, the sick and displaced communities. When power fails, hospitals lose equipment, food storage breaks down, communications become unreliable and families lose the basic systems they need to survive. When fuel is disrupted, generators stop, water pumps fail and medical services collapse. These effects are not always accidental. In several cases, infrastructure destruction appears to be part of the military strategy.

Drones also allow armed actors to apply pressure even when they cannot advance on the ground. A city can be weakened from the air before a ground assault or siege is attempted. This makes drone warfare especially dangerous in urban conflicts where civilians are trapped.

Accountability is weak. Drone strikes are difficult to attribute because systems may operate at night, from distance, or without clear visual identification. Remote areas have few independent witnesses, and both sides often deny responsibility for civilian harm. This creates a monitoring gap. Closing it will require better satellite analysis, open-source verification, technical monitoring and sanctions against procurement networks.

The external supply issue is critical. The drones used in Sudan did not originate inside Sudan. Their procurement, transfer, maintenance and technical support involve external actors. Any serious response to drone warfare must target the supply chains that allow these systems to enter the conflict.

III. EL OBEID AS AN ATROCITY RISK

El Obeid presents a high-risk atrocity profile. This does not mean mass violence is inevitable, but the indicators are severe and consistent with patterns seen elsewhere in the war.

First, the city contains a large civilian population with limited safe escape routes. Many residents are already displaced and lack money, documentation or secure transport. Movement away from the city may expose them to armed actors, criminal networks, sexual violence and ethnic targeting.

Second, the advancing force has a documented record of post-advance violence. In Darfur and other theatres, RSF advances have been followed by targeted killings, looting, sexual violence, arbitrary detention and attacks on communities perceived to support the SAF. This record must shape the assessment of risk around El Obeid.

Third, infrastructure degradation is creating pre-assault vulnerability. Drone strikes and pressure on water, electricity, fuel and communications reduce civilian resilience before any direct ground assault. A weakened population is less able to flee, organise protection or access medical care.

Fourth, ethnic and communal targeting dynamics remain dangerous. In previous theatres, identity, perceived political alignment or presence in a SAF-held area have been enough to expose civilians to violence. El Obeid's diverse population makes these dynamics especially concerning.

Fifth, international inaction has weakened deterrence. The failure to prevent atrocities after previous warnings, including in El Fasher, has taught armed actors that warnings do not always lead to consequences. Restoring deterrence requires more than statements. It requires costs for violations.

Finally, conflict-related sexual violence is a leading warning indicator. Reports of sexual violence around RSF-influenced areas in North Kordofan must be treated not only as immediate protection emergencies, but also as signs of a broader escalation pattern.

CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

ASA assesses that conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan has moved beyond opportunistic abuse and has become systematic in several theatres. It is being used to terrorise communities, force displacement, punish perceived opponents, destroy family structures and send a message of total vulnerability.

Documented cases include rape, sexual slavery, abduction for sexual exploitation and other forms of sexual violence linked to wider attacks on civilian populations. The pattern is particularly severe in Darfur, where sexual violence has often occurred during or after military advances and has targeted specific communities. In several documented situations, the scale and pattern meet the threshold for crimes against humanity.

Sexual violence has strategic effects that last long after the attack. It forces families to flee, creates trauma and stigma, fractures community trust, overwhelms health services and prevents return even when fighting decreases. It also destroys the social foundations that communities need for recovery after war.

In North Kordofan, reported sexual violence in areas affected by RSF presence must be understood within this wider pattern. These acts are not only individual crimes. They form part of a broader method of control and intimidation.

The accountability gap is dangerous. When perpetrators do not face consequences, impunity becomes an incentive. Accountability is therefore not only a justice requirement. It is also a prevention tool.

I. CHILDREN AND THE WAR

The impact of the Sudan conflict on children is a generational catastrophe. The full consequences will unfold over decades, but the damage is already visible.

Children have been killed and maimed by artillery, drones, small arms, mines and explosive remnants. Drone warfare is especially harmful because it places children at risk in homes, markets, displacement sites, water points and near schools and hospitals.

Children have also been recruited and used by armed forces and groups. Both SAF-linked structures and RSF-linked forces have been associated with child recruitment or child use in combat and support roles. Children may serve as fighters, informants, labourers or logistical support. This not only violates international law; it also makes future reintegration harder by shaping a child's identity, trauma and survival skills around war.

Schools and hospitals have been attacked, looted, closed or deprived of basic supplies. When schools close, children lose education and one of their most important protective environments. When hospitals stop functioning, preventable deaths increase quietly through untreated illness, complicated births, infections and malnutrition.

The long-term effect is severe. A child who loses years of schooling in a conflict environment does not simply restart where they left off. They lose social development, stability, protection and future opportunity. Sudan's human development trajectory has therefore been set back by a generation in some of the country's most vulnerable areas.

II. HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AS A WEAPON

In large parts of Kordofan and Darfur, humanitarian access is no longer merely constrained by insecurity. It is being denied, obstructed and used as a weapon of war.

This distinction matters. Constraint refers to the normal difficulties of operating in conflict: damaged roads, insecurity, lack of funding, staff shortages and bureaucratic delays. Weaponisation refers to the deliberate denial of aid as a method of pressure on civilian populations. This includes blocking convoys, delaying permissions, targeting aid workers, looting supplies and using humanitarian corridors as bargaining tools.

International humanitarian law requires parties to allow and facilitate rapid and impartial relief to civilians in need. Deliberate obstruction is not a legitimate military choice. It is a violation that can carry individual criminal responsibility.

El Obeid's humanitarian role makes the risk even more serious. The city is not only important for its own population. It supports aid operations across Kordofan and Darfur. If it is isolated or disrupted, the consequences will spread far beyond the city, affecting communities already facing food insecurity, medical collapse and displacement.

Aid worker security is also deteriorating. Attacks on convoys, vehicles, facilities and personnel have reduced the ability of agencies to operate. Every suspended operation removes part of the fragile protection system that civilians depend on.

III. EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE

The war continues not only because of SAF and RSF decisions, but because both parties are supported by external networks. These networks provide weapons, ammunition, drone systems, money, political backing and diplomatic protection.

Weapons and equipment supplies are central. Drone systems are especially important because they have changed the nature of the conflict. Procurement networks involve intermediaries, transit routes and financial systems that can be investigated and sanctioned.

Financial support also matters. Sudan's gold sector has long funded armed actors. RSF-linked involvement in gold extraction, transport and export has helped sustain military capacity. Gold flows through regional and international markets, including trading companies, logistics operators and financial systems. These networks are identifiable and should be targeted more aggressively.

Political protection is another form of interference. Some external actors protect their preferred Sudanese party from pressure through diplomatic support, Security Council positioning or public narrative management. This lowers the cost of continued violence.

External enablers must be named and targeted. States, companies, financial institutions and individuals that help sustain the war should face reputational, financial and legal consequences. Without this, external support will remain one of the engines of the conflict.

IV. SANCTIONS: AN OUTDATED ARCHITECTURE

The 1591 Sudan sanctions regime was created in 2006 for the Darfur crisis. It remains important, but it is outdated for the war Sudan is fighting in 2026.

The current conflict is sustained not only by conventional arms transfers and named commanders. It is also sustained by drone supply chains, gold smuggling, cross-border trade routes, digital and informal financial networks, and commercial systems that move conflict revenue into legal markets.

A modern sanctions framework should include five elements.

First, it should target drone technology transfer, including systems, components, training, maintenance and operational support.

Second, it should create due diligence obligations for companies in gold trading, logistics, telecommunications and financial services where those sectors contribute to conflict sustainment.

Third, it should integrate stronger financial intelligence to track gold revenues, hawala networks, digital transfers and trade finance flows.

Fourth, it should link designations to accountability for specific conduct, including grave violations, siege tactics, humanitarian access denial, conflict financing and weapons supply.

Fifth, it must be balanced. Sanctions will only deter if they apply to actors on all sides according to evidence, not political alignment. Selective sanctions tell protected parties that they can continue without serious consequence.

DIPLOMACY: TOO MUCH PROCESS, NOT ENOUGH LEVERAGE

Sudan does not lack diplomatic frameworks. It lacks coordinated leverage. The multiplication of meetings, envoys and mechanisms has not produced enough pressure on the parties.

The Quintet - the African Union, European Union, IGAD, League of Arab States and United Nations - has supported consultations with civilian and political actors. This is necessary. A durable Sudan settlement cannot be made by armed institutions alone. It must include civilians, women's groups, professional associations, resistance committees, local leaders, displaced communities and political actors.

The problem is sequencing. Civilian dialogue cannot be credible while cities are under assault, humanitarian access is blocked and the armed parties still believe they can gain through fighting. A political process must be linked to pressure that stops the war, not treated as a parallel activity.

The Quad - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States - has more direct leverage over the parties. Egypt has influence with the SAF. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have financial and political relationships relevant to RSF-linked networks. The United States has sanctions capacity and diplomatic weight.

The Quad's problem is lack of alignment. Its members have different regional interests and priorities. Unless they act around one civilian-protection and de-escalation agenda, the Quad will remain a consultation forum rather than a peace-forcing mechanism.

The UN Personal Envoy has an important but limited role. An envoy can maintain channels, coordinate messages and identify opportunities. He cannot impose peace without state-backed pressure. That pressure must come from the countries with influence over the parties.

I. WHAT REMAINS UNKNOWN

Several uncertainties shape the risk assessment.

The RSF's exact intentions toward El Obeid are not fully clear. The current pattern could indicate preparation for a ground assault, a siege strategy, or a pressure campaign designed to force concessions.

The SAF's defensive strength in El Obeid is also unclear. Public claims may not accurately reflect troop numbers, ammunition, equipment, command cohesion or willingness to hold the city.

The origin, number and type of drones used in and around El Obeid are not fully established from open sources. Technical attribution remains difficult.

The level of command control inside the RSF is uncertain. If field commanders operate with significant autonomy, ceasefire compliance will be harder even if senior leaders make commitments.

The actual leverage of each external actor is also only partly visible. Public diplomacy reveals less than private channels, informal relationships and financial dependencies.

ASA presents these uncertainties as part of an honest assessment. Overconfidence in a weak information environment can lead to poor policy choices.

II. OUTLOOK TO THE END OF 2026

El Obeid will likely remain the main civilian protection flashpoint through the second half of 2026. The RSF's military and strategic logic makes intensified pressure on the city likely, whether through ground assault, siege or continued infrastructure strikes. The risk of civilian casualties, displacement and atrocity conditions is high.

A durable national ceasefire is unlikely before the end of 2026 under current conditions. The parties have not yet concluded that compromise is better than continued fighting. External actors are not unified around an enforcement-backed strategy, and monitoring mechanisms are not strong enough to guarantee compliance.

The humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate unless there is a ceasefire, access guarantees and large-scale funding. Ongoing fighting, access denial, infrastructure destruction, economic collapse and mass displacement will keep civilians under extreme pressure.

Drone warfare will intensify. Both sides have seen its military value, and without sanctions on procurement networks, more systems and more sophisticated uses are likely.

The conflict economy will remain a primary obstacle to peace. Gold revenues, taxation, humanitarian access leverage and trade corridor control will continue to fund armed mobilisation.

Accountability deficits will deepen unless stronger mechanisms are used. These include ICC engagement, universal jurisdiction cases, targeted sanctions and public documentation of perpetrators.

CONCLUSION

Sudan does not lack diplomatic forums, international concern or evidence of atrocity. It lacks unified, consequence-backed pressure on the SAF, the RSF, their external backers and the economic and technological networks that make war possible.

El Obeid is the immediate test. Its warning profile is clear. The comparison with El Fasher is not rhetorical. It is an analytical reference to a case where warnings were visible, evidence was available and mass violence was not prevented.

Preventing a similar outcome requires coordinated pressure on both SAF and RSF to halt operations that endanger civilians in El Obeid. It requires safe civilian movement guarantees, monitored humanitarian corridors, independent documentation of drone strikes, and sanctions against commanders, political actors, weapons suppliers, drone procurement networks and gold revenue channels.

It also requires alignment between the Quintet and Quad around one civilian-protection agenda. Parallel messaging is not enough. The parties and their external supporters must face costs for escalation that outweigh the gains they expect from continued war.

If this does not happen, the pattern will repeat. More statements will be issued. More violations will be documented. More survivors will testify. More briefings will be delivered. And more communities will experience the same failure that El Fasher already suffered.

The war in Sudan will not end because the world expresses concern. It will begin to de-escalate when the cost of continued escalation becomes higher than the benefit of continued fighting. Creating that cost is possible. It requires political will that has so far been absent.

The people of El Obeid are waiting to see whether that will can be found.

African Security Analysis (ASA) will continue to monitor developments in Sudan independently, without political alignment to any party to the conflict, and with the analytical rigour and institutional honesty that the scale of the crisis demands.