P-DDRCS in the DRC: A Peacebuilding Illusion Without Funding

Limited Progress on the Ground, with Tentative Steps toward Dialogue

As of late June 2025, the Program of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Community Stabilization (PDDRCS) remains only marginally active on the ground, confined largely to symbolic gestures rather than systemic intervention. In Ituri, the program has issued a handful of demobilization cards and facilitated peace dialogues in areas such as Nyakunde. Meanwhile, in North Kivu, dozens of former combatants who surrendered small caches of weapons have been documented, and a branch of the program is now planned for Beni—though meaningful action remains limited.

In South Kivu, efforts to reintegrate child soldiers continue, building on nearly 1,000 children disarmed between 2022 and 2023. Yet no major breakthrough has been recorded in recent months. In Tanganyika, somewhat more structured engagements have taken place: dozens of fighters from groups like Fimbo na Fimbo and Mutono laid down arms, and nearly 100 child soldiers were released in June.

A potentially significant development unfolded in Ituri itself: from June 23, 2025, a dialogue—referred to as ARU2—opened in Aru-centre under the joint auspices of provincial authorities and MONUSCO. Building on a prior 2023 agreement (Aru1), this forum brought together leaders of armed groups (CODECO, FRPI, FPIC, ZAIRE, TCHINI YA TUNA, MAPI), communities, NGOs, and security officials. The five-day meeting aimed to assess progress, consolidate commitments to cease hostilities, and advance the reintegration of fighters—especially through alignment with the P-DDRCS framework.

Despite the endemic fragility of peace efforts in Ituri—with decades of intercommunal violence, mass displacement, and widespread insecurity—ARU2 signals a deliberate step toward inclusive dialogue. Authorities describe it as a “decisive step,” envisaging revived local markets, reopened roads, and a safe return for up to 60 percent of displaced residents. Civil society and MONUSCO emphasize expectations around ending sexual violence, reinforcing state authority at local levels, and generating conditions for sustainable reintegration and development.

However, these dialogues—though promising—are still far from indicating that the P-DDRCS has gained operational footing. They offer glimmers of engagement and institutional presence, but lack concrete budget lines, logistical support, or formal integration into a coherent nationwide demobilization strategy. In essence, these are early-stage initiatives—not scalable, sustained, or sufficiently funded interventions.

Government Declarations vs. Reality

The Congolese government continues to claim that the P-DDRCS is a national priority under the direct authority of the President. Public statements often highlight its centrality to peacebuilding and post-conflict development strategies. In June 2025, the President directed that new peacebuilding funds be prioritized for DDR activities. However, these declarations have yet to be backed by concrete budget allocations. Institutional coordination remains vague, and no clear timelines or implementation plans have been made public. A proposed partnership with the Ministry of Vocational Training to support reintegration through job skills is still at a planning stage.

Donor Engagement and Delays

International partners have reiterated support for DDR in principle but remain cautious in practice. Several UN agencies have formed coordination groups to help implement DDR projects, and technical assistance is ongoing. Funding mechanisms, however, are limited. While donors have allocated resources for local peacebuilding and community reintegration in certain areas, direct funding for the national P-DDRCS structure remains stalled. Key partners, including the World Bank, have redirected their financial support to decentralized provincial and municipal projects, bypassing the national DDR authority due to concerns over effectiveness.

Efforts to include ex-combatants in broader development programs exist, such as through stabilization projects or reintegration of children, but these initiatives operate independently of the core P-DDRCS framework. Despite repeated expressions of interest, international donors have not released major new funding for the national DDR program in 2025.

Security Context

Violence across eastern Congo continues to undermine the DDR process. In North Kivu, sustained fighting between the Congolese army and the M23 rebel group has displaced hundreds of thousands, with new offensives reported in Beni, Rutshuru, and Masisi. In Ituri, ethnic and militia-driven violence has resurged, with attacks on civilians and villages by groups like CODECO and residual ADF factions. In South Kivu and Tanganyika, local armed groups continue to disrupt peace and security, and intercommunal tensions persist.

The deteriorating security environment not only complicates DDR logistics but discourages armed groups from disarming. Many fighters remain unconvinced that peace is sustainable or that the state can offer viable alternatives to violence. Without a secure environment, the incentives for voluntary demobilization remain weak.

Critical Analysis – Structural Failures and Financial Paralysis

The P-DDRCS is trapped in a cycle of political ambition and institutional weakness. Since its inception in 2021, the program has been consistently underfunded. Provincial coordinators lack basic resources—vehicles, fuel, office supplies, or even salaries. Some have worked for over a year without pay, and no fully functional demobilization centres exist. This systemic underfinancing has rendered the program largely symbolic.

Organizational instability adds to the problem: the program has seen multiple changes in leadership, and its provincial branches were never fully formalized or empowered. Field-level staff operate with no logistical support, and even promising local initiatives struggle to scale up due to central bottlenecks.

At the heart of the issue lies the Congolese state’s failure to commit financially. Despite international goodwill, donors are unwilling to fund a program that the government itself does not prioritize. This absence of domestic investment undermines both planning and execution, leaving the DDR framework hollow.

Without tangible resources, the program cannot deliver on its core mandate: disarming fighters, reintegrating them economically and socially, and stabilizing war-affected communities. In turn, this failure fuels scepticism among ex-combatants and communities alike. Many fear that surrendering arms will lead to abandonment rather than opportunity. Others suspect that reintegration promises are politically motivated or unrealistic.

Conclusion – A Hollow Framework in a Time of Escalating Need

As of June 2025, the P-DDRCS remains largely dysfunctional. It lacks the institutional credibility, field capacity, and—most critically—the financial foundation needed to play a meaningful role in peacebuilding. Despite years of public declarations and international interest, no structural progress has been achieved. Provincial coordinators are left without resources, field activities are either symbolic or non-existent, and the Congolese state has yet to allocate a single viable budget line to support the program.

This situation has not only paralyzed demobilization efforts—it has damaged trust. Armed groups see no incentive to disarm when the promises of reintegration are clearly unfulfilled. Communities doubt that the state can offer real alternatives to violence. The country remains caught in a dangerous cycle: violence erupts, reintegration is proposed, funding fails, violence returns.

The P-DDRCS, in its current form, exists only on paper. It has no logistical capacity, no executable budget, and no operational mechanisms. Considering the expectations surrounding a potential peace agreement or exit from crisis, the DRC lacks any real tool to disarm, demobilize, or reintegrate thousands of combatants. This institutional vacuum weakens any serious peace initiative. Without a credible alternative, many fighters are likely to return to the bush and pick up arms once again, triggering yet another cycle of violence. The endless recurrence of instability in eastern Congo finds one of its root causes in the state’s inability to turn its commitments into concrete action.

Africa Security Analysis concludes that the P-DDRCS highlights a significant gap between official statements and the actual situation on the ground. Without proper funding or meaningful preparation, reintegrating former combatants will remain nothing more than an administrative illusion. Under these conditions, peace will continue to be unattainable, and the program, rather than being a true national priority, serves only as a placeholder for a policy that isn't being implemented. Even if a peace agreement were signed today, there is no indication that the DRC has the financial resources or political will to reintegrate former fighters effectively.