Luanda Summit: U.S. Strategy Faces China's Established Footprint

Africa Security Analysis – Strategic Report, June 2025

Executive Summary

This report by Africa Security Analysis (ASA) provides a U.S.-focused strategic assessment of the 2025 U.S.–Africa Business Summit in Luanda (June 22–25). It examines Washington’s efforts to deepen economic engagement in Africa amid growing competition from China’s entrenched Belt and Road Initiative (BRI/OBOR).

The U.S. is promoting new partnerships in critical minerals, green energy, digital infrastructure, and trade. However, its influence is constrained by structural limitations and a dense network of Chinese-funded projects already in place. Furthermore, the summit links economic development to U.S. security interests—recasting development corridors as instruments of geopolitical strategy.

For African leaders, Luanda should not be seen as a development breakthrough, but as the latest stage in the continent’s strategic significance in U.S.–China rivalry.

1. Trade: U.S. AGOA Uncertainty vs. China’s Established Market Access

With the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) set to expire in September 2025, prospects for full renewal are slim. U.S. negotiators are expected to push for limited extensions, tied to critical mineral supply chains. This risk disrupting trade for African exporters in textiles, agriculture, and light manufacturing.

In contrast, China has embedded itself in African economies through OBOR, offering duty-free trade, low-interest loans, and preferential access. Its firms are integrated into major corridors—from Mombasa to Lagos. Although the U.S. backs the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), implementation is likely to be slowed by existing infrastructure bottlenecks—many of them built by China.

Takeaway: U.S. trade tools remain narrow and conditional, while China has already established broader, long-term economic links across the continent.

2. Infrastructure: U.S. Initiatives vs. China’s Built Network

The centrepiece of U.S. infrastructure strategy is the Lobito Corridor, linking Angola, Zambia, and the DRC. This project symbolizes U.S. ambition to connect resource-rich regions to global markets. However, ASA notes that unlike China’s BRI—responsible for over $50 billion in African ports, railways, and power grids—the U.S. approach relies mainly on private investment guarantees and modest co-financing packages.

Meanwhile, in fragile regions like eastern DRC or Mali, China’s state-owned banks have already delivered large-scale rail and power projects. Without African government support in the form of public funding and policy reforms, U.S.-backed “transformational” corridors may struggle to take off.

Takeaway: While China delivers hard assets at scale, U.S. efforts depend on complex public-private models that may fall short without local buy-in.

3. Critical Minerals: U.S. Security Focus vs. China’s Processing Power

Washington is prioritizing access to strategic minerals—such as cobalt, lithium, copper, and rare earths—for clean energy and defence industries. The summit will feature new mining deals to secure these resources. But ASA notes that China has already spent years building mineral processing infrastructure in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. These investments are locked in through long-term offtake agreements and local technology transfers.

Even if U.S. agreements are signed in Luanda, they face stiff competition from established Chinese joint ventures. Without enforceable local-processing clauses and tax certainty, African states may simply shift from one extractive relationship to another—this time under U.S. strategic terms.

Takeaway: U.S. goals remain strategic, but China's physical control over processing gives it the real advantage.

4. Digital Economy: U.S. Pilots in a China-Dominated Landscape

U.S. tech firms are introducing pilot programs in cloud services, cybersecurity, and mobile money in countries like Angola and Kenya. These initiatives aim to offer alternatives to China’s digital dominance. However, ASA observes that Huawei, ZTE, and Chinese policy banks have already built national broadband networks, 5G infrastructure, and data centres across more than 20 African countries.

The result is a digital ecosystem closely tied to Chinese platforms and standards. Unless U.S. programs push for interoperability and strong data-sovereignty protections, Africa could end up with a fragmented digital economy.

Takeaway: U.S. efforts are promising but small-scale, operating within a landscape already wired to Chinese tech.

5. Green Energy: U.S. Guarantees vs. China’s Direct Delivery

Luanda will see announcements of U.S.-supported solar farms and transmission lines. These efforts are financed through risk guarantees and private-sector loans. In contrast, China has already delivered gigawatts of renewable capacity—especially in Angola, Ethiopia, and Egypt—through build-own-operate deals that lock in power purchase agreements with African utilities.

While U.S. financing offers more commercial flexibility, it cannot yet compete with the speed or scale of China's infrastructure delivery. Without efforts to support local manufacturing of solar panels, turbines, and other components, the impact of U.S. green energy projects may be limited.

Takeaway: China is already powering Africa; U.S. efforts remain early-stage and depend on complex financing tools.

6. Security Dimensions: Corridors as Strategic Assets

A. Militarized Routes

China’s BRI corridors are increasingly supported by military activities—such as port visits by the People’s Liberation Army Navy and overseas base planning, including in Djibouti. The U.S. is positioning Lobito and other routes as counterweights, signalling possible military access, intelligence-sharing, and private security contracts along these economic corridors.

B. Strategic Partnerships and Conditionality

Much like China uses financing to shape diplomatic alignment, the U.S. is beginning to link trade and investment to governance and security reforms. ASA warns that this could divide the continent into “preferred” and “non-preferred” partners, fuelling strategic competition for alignment.

C. Infrastructure as a Security Flashpoint

As railways, ports, and corridors become dual-use assets—serving both economic and military goals—they also become potential targets. Chinese-built networks could attract local armed groups, while U.S.-funded projects might require politically sensitive security guarantees.

D. Emerging Zones of Competition

ASA foresees a growing number of proxy zones across Africa, where ports, mines, and data centres become key arenas in the broader U.S.–China contest. Development projects risk doubling as strategic footholds for foreign influence.

Takeaway: Infrastructure is no longer just about development—it's about leverage, positioning, and security.

Conclusion

For Africa Security Analysis, the Luanda Summit reflects a strategic recalibration—not a development pivot. The U.S. is re-entering Africa with targeted initiatives and high-profile partnerships. But the real levers of power—physical infrastructure, mineral processing, digital systems, and logistics—remain firmly under China’s influence.

The coming months will test whether African governments can balance the benefits of both powers, using them to advance local priorities—rather than becoming caught in the middle of a new era of competition, where pipelines, ports, and data cables trace the lines of global rivalry.