Escalating Alliances and Foreign Involvement Intensify DRC Conflict

Recent developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) reveal growing collaboration between the M23 rebel group, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), and various local armed factions. These alliances appear aimed at strengthening political and military leverage, potentially bypassing existing ceasefire agreements.

On April 12, 2025, Pastor Joël Namunene Muganguzi and his movement, the Union of Forces for the Reconstruction of Congo (UFRC), officially aligned with the AFC-M23. This followed a meeting of self-defense groups in Bukavu on March 30. Pastor Namunene, originally from Uvira in South Kivu, expressed a desire to unify regional forces from South Kivu, Maniema, and Lualaba around a broader revolutionary agenda.

In North Kivu, the Action for Change movement, led by Ambroise Bwira, has mobilized both political and military support for the AFC in areas including Goma, Masisi, Walikale, and Kalehe. Similarly, in Beni, Mayi-Mayi leader Kava wa Seli is reportedly moving to align forces and logistical support near AFC/M23 positions following a trip to Uganda.

Foreign mercenaries’ involvement

In response to increasing security concerns, the DRC government has reportedly entered discussions with Erik Prince to facilitate the recruitment of Colombian mercenaries. These forces would potentially operate with U.S.-supplied weaponry. There are also unverified suggestions of coordination involving South African mercenaries and earlier deployments via Bosaso airport.

A South African ORYX helicopter was observed at Lubumbashi’s Luano airport on May 10, indicating possible foreign military presence in Katanga. Meanwhile, the identities of forces deployed in Kisangani and Kalemie remain unconfirmed. Sources suggest the presence of personnel from Eastern Europe, Colombia, and possibly North Korea, although this remains unverifiable.

Reports from sources close to the M23 allege the deaths of 12 Belgian soldiers during the AFC’s capture of Walikale. These claims have not been independently confirmed. Accusations have also emerged suggesting Belgian support for Congolese government forces and allied militias, including the FARDC and the FDLR. Belgium, however, denies any military involvement in the conflict.

Additional claims from M23-affiliated sources mention Belgian drone activity in Walikale and Masisi on May 1 and 2. According to these reports, five CH-4 drones were transported from Kinshasa to Bujumbura via Kalemie, allegedly for operations in South Kivu.

M23 representatives have criticized Belgium’s alleged actions, stating they contribute to escalating the conflict and hindering peace efforts. These developments may be linked to recent diplomatic tensions between the DRC and Belgium.

M23 leadership has expressed intentions to manage territories independently from the Kinshasa government and to sidestep the Doha peace process. They have also questioned the legitimacy of recent DRC-Rwanda agreements, suggesting Rwanda had strategic motives related to its international image and security interests in the region.

As the situation evolves, the DRC appears increasingly fragmented, with multiple actors—both local and international—competing for influence and control.