Islam, Tribute, or the Sword

Allied Democratic Forces/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ADF/ISCAP) Ideological Warfare and the Escalating Security Crisis in Beni–Lubero–Ituri

1. Ideological Framework

The violence carried out by the Allied Democratic Forces/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ADF/ISCAP) in Beni and Lubero is reinforced by an extremist ideological narrative.
This narrative is built around a stark triad — Islam, tribute (jizya), or the sword — which frames massacres as three coercive “choices” for civilians:

• Convert to Islam
• Pay a tax of submission
• Or face death

The aim is twofold:

• to spread terror among local populations, and
• to provide a veneer of religious justification for what are, in practice, mass atrocities.

2. The Three Options

• Conversion (shahada): Enforced as immediate integration into the group’s politico-religious order.
• Payment of the jizya: Framed as an alternative but in reality, functions as a marker of humiliation and forced submission, detached from any historical precedent.
• The sword (death): Enforced against those who resist, as evidenced by recent massacres in Lubero and Beni.

3. Recent Attacks

• Lubero – Bandolo (14 Rabiʿ al-Awwal / mid-August 2025): Clash with a Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) patrol, resulting in multiple casualties.
• Lubero – Mabonda–Bandolo (16 Rabiʿ al-Awwal): Ambush on Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) units with heavy Ugandan losses.
• Lubero – Netuyo (same period): Massacre of ~100 civilians, destruction of 30 houses and 2 vehicles.
• Beni – Oicha: Execution of 21 Christians during a convoy ambush; 8 motorbikes destroyed.
• Pakango (recent days): Ambush on a joint FARDC–UPDF patrol.

According to African Security Analysis (ASA) internal sources, around 10 Ugandan soldiers were killed — evidence that the ADF retains significant offensive capacity despite joint counter-operations.

4. Strategic Intent

ASA analysis indicates this attack wave aimed to:

• Undermine the credibility of FARDC–UPDF joint operations.
• Demonstrate the ADF’s mobility within forested terrain.
• Reinforce ideological warfare by deliberately targeting civilians.

5. Security Implications

• Civilian frustration: Massacres and weak protection by joint forces risk deepening resentment toward authorities.
• Expanding insecurity: Attacks now span Lubero, Beni, and Pakango, raising the likelihood of further spread into Ituri.
• Regional fragility: The “Islam or death” rhetoric injects a sectarian dimension that could erode cohesion and escalate communal divisions.
  

6. Conclusion

The slogan “Islam, tribute, or the sword” is not just ideological rhetoric but a psychological weapon intended to recast the conflict as a civilizational struggle.

The attacks in Lubero, Beni, and Pakango highlight both:

• the ADF/ISCAP’s resilience and tactical agility, and
• the shortcomings of FARDC–UPDF joint operations in securing the region.

ASA reaffirms its commitment to:

• delivering reliable, field-based intelligence,
• supporting actors in anticipating security trends in eastern DRC, and
• safeguarding strategic interests against rising instability.

7. ASA Recommendations

Immediate (0–30 days)

• Civilian protection: Randomized patrols, secured corridors, binational quick reaction forces (QRF), designated “safe points” (schools, churches, mosques) with supplies and trauma kits.
• Early warning: Community-based alert systems via chiefs, youth, and religious leaders; unified hotline/WhatsApp channel; standardized reporting codes.
• Anti-ambush: Vary convoy schedules, deploy forward scouts and decoys, strengthen improvised explosive device (IED) detection.
• Counter-propaganda: Rapid, fact-based communication emphasizing civilian protection and accurate casualty reporting.

Short Term (30–90 days)

• Targeted raids: 72–96-hour missions disrupting logistics rather than holding ground.
• Joint intelligence fusion: FARDC–UPDF–Police cell for weekly threat analysis.
• Community resilience: Multi-faith local safety committees trained in alerts, crowd management, and first aid; identify vulnerable populations for priority evacuation.
• Human rights safeguards: Clear rules of engagement (ROE) and human rights officers to reduce civilian harm and resentment.

Medium Term (90–180 days)

• Logistics disruption: Monitor and interdict supply chains (fuel, medicine, food); map and target financial networks.
• Community mediation: Interfaith and traditional leadership dialogues focused on civilian protection and rejection of violence.
• Humanitarian coordination: Partner with NGOs and faith-based groups for emergency relief, trauma support, and displacement monitoring.

Cross-Cutting Measures

• Crisis governance: Weekly operational reviews through a joint crisis cell.
• Technology & data: Deploy drones, encrypted communications, and shared GIS systems.
• Private sector security: Require security protocols for mining, agriculture, and transport firms (GPS tracking, evacuation drills).

8. Monitoring Progress (KPIs)

• Reduced QRF intervention time (<45 minutes).
• Fewer successful ambushes and convoy losses.
• Faster post-attack recovery (<72 hours for essential services).
• More frequent and reliable community alerts acted upon.
• Stabilization or reduction in displacement flows.

9. ASA Added Value

• Early warning and live mapping of attack patterns and displacement routes.
• Confidential decision briefs for governments, donors, and private stakeholders.
• Specialized training in ambush survival, civil-military engagement, and community safety.
• After-action reviews to continuously refine operational strategies