Preliminary Situation Report: AFC/M23 Capture of Uvira, South Kivu

By African Security Analysis (ASA)

1. Situation Overview

Armed elements of the AFC/M23 coalition have taken control of Uvira in South Kivu following a short but decisive sequence of operations. The pattern observed mirrors, with striking similarity, the approach previously used during the fall of Bukavu.

The takeover was achieved without large-scale urban combat inside the city itself. Instead, AFC/M23 relied on a phased approach designed to pull defending forces away from the urban core, generate confusion, and then enter the city once the main FARDC and allied forces had already withdrawn.

2. Operational Pattern and Tactics

The same tactical script used in Bukavu is now being reproduced in Uvira almost step by step:

1. Shaping operations in the periphery
AFC/M23 first engaged in localities on the approaches to Uvira rather than attacking the city directly. This drew FARDC and Wazalendo elements outwards, stretching their lines, weakening cohesion, and reducing their capacity to mount a coordinated defences of the urban core.

2. Fixing and disorganising defending forces
As fighting shifted to these outer zones, defending forces became progressively fixed in place. Reports point to confused withdrawals, fragmented command and control, and rising fear among both soldiers and civilians. The psychological impact of these engagements contributed to a rapid erosion of defensive will.

3. Operational pause on the city’s outskirts
Once the defenders were destabilised, AFC/M23 did not rush into Uvira. Instead, they imposed an operational pause on the immediate outskirts of the city, lasting several hours into the early morning and potentially extending into one to two days in previous cases such as Bukavu. This pause created space for remaining FARDC and Wazalendo units to continue withdrawing, often without clear orders, effectively vacating the city.

4. Low-resistance entry and occupation
With formal defences largely gone, AFC/M23 elements then entered Uvira with minimal resistance. This phase resembled an occupation rather than an assault, avoiding the political and humanitarian costs associated with high-intensity urban combat. The same sequence appears to have enabled the earlier capture of Bukavu and is now clearly visible in Uvira.

This deliberate, structured method allows AFC/M23 to gain control of major towns while conserving manpower, avoiding attrition inside built-up areas, and deepening the perception that FARDC is unable to hold key urban centres for more than short periods under pressure.

3. Institutional and Strategic Implications

From a military doctrine perspective, a critical vulnerability on the government side is the absence of institutional learning from recent defeats:

• There are no visible signs that lessons from Bukavu have been systematically documented, analysed, and integrated into training, deployments, or contingency plans.
• Defending forces continue to react tactically to each new offensive, rather than anticipating and disrupting the now-familiar AFC/M23 pattern.

If this gap persists, the same script is likely to be replayed in other high-value urban centres. Within the current operational logic, Kalemie and Kindu emerge as the most exposed potential targets:

• Both are strategic nodes with symbolic and logistical importance.
• Both could be vulnerable to a similar sequence: peripheral engagement, defensive fragmentation, operational pause, followed by low-resistance entry.

In the short term, a counter-strategic priority must be assigned to understanding and breaking this model of urban conquest. That implies:

• Preparing defensive plans that refuse to be drawn too far from urban cores.
• Establishing rapid-reaction reserves specifically tasked with holding critical junctions inside cities.
• Developing contingency plans for coordinated withdrawals that do not leave urban areas effectively open for uncontested occupation.

4. Current Ground Picture in Uvira

Field and intelligence reporting from Uvira highlight the depth of the operational imbalance:

• Burundian involvement and Wazalendo engagement
  In the early hours, several Burundian soldiers fighting alongside selected Wazalendo units were wounded while attempting to defend Uvira through the night. Their engagement took place at a point when most FARDC units had already withdrawn southwards toward Makobola, leaving allied forces exposed and relatively isolated.
• FARDC withdrawal dynamics
  FARDC’s tactical withdrawal appears to have been conducted in stages, but without the benefit of an orderly rear-guard or effective communication. This further reinforced the sense of abandonment and contributed to a collapse of confidence among remaining local defenders and civilians.
• Information operations and perception management
  Some Wazalendo elements have reportedly engaged in improvised information operations, circulating decontextualised or outdated video content purporting to show continued control of Uvira. This suggests:

– A desire to maintain a narrative of resistance despite the changed reality on the ground.

– A widening gap between messaging and the tactical situation, which risks further undermining public trust if and when the truth becomes widely evident.

The combination of physical withdrawal and contested narratives strengthens AFC/M23’s image as the decisive actor in the zone and further erodes the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of state-aligned forces.

5. Outlook and Immediate Priorities

If the current pattern continues unchallenged, AFC/M23 will retain the initiative in selecting targets, shaping the battlefield, and dictating the tempo of operations around key urban centres.

Immediate priorities for state and allied actors should include:

• Rapidly analysing and formally documenting the Bukavu and Uvira cases as reference scenarios for planning.
• Designing defensive postures that anticipate the four-phase AFC/M23 approach and deny them the benefits of uncontested final entry.
• Prioritising early-warning and rapid-response mechanisms around Kalemie and Kindu, treating them as high-risk urban targets under this emerging operational logic.
• Aligning public communication with the real situation on the ground to avoid further credibility loss and to maintain civilian cooperation.

Without such adjustments, the fall of Uvira risks becoming not an exception but a template for further AFC/M23 advances across eastern DRC.