Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: Leadership Challenges and the Quest for Peace
Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has implemented an unconventional approach to address escalating tensions in the volatile Tigray region. Amid growing fears of a renewed civil war, he has invited Tigrayans to submit suggestions for a new regional leader via email. This initiative follows internal discord within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the governing body of the region, which led to interim president Getachew Reda fleeing to Addis Ababa earlier this month.
The ongoing power struggle has reignited concerns that Tigray could relapse into the devastating civil war of 2020–2022, which claimed an estimated half a million lives. The Pretoria Agreement, a peace deal that ended the conflict, established an interim administration to govern the region until elections could be held. However, Prime Minister Abiy has criticized Tigray's leadership for failing to create the necessary conditions for elections.
New Interim President?
In a recent social media statement, Abiy announced plans to appoint a new interim president, citing the need to address "realities on the ground." He also extended the administration's mandate by an additional year, emphasizing the importance of stabilizing the region. While some view this move as an opportunity to unite Tigray's factions and chart a new course, critics argue that it undermines self-governance and the Pretoria Agreement.
The situation remains precarious, with delays in demobilizing TPLF forces and significant humanitarian challenges. International observers, including the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union, have urged all parties to avoid a return to violence. Meanwhile, Abiy has acknowledged the strain on Ethiopia's military, which is also grappling with conflicts in Oromia and Amhara. "My answer is peace," he told parliament last week.
Analysis: The conflict in Tigray has left deep scars, with all sides accused of atrocities, including mass killings and widespread sexual violence. As Ethiopia navigates this critical juncture, Abiy's decisions will likely shape the region's future.
While the appointment of a new leader may temporarily ease tensions between rival Tigray factions, the underlying issues that fueled the power struggle remain unresolved and continue to pose a significant risk of renewed violence. Months of internal discord within the TPLF culminated in armed factions aligned with TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael seizing TIA offices in what interim president Getachew Reda described as a coup.
The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have warned that the recent crisis must not lead to a resurgence of violence. A renewed conflict in Tigray could spark another civil war in Ethiopia, potentially drawing in Eritrea and destabilizing the broader Red Sea region.
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Ituri Under Surveillance
Rising Security Concerns The political fragmentation in eastern DRC continues to threaten the fragile stability of Ituri. The failure of the Doha process and the breakdown of the republican pact could pave the way for a new wave of unrest in the region. On April 22, 2025, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, met with leaders of the Lendu militia CODECO (Cooperative for the Development of the Congo) in Entebbe. Officially, the meeting was convened to address CODECO’s attack on Ugandan military positions in Ituri, a confrontation that adds to past clashes between the group and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). Key Figures and Discussions The CODECO delegation, led by Dunji Kulukpa Etienne (Vice President of the Lendu community), included political and militant representatives. On the Ugandan side, top-ranking officials participated: • General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, CDF • Lieutenant General Kayanja Muhanga, Land Forces Commander • Major General Felix Busizoori, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division • Brigadier General Oscar Munanura, Deputy Assistant Chief of Intelligence and Security Earlier in the week, CODECO leaders had already engaged with Ugandan military commanders. During the Entebbe meeting, Mr. Dunji expressed gratitude for Uganda’s reception and apologized for the Fataki clashes between CODECO and the UPDF. He claimed the militia had been influenced by external forces and emphasized that the Lendu, Balega, and Bahema communities do not view Uganda as an adversary. Dunji also highlighted Ituri’s worsening humanitarian crisis, attributing it to political divisions, while praising Uganda’s contributions in healthcare, refugee assistance, and economic aid. Uganda’s Expanding Influence in Ituri General Kainerugaba reaffirmed Uganda’s historical presence in North Kivu and Ituri, citing counter-insurgency operations dating back to the early 2000s. He urged CODECO leaders to collaborate with the UPDF in pursuit of a lasting peace. As a demonstration of goodwill, Ugandan forces provided free medical care to wounded CODECO fighters. Strategic Implications: A Larger Agenda? While Uganda frames this meeting as a step toward reconciliation, analysts at African Security Analysis suggest a deeper motive. They argue that the gathering was part of a broader effort to integrate CODECO into the militant coalition led by Thomas Lubanga, potentially setting the stage for coordinated offensives in Ituri, particularly targeting Bunia. If confirmed, this would signal a significant shift in the security landscape, with Uganda deepening its influence in Ituri under the guise of conflict resolution. The region remains under scrutiny as stakeholders assess the evolving dynamics.
Strengthening Maritime Security and Navigating Sahelian Integration Challenges
On 23 April, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its fourth session under the theme “The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.” Over the last decade, Gulf of Guinea states have deepened regional cooperation and harnessed digital technologies to bolster Maritime Domain Awareness, driving piracy incidents down from 84 in 2020 to just 18 in 2024. Yet much of this capability rests on platforms developed, financed, and controlled by external partners, leaving coastal states exposed to shifting geopolitical winds.
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