Strategic Realignment in the Sahel

Burkina Faso Deepens Ties with Iran and the Taliban

In May 2025, Burkina Faso intensified its diplomatic efforts to diversify international partnerships by engaging in formal discussions with Iran and Taliban representatives. This move reflects a clear desire to break away from dependence on traditional Western powers, amid rising insecurity across the Sahel and the weakening of conventional regional alliances.

Building Economic Cooperation

On May 13, 2025, in Tehran, Burkina Faso's ambassador Mohammad Kabura met with the Taliban's envoy to Iran, Maulvi Fazl Mohammad Haqqani. The two sides discussed strengthening cooperation in key sectors such as trade, mining, agriculture, and vocational training. They also agreed to facilitate visits by private sector delegations to foster direct economic exchanges between both parties.

This meeting comes at a time when Burkina Faso, along with Mali and Niger, has withdrawn from ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a military and political bloc focused on regional sovereignty. The search for new partners—including Iran, Russia, and Turkey—is part of this broader strategy to reshape its international alignments.

Iran’s Expanding Footprint

Iran has recently stepped up its diplomatic and economic presence in Burkina Faso. Since late 2023, the two countries have signed several Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) covering energy, urban development, higher education, and construction. Iran also delivered humanitarian aid to Ouagadougou and has expressed its readiness to share expertise in security, healthcare, and agricultural development.

Security Dimensions and Emerging Military Cooperation

Beyond economics, this evolving dynamic raises questions about potential security cooperation, particularly in the fight against non-state armed groups. Iran has offered assistance in the field of security and given Burkina Faso’s ongoing struggle with insurgent violence across several regions, this offer may serve as an alternative to diminishing Western military partnerships.

In addition, the AES recently announced the creation of a joint 5,000-troop military force, aimed at pooling regional efforts against jihadist groups. This initiative demonstrates a shared ambition among member states to reinforce their strategic autonomy while leveraging new technical and political support.

Conclusion

African Security Analysts see that these diplomatic shifts mark a deliberate break from the post-colonial international order and signal the Sahelian juntas’ intent to build a new zone of regional sovereignty—supported by cross-cutting alliances with actors previously peripheral to the region. This reconfiguration is driven less by ideological alignment than by strategic pragmatism: in a context of growing international isolation and prolonged asymmetric warfare, Burkina Faso and its allies are primarily seeking partners willing to provide immediate support—whether economic, political, or security-related.