West Africa & the Sahel: Escalating Fragmentation, Expanding Extremism, and Regional Political Volatility

1. Expected Security Council Action

In December, the Security Council will convene an open briefing followed by closed consultations on West Africa and the Sahel. Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão, Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), is expected to brief Council members, and a civil society representative may also be invited. The session occurs in the context of escalating insecurity, political volatility, and severe humanitarian pressures across the region.

2. Security Deterioration Across the Sahel

2.1 Worsening Violence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger

The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated sharply. Terrorist groups continue to expand territorial influence, displace populations, and deepen instability across several states. Burkina Faso, northern Mali, and western Niger—now functioning collectively as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) following their withdrawal from ECOWAS—have experienced a surge in attacks by armed groups, intercommunal clashes, and reprisals. UN field reporting indicates that entire communities have been emptied as civilians flee violence and predatory taxation by extremist networks.

2.2 JNIM’s Siege Strategy and Growing Urban Threats in Mali

In Mali, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, has implemented a months-long campaign targeting national supply infrastructure. More than 100 fuel tankers have been attacked and fuel truck drivers abducted near Bamako and in other locations. The blockade has disrupted access to fuel and essential goods, worsening humanitarian conditions and signalling JNIM’s growing operational confidence. While Malian officials under Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop insist the state retains control, several foreign governments—including France, the UK, and the US—have urged their citizens to leave Mali immediately due to the deteriorating security situation.

2.3 Regional Alarm and Calls for Coordinated Counter-Terrorism

The AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has called for a robust international response to counter escalating terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel. On 18 November, Sierra Leone, serving as Security Council President and current ECOWAS Chair, convened an open briefing on strengthening regional counter-terrorism cooperation. The session underscored the urgency of harmonizing international support to address rapidly evolving threats.

3. Lake Chad Basin: Intensifying Competition Among Extremist Groups

Fighting erupted in early November between Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants in the village of Dogon Chiku near Lake Chad’s tri-border area. At least 200 fighters were reportedly killed, mostly from ISWAP. The clashes highlight growing competition among extremist factions and the fragmentation of violent non-state actors in the Basin. These dynamics complicate counter-terrorism efforts, disrupt civilian access routes, and threaten to spread instability further into Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In December, members of the Council’s Informal Expert Group on Climate, Peace and Security intend to conduct a field mission to Chad to assess how environmental stressors magnify insecurity.

4. Political Transitions and Electoral Pressures

4.1 Côte d’Ivoire’s Disputed Presidential Elections

Côte d’Ivoire held presidential elections on 25 October. President Alassane Ouattara secured a fourth term amid widespread controversy following the exclusion of opposition figures Laurent Gbagbo and Tidjane Thiam. Protests erupted in several cities, met with heavy security deployments. Reports indicate the arrest of 255 protesters and use of tear gas to disperse crowds. The Government deployed 44,000 security personnel to pre-empt demonstrations and maintain public order.

4.2 Guinea-Bissau: Military Intervention and Electoral Suspension

Guinea-Bissau held presidential and legislative elections on 23 November. Disputes over the incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló’s constitutional mandate—claimed by some to have expired in February and by others in September—fuelled tensions. On 26 November, military officers identifying themselves as the “High Military Command for the Restoration of Order” seized control of state institutions, suspended the electoral process, closed borders, and halted media operations. The incident follows a history of chronic instability, including attempted coups in December 2023 and October 2024, further underscoring the fragility of the political environment.

4.3 Guinea: Military Leader’s Presidential Bid and Opposition Restrictions

Guinea’s transitional military leader, General Mamadi Doumbouya, formally registered as a candidate for the 28 December presidential elections, reversing earlier pledges not to run. Major opposition parties such as the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) and the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) have been suspended from political activity, raising doubts about the credibility of the process and signalling increasing authoritarian consolidation.

5. Humanitarian Conditions and Funding Shortfalls

The region’s worsening security and political crises have exacerbated humanitarian needs. UNHCR warns that access constraints and an acute funding shortfall threaten essential services. The Sahel appeal for 2025, totalling $409.7 million, is funded at only 32 percent, prompting cuts in health, education, and protection programming. Displacement continues to rise, and humanitarian actors face layered risks from extremist attacks, military operations, and governance breakdowns.

6. Key Issues and Options Before the Council

6.1 Expanding Terrorist Threats and the Crime–Terror Nexus

Council members are concerned about the growing sophistication of extremist groups across the region. The convergence of terrorism with organised crime—including money laundering, drug trafficking, human smuggling, arms networks, and illicit resource extraction—has created resilient financial lifelines for armed groups. This nexus risks spillover into coastal states previously considered stable. Members may consider inviting UNODC Executive Director Ghada Fathi Waly to brief on transnational criminal dynamics.

6.2 Guinea-Bissau Crisis Management

The sudden suspension of elections in Guinea-Bissau presents a pressing diplomatic concern. Council members will likely monitor the situation closely and may initiate informal discussions on potential responses should the crisis deepen.

6.3 Strengthening Regional Counter-Terrorism Arrangements

Regional frameworks—such as the Accra Initiative, ECOWAS Standby Force, and the Multinational Joint Task Force—face operational fragmentation, political friction, and chronic underfunding. The AES states’ withdrawal from ECOWAS further complicates collective security architecture. The Council may encourage renewed dialogue among Sahelian governments to identify common counter-terrorism objectives.

6.4 Operationalising the Issoufou Panel Recommendations

Council members may consider an informal dialogue with the AU, ECOWAS, and regional actors to discuss the findings of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel. The panel’s assessment of violent extremism, climate vulnerability, economic stagnation, and political transitions remains crucial yet under-briefed to the Council.

6.5 Financing AU-Led Operations Under Resolution 2719

There is growing interest among regional actors in leveraging resolution 2719 to support an AU-led mission in the Sahel. However, practical and political obstacles—particularly concerning the AES states operating outside ECOWAS frameworks—pose challenges. Setbacks in operationalising 2719 in Somalia have also dampened momentum.

6.6 Structural Conflict Drivers

Governance deficits, underdevelopment, climate-driven shocks, and demographic pressures remain central to instability. Council members may explore strengthening cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission and aligning efforts with the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to support sustainable, locally led stabilisation initiatives.

7. Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council remains broadly united in its concern over terrorism and humanitarian decline in West Africa and the Sahel. Sierra Leone and several members continue to highlight the urgency of sustained Council engagement.

However, strategic divergences persist. Western members remain alarmed by Russia’s expanding influence across military-led governments in the Sahel. Russia, by contrast, attributes regional instability to past Western interventions and supports the AES governments, including through bilateral defence agreements and deployments by the Africa Corps—the successor to the Wagner Group.

The United States appears to be recalibrating its approach to Sahelian juntas, seeking to re-establish security cooperation while maintaining strategic access to critical minerals. Simultaneously, its recent redesignation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” and threats of coercive action have heightened tensions.

France’s relations with Mali have further deteriorated following mutual expulsions of diplomats and Bamako’s arrest of a French embassy member on espionage charges. Mali’s media regulator has suspended French broadcasters, reflecting increased hostility toward Western actors.

Denmark and Sierra Leone serve as co-penholders on UNOWAS.

TRS KEY JUDGEMENTS – ONLY NOTE

Region: West Africa & the Sahel – December 2025

1. The security environment in the Sahel core (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) is deteriorating rapidly, with jihadist groups consolidating territorial influence, targeting strategic economic nodes (fuel, logistics), and accelerating displacement. Existing national and regional military responses remain outpaced by the tempo and sophistication of armed groups.

2. Mali has entered a qualitatively more dangerous phase, with JNIM’s fuel-tanker blockade signalling both enhanced operational capability and a deliberate strategy to impose economic pressure on the state and its capital. Even if Bamako does not fall militarily, the perception of regime vulnerability is increasing.

3. Fragmentation among extremist actors in the Lake Chad Basin (Boko Haram vs. ISWAP) does not reduce the overall threat; instead, intra-jihadist competition is likely to generate short-term spikes in violence and civilian risk, while incentivising each faction to escalate attacks for relevance and recruitment.

4. Political transitions in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire are eroding already fragile governance structures, increasing the risk of contested mandates, unconstitutional power retention, and military intervention. Guinea-Bissau is at particular risk of prolonged institutional crisis following the military’s suspension of the electoral process.

5. The regional security architecture is fragmenting at the exact moment it is most needed. AES states’ exit from ECOWAS, strained relations between Sahelian juntas and coastal democracies, and stalled operationalisation of AU/UN burden-sharing (resolution 2719) have significantly weakened coordinated counter-terrorism frameworks.

6. External power competition is deepening, with Russia expanding influence via bilateral defence pacts and Africa Corps deployments, while Western states recalibrate or partially withdraw security assistance. This is creating overlapping, sometimes rival, security spheres that lack strategic coherence and may fuel proxy dynamics.

7. The humanitarian situation is approaching a structural breaking point, as displacement, food insecurity, and protection needs grow while funding remains drastically insufficient. Cuts in education and health services are likely to fuel future radicalisation and recruitment pipelines for armed groups.

8. Climate stressors are acting as a critical threat multiplier in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, intensifying livelihood shocks, resource conflicts, and migration. Absent large-scale adaptation and resilience investments, climate pressures will continue to accelerate recruitment into armed groups and criminal networks.

9. In the next 6 months, the most likely scenario is continued gradual degradation rather than a single dramatic collapse, but the combination of extremist expansion, governance crises, and regional fragmentation significantly raises the probability of sudden “break points” in one or more states (notably Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea-Bissau).

TRS RISK MATRIX – WEST AFRICA & THE SAHEL (DEC 2025)

Scale used

• Likelihood: Low / Medium / Medium–High / High / Very High
• Impact: Low / Medium / High / Severe
• Overall Risk: Moderate / Substantial / High / Severe / Critical

1.

Risk Category: Further territorial expansion by jihadist groups in Sahel core (AES)

Description: JNIM/ISGS and affiliates consolidate de facto control over rural areas in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, encroach on secondary towns, and tighten economic blockades.

Likelihood: High

Impact: Severe

Overall Risk: Severe

12-Month Trend: Worsening

2.

Risk Category: State fragility / coup or counter-coup in fragile political systems

Description: Military intervention or elite splits in states with contested mandates (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, possibly others) leading to institutional paralysis.

Likelihood: Medium–High

Impact: High

Overall Risk: High

12-Month Trend: Worsening

3.

Risk Category: Major security shock in Mali (Bamako-centric)

Description: Large-scale attack, siege, or sustained blockade significantly degrades state authority around the capital and triggers foreign evacuation and capital flight.

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: Severe

Overall Risk: High

12-Month Trend: Worsening

4.

Risk Category: Escalation and spillover from Lake Chad Basin conflict

Description: Intensified Boko Haram/ISWAP conflict, expansion into new zones of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, with higher civilian and military casualties.

Likelihood: High

Impact: High

Overall Risk: Severe

12-Month Trend: Worsening

5.

Risk Category: Entrenchment of crime–terror nexus

Description: Deepened integration of trafficking, smuggling, and illicit resource economies with jihadist groups, making them financially self-sustaining and resilient to sanctions.

Likelihood: High

Impact: High

Overall Risk: Severe

12-Month Trend: Worsening

6.

Risk Category: Humanitarian system breakdown in key Sahel corridors

Description: Funding shortfalls and access constraints force suspension of critical services, driving malnutrition, school closures, and secondary displacement.

Likelihood: Medium–High

Impact: High

Overall Risk: High

12-Month Trend: Worsening

7.

Risk Category: Regional security architecture collapse

Description: Functional marginalisation of ECOWAS, Accra Initiative, MNJTF, and FC-G5S, with parallel, uncoordinated security blocs (AES–Russia vs others).

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: High

Overall Risk: High

12-Month Trend: Worsening

8.

Risk Category: Open proxy competition among external powers

Description: Direct or indirect confrontation of foreign actors via partners (e.g., Russia-aligned forces vs Western-backed units), leading to escalatory incidents.

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: High

Overall Risk: Substantial

12-Month Trend: Worsening

9.

Risk Category: Climate-driven local conflict escalation

Description: Severe climatic shocks (drought/flooding) triggering spikes in local conflict over land, water, and pasture, exploited by armed groups.

Likelihood: High

Impact: Medium–High

Overall Risk: High

12-Month Trend: Worsening

10.

Risk Category: Large-scale displacement into coastal states

Description: Accumulated insecurity and economic collapse in Sahel core pushing significant numbers toward Ghana, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, stressing fragile urban centres.

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: High

Overall Risk: Substantial

12-Month Trend: Worsening

COMBINED REGIONAL FORECAST – 30/90/180 Days

A. 30-Day Outlook (Near Term)

Security:
In the next month, the region is likely to see continuity rather than dramatic inflection. JNIM and other Sahelian jihadist groups will maintain pressure on supply routes and peripheral garrisons; additional attacks on logistics and fuel infrastructure are likely in Mali and Burkina Faso. In the Lake Chad Basin, expect episodic, high-casualty clashes as Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to compete for dominance.

Politics:

• Guinea-Bissau: The risk of prolonged military dominance and stalled political institutions is high; negotiations or external mediation are likely to begin, but without rapid resolution.
• Guinea: Doumbouya’s candidacy will further polarise the field; space for opposition mobilization will likely narrow, with an increased chance of targeted repression.
• Côte d’Ivoire: Having secured a fourth term, Ouattara’s government will focus on consolidating control; protests may continue at a low to medium intensity, but widespread destabilisation is unlikely in the immediate term.

Humanitarian:
No major positive shift in funding is expected within 30 days. Agencies will continue to cut or scale back programmes, with immediate impacts felt in education and healthcare for displaced and host communities.

B. 90-Day Outlook (Short to Medium Term)

Security:
Within three months, the cumulative effect of current trends is likely to produce:

• Further rural consolidation by jihadist groups in AES states, including attempts to formalise parallel governance (taxation, dispute resolution, basic services) in some areas.
• Possible high-profile attack or siege attempt targeting a provincial capital or critical infrastructure node, designed to demonstrate state weakness and attract recruits.
• In the Lake Chad Basin, cross-border raids and ambushes are expected to increase, particularly along vulnerable corridors in Nigeria and Niger.

Politics & Governance:

• Guinea-Bissau: Either a negotiated compromise leading to a reconfigured electoral calendar or entrenchment of the “High Military Command,” with rising external pressure (ECOWAS, AU, UN). Both outcomes keep the country unstable.
• Guinea: Elections or pre-electoral processes are likely to be held under heavily contested conditions. International reactions will focus on credibility and inclusion; sanctions or targeted measures may be floated if repression escalates.
• AES vs ECOWAS: Relations may stabilise at a low-cooperation baseline, with no rapid reintegration. AES will deepen alternative partnerships (notably with Russia and other non-Western partners).

Regional Architecture & External Actors:

• Attempts to meaningfully operationalise resolution 2719 in the Sahel context are likely to remain blocked or stalled.
• Russia will continue incremental expansion of its security footprint through Africa Corps deployments; Western actors (US, EU states) will selectively re-engage but in more transactional, limited formats.

Humanitarian & Climate:

• Without a significant donor pivot, funding gaps will translate into persistent service gaps, compounding grievances and recruitment incentives.
• Seasonal climate patterns may generate localized crisis hotspots (e.g., drought-driven conflict over grazing routes, flood-related displacement) that further overstretch already thin state capacities.

C. 180-Day Outlook (Medium Term)

Security Trajectory:
Over six months, the most likely scenario is continued incremental decline rather than a sudden regional collapse, but with a meaningful risk of discrete “shock events”:

• In Mali and Burkina Faso, jihadist influence could solidify into semi-permanent zones where state presence is largely symbolic or absent.
• In Niger, depending on the junta’s strategic choices and local dynamics, there is a serious risk that extremist actors will exploit institutional isolation and reduced support to expand their rural footprint.
• In the Lake Chad Basin, the conflict may become more fragmented, with splinter factions and criminal bands further blurring lines between ideological and purely economic violence.

Political Landscape:

• Some transitional timelines (Guinea, possibly others) will likely slip, entrenching military or quasi-military governance.
• Guinea-Bissau’s stability will remain uncertain; even if a formal transition arrangement is reached, the probability of renewed interference by security actors will remain high.
• Côte d’Ivoire is likely to stay relatively more stable than Sahelian states, but underlying tensions around exclusion and term limits will persist, especially as succession debates intensify over the medium term.

Regional & External Dynamics:

• The regional security architecture may evolve into overlapping, partially competing “constellations”:

– AES + Russia and select non-Western partners,

– ECOWAS + coastal democracies with varied Western support,

– Ad hoc coalitions (Accra Initiative, bilateral defence agreements).
Coordination across these constellations will remain minimal, limiting the effectiveness of any comprehensive strategy.

• The likelihood of proxy-like frictions increases, particularly if external actors directly support rival security forces or intelligence units within the same theatre.

Humanitarian & Structural Drivers:

• Without a major injection of flexible, multi-year funding and a pivot toward resilience and livelihoods, humanitarian operations will shift into chronic emergency mode, responding to symptoms rather than drivers.
• Climate change will continue to amplify all negative variables: resource scarcity, food insecurity, rural–urban migration, and grievance narratives exploited by both extremist and criminal actors.

Overall 6-Month Strategic Assessment:
The region is unlikely to experience a single, headline-grabbing collapse, but the accumulation of localized losses, political crises, and institutional erosion will deepen what is effectively a long, slow unravelling. The window for relatively low-cost stabilisation is shrinking; interventions in 6–12 months will likely be more complex, more expensive, and face more entrenched armed and political actors than today.