Ethiopia–Eritrea: Escalating Accusations and the Return of War Risk in the Horn of Africa

Seven years after a landmark peace agreement formally ended two decades of hostility, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are again sliding toward open confrontation. A new cycle of accusations, counter-accusations, and strategic signalling has revived the spectre of armed conflict in one of Africa’s most volatile regions, where unresolved rivalries, internal rebellions, and regional ambitions continue to intersect.

A Seizure That Raises Regional Stakes

On 15 January 2026, Ethiopian federal police announced the interception of a large shipment of ammunition in the Amhara region. According to official statements, more than 56,000 rounds were seized en-route to the Fano militias, armed groups that have been engaged in an insurgency against the federal government since 2023. Two suspects were reportedly arrested during the operation.

Ethiopian authorities claimed preliminary investigations linked the ammunition to the Eritrean state, accusing what they referred to as the “Shabiya government” of actively supplying the Fano rebellion. If substantiated, such support would represent a direct escalation by Eritrea into Ethiopia’s internal conflict, transforming a domestic security crisis into a regional confrontation.

Asmara’s Rebuttal and the Narrative of Provocation

Asmara moved swiftly to deny the allegations. Eritrea’s information minister described the accusations as a fabricated pretext, arguing that Addis Ababa was deliberately constructing a “false flag” narrative to justify military action. From Eritrea’s perspective, the claims are part of a broader Ethiopian strategy to externalize internal instability and rally nationalist support amid mounting domestic pressures on the federal government of Ethiopia.

This exchange follows unusually sharp rhetoric from Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, who recently accused Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party of having effectively “declared war” on Eritrea. While insisting that Asmara does not seek conflict, Afwerki emphasized Eritrea’s readiness to defend itself—language widely interpreted as both a warning and a signal of deterrence.

Internal Conflict as a Regional Catalyst

The Amhara crisis has become a central fault line in Ethiopia’s security landscape. The Fano militias, initially mobilized as local self-defence groups, have evolved into a loosely coordinated insurgent force challenging federal authority. For Addis Ababa, any suggestion of foreign support to these groups fundamentally alters the threat perception, raising the stakes from counterinsurgency to national defence.

From an Eritrean standpoint, however, Ethiopia’s accusations are seen as an attempt to frame a regional enemy in order to mask governance failures, economic strain, and the persistence of armed resistance across multiple regions. This mutual distrust reflects how internal Ethiopian conflicts increasingly spill into regional geopolitics.

The Red Sea Question: A Strategic Obsession

Underlying the current escalation is a deeper strategic dispute: Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign access to the Red Sea. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has repeatedly described maritime access as an “existential” issue for a country of more than 120 million people. In recent months, Ethiopian leaders have spoken more openly about securing such access, heightening alarm in neighbouring states.

The Eritrean port of Assab has become the symbolic and strategic focal point of these ambitions. President Afwerki has dismissed Ethiopian claims as reckless and dangerous, warning against any attempt to alter regional borders or access routes by force. For Asmara, Ethiopia’s maritime rhetoric represents not economic pragmatism, but a direct challenge to Eritrean sovereignty.

From Peace Dividend to Strategic Breakdown

The deterioration of relations marks a stark reversal from the optimism of 2018, when Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement that ended years of frozen hostility and earned Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed international acclaim. That détente, however, was never fully institutionalized. Borders remained largely closed, economic integration stalled, and mutual suspicion persisted beneath the surface.

The war in Tigray further eroded trust. Eritrea’s military involvement alongside Ethiopian federal forces initially aligned the two governments, but Asmara’s exclusion from the 2022 Pretoria peace negotiations reignited long-standing grievances. Since then, coordination has given way to strategic divergence, with both sides reassessing each other as potential threats rather than partners.

Strategic Outlook: Conflict Risk Without Clear Off-Ramps

The current trajectory does not point inevitably to war, but it does suggest a dangerous erosion of restraint. Accusations of proxy warfare, unresolved disputes over Red Sea access, and the absence of credible mediation mechanisms increase the risk of miscalculation. Unlike the 1998–2000 conflict, today’s tensions are layered onto multiple internal crises, making escalation harder to contain.

For the Horn of Africa, renewed Ethiopia–Eritrea hostilities would reverberate far beyond their shared border—destabilizing Sudan, complicating Red Sea security, and further militarizing a region already strained by overlapping conflicts. The peace signed seven years ago has not collapsed formally, but its strategic foundations have clearly weakened. What remains is a fragile equilibrium, sustained less by reconciliation than by the uncertain calculus of deterrence.