Ethiopia Sounds the Alarm: Eritrea Mobilizing for War

A Nobel Peace Laureate in the Shadow of Conflict

Just days before the announcement of the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—himself a Nobel laureate in 2019—finds his name again in international headlines, but this time under dramatically different circumstances.

In a letter dated 2 October 2025, addressed to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and obtained by AFP, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accuses Eritrea of actively preparing for war by financing and directing armed groups operating inside Ethiopia.

The accusations, which mark a major diplomatic rupture between two former allies, threaten to destabilize an already fragile region still recovering from years of civil conflict.

Addis Ababa’s Accusations: Asmara’s Shadow War

The Ethiopian government claims that Eritrea is arming and coordinating multiple rebel factions, including militias active in the Amhara region, where intermittent anti-government uprisings have challenged federal authority.

The most explosive allegation, however, concerns an alleged “collusion” between Eritrea and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—Addis Ababa’s former adversary in the 2020–2022 Tigray War.

According to the Ethiopian letter, this new alignment seeks to “fragment and destabilize Ethiopia from within.”

If confirmed, the development would represent a stunning geopolitical reversal: during the Tigray conflict, Eritrea had militarily supported Abiy Ahmed’s federal forces against the TPLF.

Three years later, those same partners are now locked in mutual suspicion and rhetorical confrontation.

A Fragile Peace Built on a Violent Past

Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, relations between the two countries have oscillated between cautious cooperation and open hostility.

• The 1998–2000 border war killed tens of thousands.
• The 2018 peace accord, signed by Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki, was hailed worldwide as a breakthrough and earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize.

Yet, as Ethiopia’s internal fractures deepened after 2022, Asmara’s patience waned. Eritrean leadership now views Addis Ababa’s domestic unrest as a potential security threat—and a strategic opportunity to reassert regional leverage.

The Red Sea Factor: Strategic Depth and Maritime Access

At the heart of the renewed tension lies Ethiopia’s maritime ambition. Since losing its coastline in 1993, the country has depended on Djibouti for 95% of its seaborne trade.

However, Prime Minister Abiy has repeatedly emphasized Ethiopia’s “right to access the Red Sea,” describing it as “existential for national survival.”

Diplomatic overtures to Eritrea (Assab port), Somalia (Berbera), and Sudan (Port Sudan) have produced little success. Asmara interprets recent Ethiopian rhetoric and troop redeployments in the north as possible precursors to coercive diplomacy—or even limited incursions aimed at securing a maritime corridor.

For Eritrea, any Ethiopian push toward the coast represents a red line, reviving memories of territorial confrontation.

Regional Repercussions: The Horn on the Edge

The accusations come amid rising volatility across the Horn of Africa:

• Sudan’s civil war continues to spill weapons and refugees into the region.
• Somalia’s counterinsurgency against Al-Shabaab remains stretched.
• Djibouti’s ports have become crowded with competing foreign militaries (China, the U.S., France).

A renewed Ethiopia–Eritrea confrontation would therefore risk collapsing the regional balance, undermining existing peacekeeping operations and threatening maritime stability in one of the world’s busiest trade corridors—the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Diplomatic Isolation and Perception Risks

For Prime Minister Abiy, the accusations against Eritrea also carry political symbolism. The international community that once celebrated him as a peacemaker increasingly views him through the lens of internal repression and regional assertiveness.

Meanwhile, Eritrea—long isolated by sanctions and opaque governance—is seeking new strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and the UAE, diversifying its external backers. This shifting alignment could harden Asmara’s position and complicate UN mediation efforts.

Conflict Scenarios

Scenario 1 – Controlled Confrontation:
Limited cross-border skirmishes or proxy clashes via militias, with both governments avoiding open war. (Probability: 55%)

Scenario 2 – Direct Military Escalation:
Ethiopia attempts to secure a corridor toward the Red Sea by force; Eritrea retaliates with full mobilization. Regional spillover likely. (Probability: 25%)

Scenario 3 – Diplomatic De-escalation:
External mediation by the African Union or the UAE restores communication channels; mutual restraint achieved. (Probability: 20%)

Strategic Assessment: Fragility Meets Geostrategy

The Ethiopian – Eritrean standoff encapsulates a wider structural crisis in the Horn of Africa:

• Economic desperation, worsened by drought and debt.
• Militarized nationalism, redefining borders through access to resources.
• Great-power competition over Red Sea ports and logistics nodes.

Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions and Eritrea’s defensive posture make the Red Sea coast a flashpoint for 2026, with potential implications for trade security, regional diplomacy, and humanitarian corridors.

Advisory and Foresight

Increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea call for comprehensive monitoring, including tracking troop activity, diplomatic moves, and resource interests.

African Security Analysis (ASA) supports governments, investors, and international groups with:

• Real-time early-warning analytics on troop movements and cross-border issues.
• Risk modelling for Red Sea maritime security.
• Political stability indices that cover governance, economic, and environmental factors.
• Mediation advisory tools to help prevent conflict.

This public summary provides an overview of available intelligence, but ASA can deliver detailed and confidential assessments for defence ministries, peacekeeping operations, and regional development agencies.

Leaders who need informed guidance about escalation risks in the Horn of Africa, competition for maritime access, or new alliances involving Eritrea are encouraged to reach out to ASA directly.