The Alliance of Sahel States and the Push Toward the Gulf of Guinea: The Failed Coup in Benin as a Signal of Expanding Sahelian Influence

Executive Summary

The attempted coup in Benin on 7 December 2025 goes beyond a failed domestic power grab. It reveals a broader and increasingly assertive strategy by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—to project influence into the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea.

This strategy is driven by a central geostrategic objective: breaking Sahelian landlock and securing access to the Atlantic Ocean. Backed by Russian political, informational, and logistical support, AES pressure is reshaping regional power balances and raising serious concerns among coastal states. The Benin episode should be read as an early-warning signal of a wider contest over sovereignty, ports, and regional security architecture in West Africa.

The Failed Coup in Benin: Indicator of Regional Interference

Although the coup attempt in Benin ultimately failed, its significance lies in the regional dimensions that emerged in its aftermath. Intelligence indicators suggest the operation was not purely endogenous but embedded within a transnational ecosystem of influence, extending beyond Beninese military circles.

The episode fits a broader pattern of indirect destabilization efforts targeting coastal states. These efforts aim to probe institutional resilience, exploit political fault lines, and create strategic openings that could be leveraged by Sahelian military regimes seeking maritime access and greater regional leverage.

Information Warfare and Digital Manipulation

One of the most revealing aspects of the Benin episode was the information domain. During the critical hours of the attempted coup, the Facebook page “Notre Bénin” disseminated large volumes of false information announcing the fall of the government and the success of the putschists.

Metadata analysis shows the page was administered from Burkina Faso, with technical and operational links pointing toward the BIR-C, a strategic communication unit established after Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s rise to power in 2022, reportedly with Russian assistance.

A controversial communiqué—briefly published and later deleted—claimed that Colonel Pascal Tirgri had been received in Ouagadougou under AES protection. Although quickly removed, this message strongly suggests pre-positioned narratives and cross-border coordination, consistent with modern influence operations accompanying coup attempts.

This confirms that information warfare has become a core instrument of AES power projection, used to shape perceptions, legitimize destabilization efforts, and confuse both domestic and international audiences.

The Core Objective: Securing Maritime Access

Behind these manoeuvres lies a structural constraint: geographic landlock. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger face significant economic and strategic disadvantages due to their lack of direct access to the sea. World Bank estimates indicate that landlocked countries incur trade costs more than twice as high as those of coastal states.

The Port of Cotonou is central to this equation. Nearly half of its transit traffic serves Sahelian countries, making it a critical strategic node. Any form of political leverage, disruption, or indirect control over Cotonou would provide the AES with significant economic and coercive power.

At the same time, diplomatic pressure is increasing on other coastal states:

• Togo, whose Port of Lomé was approached in late November to facilitate Nigerien uranium shipments—an issue reportedly discussed during President Faure Gnassingbé’s visit to Moscow.
• Guinea, whose Prime Minister Amadou Oury Bah publicly committed on 9 December to supporting Mali’s “access to the sea.”

These moves indicate a gradual, multi-track strategy, blending diplomacy, influence operations, and security pressure rather than overt confrontation.

Moscow as Strategic Enabler and Beneficiary

The AES’s expanding influence toward the Gulf of Guinea is inseparable from Russian strategic backing. Moscow has emerged as the key external enabler of coordination among Sahelian military regimes.

The Nigerien uranium agreement illustrates this dynamic. Russia reportedly acquired 1,000 tons of uranium at a price 13% below French 2023 levels, despite global uranium prices rising by nearly 30% since March. Such terms underline Niger’s growing dependency and Moscow’s leverage.

For Russia, securing stable maritime export corridors for strategic resources is essential. This explains its direct interest in influencing—or indirectly controlling—West African port infrastructure. Analysts widely agree that the scale and synchronization of current AES actions exceed what these regimes could achieve alone, pointing to structured external support in intelligence, logistics, and strategic communications.

Security Implications for the Gulf of Guinea

The emerging Sahel-to-coast pressure axis represents a systemic risk to Gulf of Guinea stability. Coastal states increasingly face challenges to their sovereignty from external actors exploiting domestic vulnerabilities.

Key medium-term risks include:

• an increase in coup attempts or destabilization plots,
• intensified disinformation and psychological operations,
• pressure on ports and transport infrastructure,
• and the transformation of the Gulf of Guinea into a zone of indirect geopolitical confrontation.

The Benin coup attempt should therefore be understood not as an isolated incident, but as part of a broader regional power shift, in which maritime access becomes a primary strategic battleground.

Conclusion

The Alliance of Sahel States has launched a multidimensional influence campaign toward the Gulf of Guinea, combining political interference, information warfare, and diplomatic pressure. With Russian backing, this strategy seeks to convert Sahelian landlock into leverage over coastal states.

The failed coup in Benin represents the most visible—and alarming—manifestation of this approach to date. It underscores the need for enhanced vigilance, regional coordination, and institutional resilience among Gulf of Guinea states.

The Gulf of Guinea has now become a central strategic theatre in West Africa’s evolving security landscape. How coastal states respond will shape the region’s stability for years to come.

Area: West Africa – Sahel / Gulf of Guinea
Department: Regional Security & Strategic Interference