South Sudan: Treason Trial of Riek Machar and SPLM-IO Officials Opens in Juba

Opening of the Proceedings

On 22 September 2025, South Sudan formally opened the treason and war crimes trial of suspended First Vice President Riek Machar and seven senior officials of his faction, the SPLM-IO. They stand accused of orchestrating and supporting attacks against the South Sudanese army in Upper Nile state, particularly in Nasir, where fighting left significant casualties earlier this year.

Charges include treason, murder, and crimes against humanity, reflecting the gravity of the indictment. The trial began with a brief two-hour session, dominated by legal wrangling over the tribunal’s competence.

Legal Contestation

Machar’s defense team argued that the special tribunal convened for the case is “incompetent” and lacks proper jurisdiction. They claim that under the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement, Machar and his allies enjoy immunity for political actions linked to the conflict, and that only a hybrid court mechanism (as envisioned in the peace framework) could handle such charges.

The prosecution, represented by Me Ajo Ony Ohisa, rejected this objection, insisting that the tribunal is legally empowered because all its members are drawn from the Supreme Court of South Sudan. According to the prosecution, the attacks in Nasir were not led by the SPLM-IO as an official signatory party, but by the White Army, a local militia outside the peace framework. This distinction, they argued, allows the state to proceed under national jurisdiction.

Political Stakes and Power Balance

The trial is inseparable from South Sudan’s fragile political equilibrium. Machar has been the most prominent opposition leader since the civil war, and his role as First Vice President was central to the 2018 power-sharing agreement.

• For President Kiir’s camp, the trial consolidates central authority, but risks appearing as a political purge.
• For SPLM-IO supporters, it threatens to undo years of negotiation, potentially pushing armed factions back into open rebellion.
• For regional mediators (IGAD, AU), the trial is a direct stress test of the peace deal’s sustainability.

Security Risks on the Ground

The charges directly reference Upper Nile, a region that has repeatedly served as a flashpoint for violence. Security implications include:

• Risk of SPLM-IO defections: Units in Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile may refuse integration and remobilize.
• Localized violence: Retaliation against government positions or ethnic communities aligned with Kiir is possible.
• Destabilization of cantonment sites: The fragile arrangements meant to unify SPLM-IO fighters into the national army could collapse.

Security forces in Juba have been reinforced amid fears of urban unrest, while intelligence reports indicate increased mobilization in Machar’s northern strongholds.

Diplomatic and Regional Dimensions

• IGAD & AU: Pressure is mounting for a diplomatic intervention to suspend or redirect the trial toward a hybrid court framework.
• Uganda & Sudan: Both states are monitoring closely, with potential to influence events should violence escalate.
• Western donors: Concerned that the trial undermines donor-backed peace and justice mechanisms, raising questions about future aid flows.

Outlook

The trial resumes Tuesday, 23 September 2025, with jurisdictional objections still unresolved. Three possible trajectories emerge:

Conviction & Harsh Sentence – High risk of SPLM-IO withdrawal from the peace deal and renewed conflict.

Prolonged Judicial Stalemate – Political paralysis, with Machar sidelined but his supporters neither disarmed nor fully integrated.

Mediated Suspension – Regional or international mediators intervene, shifting the trial toward a negotiated settlement.

ASA Assessment and Support

The Machar trial is not just a courtroom drama—it is a strategic pivot point that could determine whether South Sudan maintains its fragile peace or slides back into large-scale conflict.

African Security Analysis (ASA) highlights three critical points:

• The Upper Nile–Nasir axis will be the first indicator of whether SPLM-IO units tolerate or resist the trial.
• The trial’s framing as treason risks deepening ethnic-political divides if not counterbalanced by inclusive dialogue.
• Regional guarantors may intervene late; stakeholders need forward intelligence to anticipate escalation.

The proceedings place South Sudan’s entire transition at risk. Without calibrated mediation and robust monitoring, the trial could reignite front-line hostilities. ASA stands ready to provide confidential conflict monitoring, risk mapping, and scenario planning to governments, humanitarian actors, and private partners operating in South Sudan.