Goma–Gisenyi Border Goes 24/7, Signalling Power Shifts
Rwandan authorities and the AFC/M23-run administration in Goma will restore around-the-clock crossings at the Goma–Gisenyi frontier. Closed outright when M23 seized Goma on January 27, the border later reopened with limited hours—first until 15:00, then 18:00, but never operated overnight until now.
This decision reflects Kigali’s confidence in AFC/ M23’s grip on Goma and marks a de facto partnership: joint customs protocols, coordinated security patrols and shared health inspections imply that Rwandan agencies recognize the rebel administration as a local authority. Economically, full access should relieve traders, commuters and aid convoys of persistent bottlenecks, stabilizing supplies of perishables, fuel and essential goods on both sides of Lake Kivu.
Politically, however, direct engagement with AFC/M23 threatens to erode Kinshasa’s sovereignty and sets a precedent for other non-state actors in eastern DRC to negotiate independently with neighbouring capitals—further fragmenting central authority. Simultaneously, former President Joseph Kabila has held consultations in Bukavu to gauge local viewpoints on stabilization. According to on-the-ground information gathered by African Security Analysis, Belgium sought talks with him to harmonize positions on eastern DRC, but Kabila has remained unavailable—underscoring the fragmented authority in Kinshasa.
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Benin: Northern Attacks, Fuel Pressure, and Regional Security Cooperation Define the Incoming Government’s Stability Challenge
Benin is entering a more difficult security and economic phase. The March attacks in Alibori and Atacora confirm that JNIM remains capable of striking Beninese military positions, seizing equipment, and operating across border areas linked to Niger, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.
Mali: Humanitarian Flight Suspension and Expanding Extremist Pressure Signal a Deteriorating National Security Environment
Mali’s security environment is no longer defined by isolated insurgent pressure in the north and centre. The pattern now points to a wider national threat picture: JNIM continues to shape conditions in central and northern Mali while pushing deeper into the south and west; ISSP remains active in Gao and Ménaka; northern armed groups retain the ability to challenge Malian military positions; and humanitarian access is increasingly vulnerable to state-imposed restrictions as well as armed-group pressure.
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