United Nations Security Council Consultation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): Emergency Briefing

African Security Analysis (ASA) Independent Analysis

Date: 22 August 2025

Source: United Nations Security Council.

Executive Summary

On 22 August, the UN Security Council convened an emergency briefing on eastern DRC, responding to surging violence by armed groups, notably the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The session, requested by the United States, underscores escalating tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali, amid mutual accusations of proxy support for armed actors. Recent diplomatic efforts—the DRC–Rwanda Peace Agreement (27 June) and the Doha Declaration of Principles with M23 (23 April)—represent critical steps toward stabilization, yet the resurgence of violence threatens their credibility. ASA assesses that Council discussions will focus on condemnation of attacks, attribution of responsibility, and the durability of ongoing peace initiatives.

Security and Humanitarian Context

Between 9 and 21 July, M23 attacks in Rutshuru, North Kivu reportedly claimed over 300 civilian lives, including women and children. The UN OHCHR suggested potential support from the Rwanda Defence Force, an allegation strongly rejected by Kigali and denied by M23. Concurrently, the ADF conducted attacks in Ituri and North Kivu, targeting civilians and killing dozens. Local sources indicate Wazalendo fighters operating alongside FDLR elements, adding complexity to the security environment. These developments underscore the failure of ceasefire commitments and the persistent humanitarian toll in eastern DRC.

UNSC Dynamics

Council deliberations reveal clear divisions. France, as penholder, circulated a draft statement condemning violence. The United States pressed for explicit reference to “Rwanda-backed M23,” whereas the A3 Plus group (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Guyana) resisted direct attribution, reflecting sensitivities around Rwanda’s role. ASA notes these fractures mirror broader geopolitical tensions that complicate unified Council action.

Peace Process Updates

The Washington Track, formalized in June, has made incremental progress, including the formation of a Joint Oversight Committee, preliminary agreements on regional economic integration, and the adoption of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism to enhance FARDC–RDF cooperation against FDLR.

The Doha Track with M23 committed parties to cease hostilities and protect civilians. However, planned agreements were delayed due to disagreements over sequencing of confidence-building measures, prisoner releases, and governance arrangements. Qatar remains actively engaged, but progress remains slow and fragile.

Rising Tensions

On the ground, both M23 and FARDC have escalated troop deployments and exchanged accusations of offensive posturing, even as they publicly reaffirm commitments to Washington and Doha frameworks. This dichotomy between diplomacy and military reality highlights the fragility of current peace processes.

ASA Assessment

African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses that the security situation in eastern DRC now poses a serious threat to the credibility of both Washington and Doha tracks. Proxy dynamics between Kinshasa and Kigali remain central obstacles to durable peace, as both states continue to leverage armed groups for strategic advantage. Council divisions mirror these tensions: Western members favour explicit attribution to Rwanda/M23, while African and non-aligned members prefer neutral language to avoid escalation.

Critically, ASA continues to verify allegations regarding civilian killings in Rutshuru, reportedly linked to M23/Allied Forces Coalition (AFC). Our local sources have not confirmed the full scale of these incidents but report the presence of Wazalendo combatants operating alongside FDLR elements. This highlights the complexity of attribution in eastern DRC, where multiple armed actors operate within shifting alliances and fluid operational lines.

Furthermore, ASA assesses that recent massacres in Beni, Lubero, and Ituri were likely not conducted by the ADF/ISCAP faction under Musa Baluku’s leadership. Instead, evidence points to external forces supported by unidentified groups that exploit the persistence of insecurity for strategic or economic gain. This pattern indicates that violence in eastern DRC cannot be fully explained by traditional armed groups alone. Instead, the conflict is increasingly shaped by overlapping networks of opportunistic actors, including local militias, criminal networks, and political spoilers, all of whom profit from instability and erode efforts toward durable peace.

The combination of ongoing attacks, delayed peace agreements, and complex attribution dynamics underscores a dual challenge: sustaining international mediation momentum while containing both armed group advances and opportunistic exploitation of insecurity. Without concrete confidence-building measures—prisoner releases, security guarantees, and robust regional oversight—both Washington and Doha tracks risk stagnation or collapse.

Implications

The UNSC emergency briefing underscores the urgent need to align diplomatic engagement with on-the-ground realities. While Washington and Doha frameworks provide structured avenues for dialogue, fresh violence and complex actor dynamics are eroding their credibility. Pressure on both Kigali and Kinshasa to honour commitments, coupled with operational mechanisms to verify and contain violence, is essential to prevent further cycles of insecurity.

ASA concludes that stabilizing eastern DRC requires a dual focus: strengthening diplomatic frameworks while addressing the layered networks of opportunistic actors that increasingly drive violence beyond the control of known armed movements.