Zapad-2025: African Participation with Russia–Belarus and the Security Outlook for the Sahel vs. Central Africa

Synopsis

Zapad-2025 was a Russian - Belarusian military exercise held in Belarus from 12–16 September 2025, with over 20 foreign participants. African states including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Republic of the Congo joined as contingents or observers, indicating a shift in their defence partnerships and alignment away from Western models.

Strategic Significance

Projection of Russian power. Moscow leverages Zapad to demonstrate global reach and resiliency, while showcasing a ready network of partners beyond Eurasia. African participation helps validate Russia’s narrative of an alternative security pole.

African motivations (by cohort).

• Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger (Sahel juntas): Replace withdrawn Western support; secure arms, training, and political cover; tighten regime security amid jihadist pressure; reframe security doctrine without Western conditionality.
• Congo-Brazzaville (Central Africa): Deepen a long-standing strategic relationship; diversify partners for regime stability; access training/logistics; strengthen leverage in energy and infrastructure negotiations.

Signal to Western/Regional frameworks. Participation telegraphs reduced dependence on ECOWAS/EU/France/U.S. tools and growing openness to a Russia-centric model of training, kit, and advisory support.

Military Implications

Doctrine & training exposure. African units gain hands-on exposure to combined-arms manoeuvre, layered air defence integration, EW/ISR-enabled targeting, and urban operations, with an emphasis on massed firepower and rapid operational tempo.

Modernization & sustainment. Likely follow-on packages: training teams, maintenance support, ammunition pipelines, rotary-wing and air-defence kits, and spares. This creates medium-term platform dependency on Russian supply chains.

Interoperability trade-offs. Pivoting to Russian standards reduces compatibility with NATO/UN mission procedures (C2, comms, ATAK/JBC-P analogues, JTAC, IFF), complicating multinational ops and peacekeeping interoperability.

Operational logistics. Moving African personnel to Belarus under Russian facilitation demonstrates expeditionary logistics under a Russian umbrella and habituates staffs to Russian planning cycles and after-action processes.

Political & Diplomatic Dynamics

Sovereignty narrative. Sahel juntas recast alignment as “strategic autonomy,” reinforcing domestic legitimacy and rejecting Western governance conditionality.

Bargaining leverage. Moscow’s defence assistance links to broader energy/mining/infrastructure bargains. African capitals increase negotiating space vis-à-vis all suitors.

Western dilemma. EU/U.S./France face narrowed access and influence; sanctions or drawdowns risk pushing states further into Russian orbit; re-engagement will require calibrated incentives and corridor-security deliverables.

Security Outlook (Continental)

Polarisation risk. Expect clearer fault lines between Russian-aligned militaries and Western-aligned coastal/central states. That segmentation can bleed into customs, aviation, and telecom standards—affecting commerce and aid flows.

Insurgency impact (ambiguous). Short-term boosts in fire support and air mobility may enable sharper offensive action in the Sahel. Without parallel governance/justice/local reconciliation, insurgents adapt, collateral harm risks recruitment spikes.

Institutional erosion. Reduced ECOWAS/AU conflict-management coherence as AES (Sahel alliance) consolidates alternative security partnerships; cross-border coordination becomes ad hoc and personality-driven.

Theatre Scenarios & Indicators

A) Sahel Theatre (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger)

Scenario S-1: “Steel Backbone” – Russian-enabled tactical ascendancy (Most likely, 6–18 months)

• Description: Expanded advisory presence, deliveries of air-defence/rotary-wing/ISR, improved logistics. Sahel forces execute more frequent battalion-level clear-and-hold ops; towns and main supply routes (MSRs) see episodic stabilisation.
• Key Indicators:

– Regular Russian training rotations; new maintenance depots and ammo storage.

– Increased heliborne insertions/night ops; uptick in precision fires guided by ISR.

– Publicized joint exercises on Sahel soil; AES standard operating procedures echo Russian doctrine.

• Implications: Short-term territorial gains and highway reopening’s; aid access improves on select corridors; civilian-harm risk rises with heavy fires; insurgents shift to IED/ambush war.

Scenario S-2: “Attrition Spiral” – gains stall, insurgents adapt (Plausible, 9–24 months)

• Description: Insurgents disperse, escalate complex IED belts and VBIEDs; target fuel, bridges, and local administrators; rural governance vacuum persists.
• Key Indicators:

– Spike in complex IED incidents on re-opened MSRs (Dori–Sebba, Gao–Ansongo, Tillabéri axes).

– Assassinations of local officials after security redeployments.

– Reports of munition/sustainment shortages, down-time for aircraft/helicopters.

• Implications: Stalemate; costs mount; legitimacy erodes; humanitarian operations face stop-go access; investors delay projects pending insurance/security premium resets.

Scenario S-3: “Bloc Consolidation” – formal AES–Russia defence compact (Low–moderate likelihood, high impact)

• Description: AES signs a comprehensive defence pact with Russia (training, basing access, integrated air-defence picture).
• Key Indicators:

– Framework agreements for permanent training missions; shared radar/air tracks.

– Joint procurement announcements (SHORAD/MRAD, transport/attack helos).

– Coordinated media on “collective defence” language.

• Implications: Irreversible alignment; Western re-engagement costs rise; cross-border deconfliction with non-AES neighbours degrades.

Tripwires to monitor (Sahel):

• Abrupt replacement of senior Sahel commanders with Russian-vetted officers.
• Fuel/munitions resupply flights increasing via non-traditional routes.
• Sudden curbs on international NGO movement or press access following major ops.

B) Central Africa Theatre (Congo-Brazzaville focus; spillovers to CAR/DRC)

Scenario C-1: “Managed Deepening” – quiet capacity build (Most likely, 6–24 months)

• Description: Congo expands bilateral training; upgrades base security and coastal surveillance; integrates limited Russian systems (radars, comms).
• Key Indicators:

– New MoUs for gendarmerie/marine training; simulator purchases; comms interoperability trials.

– Russian technical teams in armoury/logistics depots; periodic coastal exercises.

• Implications: Regime stability improves; port/energy nodes more secure; limited visibility and minimal regional friction.

Scenario C-2: “Regional Leverage” – security role expands beyond borders (Plausible, 12–24 months)

• Description: Congo uses enhanced capabilities to influence cross-border security (riverine patrols, border posts with CAR/DRC); may mediate or pressure neighbours.
• Key Indicators:

– Joint patrol announcements on Congo/Ubangi rivers; expansion of air assets near borders.

– Political messaging on “regional security provider” role; uptick in trilateral meetings.

• Implications: Higher diplomatic profile for Brazzaville; risk of frictions if operations are perceived as partisan by neighbours.

Scenario C-3: “Overreach & Blowback” – sanctions or reputational hit (Low likelihood, high impact)

• Description: Overt, controversial deployments or rights-abuse allegations trigger Western sanctions or financing constraints.
• Key Indicators:

– Sharp increase in foreign personnel; opaque security contracts tied to extractives.

– Publicised incidents involving journalists/activists around security sites.

• Implications: Financing risk for state-owned energy/logistics projects; insurance premia rise; investor exits from sensitive assets.

Tripwires to monitor (Central Africa):

• Sudden expansion of foreign security footprints at ports/airfields.
• New dual-use infrastructure (radar, hardened comms) funded outside normal budget lines.
• Procurement of crowd-control/ISR packages tied to political calendars.

Comparative Outlook: Sahel vs Central Africa

Dimension: Primary Aim

Sahel (BFA/MLI/NER): Fight insurgencies; regime survival; replace Western security architecture

Central Africa (COG focus): Regime security; leverage in energy/logistics; quiet capacity build

Dimension: Near-Term Effect

Sahel (BFA/MLI/NER): More firepower & tempo; partial MSR reopening’s; risk of civilian-harm backlash

Central Africa (COG focus): Better site security; limited outward signalling; low immediate friction

Dimension: Risk Profile

Sahel (BFA/MLI/NER): High kinetic risk: governance gaps persist; polarisation with neighbours

Central Africa (COG focus): Political/financing risk if alignment becomes conspicuous or coercive

Dimension: Interoperability

Sahel (BFA/MLI/NER): Decreasing with NATO/UN; growing Russian dependency

Central Africa (COG focus): Mixed—select Russian systems; manageable if footprint remains limited

Dimension: Most Likely Scenario

Sahel (BFA/MLI/NER): S-1 “Steel Backbone” → S-2 “Attrition Spiral” if sustainment lags

Central Africa (COG focus): C-1 “Managed Deepening”

Implications for Stakeholders

• Governments (regional & external): Expect harder AES posture and reduced ECOWAS leverage; anticipate deconfliction challenges and competing training standards.
• Corporates (energy, mining, logistics): Revisit route security (Sahel MSRs), insurance, and OFAC/EU compliance exposure; factor new gatekeepers and vet security providers carefully.
• NGOs/IOs: Prepare for access volatility post-offensives; invest in acceptance strategies distinct from state-aligned narratives.
• Financial institutions/insurers: Model sanctions contagion and reputational vectors in Central Africa; stress-test project finance with alternative security guarantees.

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)

1. Force-structure changes: Evidence of embedded foreign advisors at brigade/battalion echelons in Sahel armies.

2. Sustainment pipelines: Ammunition, aviation spares, and fuel flows sustaining higher tempo ops.

3. Air defence posture: New SHORAD/MRAD systems and integration with national air pictures.

4. Cross-border deconfliction: Changes in hot pursuit rules and incident reporting with non-AES neighbours.

5. Central Africa security contracts: Scope/terms of foreign security at ports, energy sites, and dual-use infrastructure.

ASA Support

African participation in Zapad-2025 crystallises a security realignment. In the Sahel, expect a near-term uptick in state offensive capacity offset by sustainability and legitimacy risks. In Central Africa, anticipate quiet capability gains with periodic political exposure risk. Stakeholders who calibrate security design, compliance posture, and engagement strategies to this bifurcated reality will preserve freedom of action; those who do not risk strategic surprise.

African Security Analysis (ASA) provides decision-grade, confidential support across both theatres:

• Live threat monitoring (MSR risk, factional dynamics, force movements).
• Route & site-specific security design for assets, compounds, and convoys.
• Exercise-to-theatre translation (what Zapad-style doctrine means for local TTPs).
• Sanctions & reputational exposure mapping tied to security partnerships.
• Red-team stress-tests of contingency plans (evacuation, supply continuity, crisis comms).