West Africa and the Sahel: UN Security Council Forecast for November 2025

Based on UNSC briefings and consultations

Expected Council Action

In November 2025, the UN Security Council will convene under the agenda item “Peace Consolidation in West Africa”, chaired by Julius Maada Bio, President of Sierra Leone and current Chairperson of ECOWAS. The meeting will focus on the deteriorating security environment across the Sahel, with particular attention to counterterrorism coordination, regional integration gaps, and the political fallout from recent coups in the subregion.

The Council is expected to review the growing threat from jihadist groups, including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), andIslamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), alongside ECOWAS’ slow-moving plans to operationalize a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 2026.

Regional Overview: A Fragmented Security Landscape

Rising Terrorist Threat Across the Sahel Core

The Sahel’s security map continues to deteriorate. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—faces intensified attacks amid its isolation from ECOWAS and disengagement from Western counterterrorism partnerships. The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team notes that JNIM has reached its highest operational capacity since 2018, with expanded capabilities to launch coordinated assaults using drones, IEDs, and multi-front offensives on fortified positions.

Simultaneously, ISGS has resurged along the Niger–Nigeria border, exploiting security vacuums and maintaining a de facto non-aggression pact with JNIM to jointly target state forces. This tacit cooperation underscores a strategic convergence of jihadist factions around anti-state objectives, despite ideological rivalries.

In Burkina Faso and northern Mali, JNIM’s influence has deepened into governance functions — imposing local taxes, settling disputes, and restricting cross-border commerce to assert de facto control. The movement’s southward expansion toward northern Benin, Togo, and Nigeria’s Sokoto region marks a dangerous evolution of the Sahel threat toward coastal West Africa.

Strategic Blockades and Economic Disruption

In early September, JNIM announced blockades on the southwestern Malian towns of Kayes and Nioro, cutting key fuel and trade routes from Senegal, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania. The embargo has triggered fuel shortages, inflation, and economic paralysis, amplifying frustration toward Bamako’s transitional authorities.

Local sources indicate that Malian intelligence services have initiated indirect talks with JNIM intermediaries in Mopti to negotiate partial relief of the blockade—an indicator of the state’s waning control and the insurgents’ growing leverage in rural governance.

Regional Political Realignments and Institutional Drift

The AES withdrawal from ECOWAS (effective January 2025) has reshaped the political geometry of regional security cooperation. The Abuja ECOWAS Summit (June 2025) appointed a Chief Negotiator to engage with the AES leadership but yielded limited progress. Divergent threat perceptions and sovereignty concerns have hampered intelligence sharing and cross-border operations.

The ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Abdel-Fatau Musah, confirmed the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force of 1,650 personnel set to deploy in 2026 — a move welcomed symbolically but insufficient to reverse near-term insecurity.

At the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council ministerial session in September, members agreed to create a Sahel Task Force to enhance border security, intelligence coordination, and counter-terror financing. However, with overlapping mandates between AU, ECOWAS, and AES frameworks, the institutional fragmentation remains acute, delaying any collective operational effect.

External Dynamics and Emerging Fault Lines

Great Power Competition in the Sahel

The Sahel’s geopolitical theatre continues to reflect competing external interests:

• Russia has entrenched its influence through bilateral defence pacts and the deployment of Africa Corps personnel, successor to the Wagner Group, under the Ministry of Defence. These forces operate mainly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, but have increasingly come under attack, exposing vulnerabilities in their force protection. Moscow presents its engagement as “sovereign support,” contrasting Western models of conditional aid.
• The United States, after a period of disengagement, has initiated a cautious re-engagement strategy. Senior U.S. officials have visited Bamako and Niamey, with Washington resuming intelligence-sharing programs and exploring mineral supply partnerships. Analysts interpret this as an attempt to retain strategic access to critical minerals and to offset Russian and Chinese presence.
• France remains diplomatically isolated in Mali, following the complete rupture of counter-terrorism cooperation. The arrest of a French embassy staff member in Bamako on espionage charges has further deepened the rift, confirming the erosion of France’s traditional influence in the Sahel.

Expanding Criminal-Terrorist Nexus

A defining feature of 2025’s Sahel security dynamics is the interconnection between jihadist financing and organized crime. Terrorist groups increasingly rely on gold smuggling, fuel trafficking, human migration routes, and narcotics to sustain operations.
Illicit networks now function as regional revenue systems, blurring distinctions between insurgency and economic survivalism. Analysts suggest these dynamics have created “hybrid economies of conflict”, enabling groups like JNIM and ISGS to outlast military offensives.

Governance, Climate Stress, and Economic Fragility

Beyond insurgency, structural fragilities remain at the core of regional instability:

• Governance deficits and contested transitions in AES countries have weakened institutional legitimacy.
• Climate-induced resource scarcity intensifies communal clashes in Niger, Chad, and northern Burkina Faso.
• Economic contraction and sanctions following AES’ withdrawal from ECOWAS have curtailed access to regional trade and aid mechanisms, worsening humanitarian conditions.

These conditions feed a feedback loop of radicalization, as marginalized populations align with non-state actors who offer protection and livelihood alternatives.

UN and Regional Policy Outlook

The upcoming Security Council session will likely emphasize:

1. Reinforcing multilateral coordination between ECOWAS, AU, AES, and UNOWAS to bridge political divides.

2. Exploring mechanisms under UN Resolution 2719 (December 2023) to finance African-led counterterrorism operations through UN-assessed contributions.

3. Enhancing collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to curb trafficking and terrorist financing.

4. Expanding Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) engagement to support governance reforms and local resilience under the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS).

The Council is also expected to request a Secretary-General briefing on new models of international engagement in the Sahel, drawing lessons from the Mali UN withdrawal (MINUSMA) and the need for more flexible, intelligence-driven interventions.

Council and Political Dynamics

Consensus on the Sahel remains limited and transactional:

• Western members advocate for a human rights–anchored counterterrorism approach, wary of legitimizing military juntas.
• Russia and China promote state-sovereignty–based engagement, positioning themselves as alternative security guarantors to the West.
• African members (notably Sierra Leone and Mozambique) seek greater financial autonomy for regional forces through UN mechanisms.

The absence of a unified approach risks perpetuating strategic incoherence, as overlapping coalitions pursue fragmented agendas with limited accountability.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Assessment

The security landscape in West Africa and the Sahel is evolving toward multi-layered instability — a convergence of jihadist insurgency, criminal economies, and geopolitical competition. The fragmentation of regional alliances following the AES withdrawal from ECOWAS has created a vacuum of coordination, while jihadist actors exploit state weakness to expand southward.

Unless the UN and regional partners can integrate security, governance, and economic stabilization into a coherent framework, current counterterrorism measures will remain tactically reactive and strategically ineffective.

ASA assesses that:

• JNIM’s hybrid governance model represents the most significant threat trajectory for 2026, as the group transitions from insurgency to territorial administration.
• ECOWAS’ delayed RDF deployment limits the region’s short-term deterrence capacity.
• External rivalries (Russia–West) will continue to shape the Sahel’s political future more than local dynamics, with potential proxy implications.

Outlook (Q1 2026)

• Short-term: Persistent attacks in AES states; risk of cross-border incidents in northern Benin and Togo.
• Medium-term: Gradual militarization of AES–ECOWAS relations; expanded Russian advisory footprint.
• Long-term: Institutional bifurcation between “pro-sovereignty” and “pro-democracy” blocs risks solidifying a new fault line across West Africa.

ASA Conclusion:
The Sahel’s crisis has entered a post-MINUSMA era defined by fragmented authority, adaptive insurgencies, and competitive external engagement. Without a credible regional compact linking security, legitimacy, and economic inclusion, West Africa is poised to remain the epicentre of global jihadist evolution and geopolitical contestation through 2026.