General Muhoozi in Kinshasa: Authentic Joint Operations or Disruption?

General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, born in 1974, is the son of President Yoweri Museveni and has served as Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) since March 2024. A graduate of Sandhurst, he is a career military officer who quickly ascended through the ranks of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). Known both for his battlefield leadership and controversial public statements, Muhoozi has increasingly become a central figure in Uganda’s defence diplomacy. Over the past year, he has been dispatched to represent Uganda in high-level meetings across the region, consolidating his dual role as the military’s top commander and a political emissary of his father.

Security Cooperation with the DRC

Uganda’s military engagement in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has intensified since the launch of Operation Shujaa in late 2021, a joint campaign with the Congolese army (FARDC) aimed at dismantling the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a violent insurgent group linked to transnational jihadist networks. As of mid-2025, the operation is deemed a military success by Ugandan officials, who report that many ADF bases have been neutralized, and territory reclaimed.

During Muhoozi’s June 2025 visit to Kinshasa, a new protocol was signed expanding Shujaa’s mandate across North Kivu and into Ituri Province. This extension includes operations not only against ADF, but also against other armed groups destabilizing the region, such as CODECO militias in northeast Ituri. UPDF deployments were recently reinforced, including airlifts of additional troops to Bunia. In March 2025, joint UPDF-FARDC operations in the area repelled a major militia assault, reportedly inflicting heavy losses on CODECO fighters.

These efforts highlight Uganda’s intention to project itself as a stabilizing force along its western border. However, the presence of M23 rebels—an armed group seen by many as aligned with Rwandan interests—complicates the picture. While UPDF operations focus on fighting ADF and CODECO, M23 controls large swathes of Rutshuru and Masisi. This territorial division has become a focal point of regional tensions, particularly given past accusations that Uganda may have indirectly facilitated M23’s resurgence.

Persistent Suspicions and Regional Ambiguities

Uganda’s relationship with Kinshasa remains uneasy. While the two states maintain operational cooperation against mutual threats like the ADF, suspicions persist about Uganda’s alleged involvement—or at least passive tolerance—of M23 activities. Statements by Muhoozi referring to M23 fighters as "brothers" have been viewed with concern in the Congolese capital, reinforcing doubts about Kampala’s neutrality.

Though Uganda denies any support to foreign armed groups, Kinshasa has cited credible evidence suggesting that M23 fighters and materiel may have passed through Ugandan territory. At the same time, Uganda points to its participation in the now-disbanded East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which conducted joint operations with FARDC to expel M23 from certain areas. Uganda has framed this past cooperation as proof of its commitment to Congolese sovereignty—yet it also shows how Kampala seeks to maintain a balancing act between Kinshasa and Kigali.

Economic Ambitions and Shadow Economies

Uganda’s engagement in eastern Congo is not purely military. The region represents a crucial economic frontier. Eastern DRC is Uganda’s second-largest export destination, and Uganda has invested heavily in road construction projects—such as the Bunagana–Beni corridor—to facilitate cross-border trade and troop movements alike.

These commercial ties, however, are not without controversy. Uganda has seen a dramatic increase in declared gold exports, despite having minimal gold production of its own. Observers link this surge to smuggling from Congolese mines, routed through Uganda’s porous regulatory environment. While Kampala has introduced stricter controls in recent years, the scale of illicit mineral flows continues to raise alarms. Gold refined or exported from Uganda is often labelled as "domestic," masking its true Congolese origin and deepening grievances in Kinshasa. The issue remains a key flashpoint in broader debates over economic sovereignty and ethical resource governance.

Political Climate in Kinshasa

Muhoozi’s arrival in Kinshasa on June 21, 2025, coincided with a critical juncture in Congolese politics. President Félix Tshisekedi was engaged in delicate discussions with leaders of the Catholic (CENCO) and Protestant (ECC) churches, who presented a national "Pact for Peace" aimed at facilitating social reform and dialogue. Tshisekedi publicly endorsed the initiative but set clear parameters: any dialogue must remain Congolese-led and must not serve to legitimize armed groups.

His government has refused direct negotiations with M23, labelling them a terrorist group and demanding that all foreign forces, particularly Rwandan, withdraw from Congolese soil. Notably, Kinshasa rejected a U.S.-backed proposal that sought to include M23 as an equal partner in future dialogue. Tshisekedi appears open to working with civil society and opposition forces on inclusive governance and disarmament—but only within a framework that upholds national sovereignty and excludes foreign-backed militias.

Uganda–Rwanda–DRC Triangle

Muhoozi’s visit came just after a Uganda–Rwanda military commanders’ conference held in Nyagatare (June 18–20), the fifth in a series aimed at improving security cooperation along their shared border. Although Uganda and Rwanda have a history of tensions, they seem to be cautiously cooperating on some security issues. However, their main concerns differ: Rwanda is focused on the M23 group, while Uganda is more concerned with fighting the ADF and CODECO.

Uganda's current regional strategy involves a careful balancing act. Kampala maintains strong operational ties with Kinshasa, especially through Operation Shujaa, while at the same time working to ease tensions with Kigali. This positioning allows Uganda to exert influence across both sides of the Great Lakes conflict, aiming to emerge as a pivotal regional security actor. However, this balancing strategy is inherently risky. It opens Uganda to accusations of duplicity and entangles it in competing national agendas.

Timeline of Key Events (2022–2025)

• Nov 2021: Operation Shujaa launched in eastern DRC.
• Mar–Jun 2022: M23 captures strategic areas in North Kivu.
• Nov 2022: UPDF joins regional efforts to push back M23.
• Jan 2023: M23 seizes Kitchanga.
• Feb 2025: Uganda deploys 1,000+ troops to Bunia (Ituri).
• Mar 2025: UPDF–FARDC repulse major CODECO offensive.
• June 2025: UPDF secures border towns in anti-ADF campaign.
• June 18–20, 2025: Uganda–Rwanda border security summit.
• June 21, 2025: Muhoozi visits Kinshasa; meets Tshisekedi.
• June 21, 2025: President Tshisekedi receives church leaders.
• June 27, 2025 (scheduled): Signing of Rwanda–DRC peace accord in Washington.

Africa Security Analysis (ASA) interprets General Muhoozi’s Kinshasa mission as a calculated bid by Uganda to entrench itself at the heart of Great Lakes security. By deepening Operation Shujaa cooperation with Kinshasa even as Kampala sustains border-security talks with Kigali, Uganda is pursuing a dual-track diplomacy that serves both tactical and geostrategic ends. In the short term, Shujaa’s expanded mandate against the ADF and CODECO has yielded concrete gains—neutralized rebel bases, restored territorial control and repelled militia offensives. Yet Africa Security Analysis notes that these battlefield successes mask deeper structural vulnerabilities.

First, the absence of clear, consistently applied protocols risks eroding the very Congolese sovereignty that Uganda publicly pledges to uphold. The 2019 cap on UPDF incursions—meant to preserve FARDC’s freedom of manoeuvre beyond a 100-km border buffer—has in practice been sidestepped, enabling both insurgent spill-over and questions about Uganda’s true operational limits. Second, the optics of Ugandan praise for M23 fighters and the disproportionate growth of Uganda’s gold exports—amid U.S. sanctions on a Uganda-based trading company—underscore how military and economic objectives have become intertwined, fuelling regional mistrust. Third, the rapid sprouting of armed splinter groups inside Uganda itself has heightened domestic insecurity even as Kampala seeks to project stability abroad.