JNIM’s Multi-Pronged Offensive in Mali

Overview

As of early September 2025, Mali faces an intensifying insurgency led by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate. Recent events in central and western Mali highlight a coordinated strategy by JNIM to weaken the Malian state on multiple fronts. This analysis focuses on three key developments: the seizure and continued occupation of Farabougou, the assassination of a local mayor amidst internal rivalries, and targeted economic sabotage. Together these illustrate JNIM’s multi-dimensional campaign: territorial control, manipulation of local governance, exploitation of political fragmentation, and economic disruption.

Territorial Control

On 19 August 2025, JNIM launched a large-scale offensive against the Malian army base and village of Farabougou in the Ségou region. The assault overran government positions, resulting in significant military and civilian casualties. JNIM fighters captured vehicles, weapons, and prisoners, later using them for propaganda purposes.

Since the attack, JNIM has maintained its presence in Farabougou, effectively barring the Malian army’s return. This represents a shift from hit-and-run tactics toward sustained territorial occupation, turning Farabougou into a foothold for insurgent administration. For local residents, the aftermath has been severe: many fled to neighbouring towns, while those who remain live under the group’s control. Farabougou has effectively become a no-go zone for state forces and a staging ground for further operations.

Local Governance and Civil Accommodation

Following the fall of Farabougou, reports indicate that an informal arrangement emerged between JNIM and local villagers to prevent the return of the Malian army. This allowed some residents to cautiously return, but under jihadist conditions. In practice, JNIM has imposed itself as the local authority, dictating security arrangements and social conduct.

Local leaders in nearby communes attempted negotiations to avoid further attacks. The mayor of Dogofry, for instance, sought a localized agreement with JNIM to spare his community from suffering the same fate as Farabougou. This reflects a wider trend: communities, facing state absence and fearing violence, increasingly opt for negotiated submission to jihadist governance in exchange for survival.

Such dynamics erode state legitimacy. When populations pay taxes, accept religious rules, and rely on JNIM for justice or security, insurgents gradually replace the state’s authority. Farabougou illustrates how JNIM leverages coercion and conditional agreements to establish parallel governance structures.

Political Fragmentation and Local Tensions

The assassination of Dogofry’s mayor on 30 August exposed deep divisions among local actors. While some leaders pursue negotiation to safeguard civilians, others categorically reject compromise. The killing, carried out by traditional hunter militias opposed to any deal with jihadists, highlights the fracturing of community leadership under insurgent pressure.

This fragmentation creates a dangerous dynamic: local militias turn their weapons not only against jihadists but also against community leaders viewed as collaborators. Such internal rifts weaken resistance to insurgency and feed cycles of mistrust and violence. JNIM benefits indirectly from this fragmentation, as communities divided between “appeasers” and “resisters” cannot mount a united defence.

Economic Disruption

Parallel to its military advances, JNIM has intensified attacks on Mali’s economic infrastructure. Recent sabotage operations targeted construction equipment along the strategic Bamako–Kayes road, burning heavy machinery and halting work on a vital transport corridor. Similar incidents in previous months struck projects run by foreign contractors, particularly in infrastructure and mining.

By deliberately attacking development projects and foreign-owned assets, JNIM seeks to:

• Undermine government credibility by preventing the delivery of services and infrastructure.
• Intimidate foreign investors, discouraging further economic engagement.
• Deepen economic hardship for local populations, making them more susceptible to insurgent influence.

This economic war complements JNIM’s military campaign. By isolating Mali economically and crippling its partnerships, insurgents weaken state resilience and increase their leverage over local populations.

Conclusion

The occupation of Farabougou, the assassination of a negotiating mayor, and the sabotage of key infrastructure projects collectively reveal JNIM’s deliberate, multi-pronged strategy:

• Territorial entrenchment through military offensives and holding ground.
• Governance substitution via coercive local agreements.
• Exploitation of political divisions to weaken communal unity.
• Economic sabotage to isolate the state and deter external support.

This strategy is structural, not opportunistic. JNIM is embedding itself as an alternative governing authority, progressively undermining Mali’s sovereignty, governance, and economy. The events of August–September 2025 mark a critical stage in this campaign, with Farabougou now a symbol of the insurgents’ ability to seize, hold, and administer territory.

ASA Independent Offerings

On request, African Security Analysis (ASA) provides tailored analysis and support to diverse stakeholders seeking to understand and navigate Mali’s evolving security landscape:

• For International Organizations:
  ASA delivers early-warning assessments on humanitarian and security risks in conflict-affected regions, enabling timely deployment of relief operations and alignment of humanitarian corridors.
• For Private Companies and Investors:
  ASA provides detailed risk mapping of regions and projects, including infrastructure and extractive sectors. This helps businesses anticipate threats to personnel, supply chains, and assets, particularly from sabotage, taxation by armed groups, or forced closures.
• For Governments and Security Institutions:
  ASA develops scenario-based analyses of insurgent strategies, highlighting vulnerabilities in border zones, local governance, and economic targets. These insights inform strategic planning, peacekeeping deployments, and diplomatic engagement.
• For NGOs and Civil Society Actors:
  ASA offers contextual briefings on community dynamics, local governance vacuums, and insurgent-imposed norms, supporting programming decisions in education, health, and reconciliation initiatives.

Through its independent intelligence framework, ASA aims to equip each partner with clear situational awareness, forward-looking risk analysis, and tailored insights. The goal is not to prescribe policy but to enable decision-makers to act with foresight in one of the most complex insurgent theatres in West Africa.