The UN and AU partnership at twenty

October 2026 consultations and the test of operational delivery

Executive Summary

The UN–AU peace and security partnership enters its twentieth annual consultation cycle with stronger institutions but insufficient evidence that those institutions can deliver the operational outcomes Africa requires. October’s meetings will test whether an established diplomatic relationship can produce credible burden-sharing while UN peace operations face financial pressure and the African Union seeks a larger security role.

ASA Assessment: The partnership’s immediate vulnerability is the widening gap between political commitments and deployable capacity. Resolution 2719 provides a route to financing African Union peace support operations through UN assessed contributions, but nearly three years after adoption it has yet to finance an operation. Its December review will test whether the mechanism can move into practical use.

Three pressures converge. The UN and AU are separately reviewing their peace-operations models without a sufficiently defined common operational framework. Somalia’s funding problem demonstrates the cost of delaying implementation. Disagreement over how to discuss natural resources reveals the political limits of cooperation on conflict economies, particularly in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan.

The 22 October informal seminar and 23 October joint consultative meeting in New York are therefore significant preparation for the December review. A joint communiqué would restore an agreed outcome after the failure to produce one in 2025. Its strategic value, however, will depend on whether it identifies responsibilities, financing options and implementation steps rather than restating familiar commitments.

A narrowed communiqué remains the baseline scenario, with a fallback press statement almost as likely. A substantive agreement linking financing, operational reform and country priorities is possible but considerably less likely. Governments, diplomatic missions and security partners should judge October by the commitments it creates, rather than the breadth of language it accommodates.

Institutional maturity and the delivery gap

The partnership has developed a durable institutional structure. Annual leadership conferences, regular Council consultations, expert-level exchanges and the United Nations Office to the African Union provide established channels for political coordination. The May 2026 declaration reaffirming the cooperation frameworks strengthens that structure. The September leadership discussions also widened the lens to include external economic shocks, supply-chain disruption and pressure on maritime chokepoints.

October brings the principal mechanisms together: the annual Security Council briefing on UN–AU cooperation, engagement between the AU Peace and Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, the eleventh informal joint seminar, and the twentieth annual joint consultative meeting. Greece’s retreat format at Greentree is intended to encourage a more direct exchange than formal Council proceedings normally allow.

These mechanisms have value. They sustain contact when relations are strained, give African priorities a regular hearing in New York and support cooperation on prevention, peacebuilding and institutional recovery. The Peacebuilding Commission track is particularly useful because it can connect political engagement with support for national institutions before or after a peace operation.

The weakness emerges when coordination must become collective action. Constitutional ruptures, persistent conflict and underfunded missions expose the limited reach of agreed frameworks. AU suspension mechanisms can defend institutional norms, but they do not by themselves restore constitutional order. Expert consultations can prepare common positions, but they cannot overcome disagreement over money, political authority or responsibility for implementation.

The strategic question is whether the existing machinery can sustain security arrangements as UN missions’ contract and African operations assume greater responsibilities. Institutional continuity is a foundation for that task; it is not evidence that the task has been accomplished.

Two reform processes without a common operational settlement

The UN and AU reviews respond to related pressures from different starting points. The UN’s review of all forms of peace operations, transmitted in August, addresses financial constraints, political resistance and the need for missions better matched to achievable political objectives. The departure of MINUSMA from Mali, MONUSCO’s transition pressures in the DRC and the strain on UNMISS in South Sudan illustrate the changing operating environment.

The direction is toward more adaptable instruments, with greater emphasis on political engagement and a clearer relationship between mandates and resources. The September Security Council debate reinforced that emphasis on peace-making. Smaller or more flexible missions may be appropriate, but reduced scale cannot substitute for a credible political settlement or sufficient protection capacity.

The AU faces a different immediate problem: it has security responsibilities that exceed its predictable funding. AUSSOM in Somalia is the clearest example. The review of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including peace support operations, must address both financial sustainability and the gap between the African Standby Force’s intended design and actual deployment practice.

These approaches can complement each other if the two organisations agree who leads, who pays, who provides support and who remains accountable when a mission’s circumstances change. Without that agreement, UN retrenchment and AU ambition can create an operational gap rather than an orderly transfer of responsibility.

An exchange of views on the two reviews is insufficient. The October consultations should be assessed against whether they establish a process for aligning mission planning, financing, command arrangements, compliance and transition timelines. A declaration of complementarity without these elements leaves the central problem unresolved.

Resolution 2719 and the credibility of predictable financing

Adopted on 21 December 2023, Resolution 2719 established a framework for UN assessed contributions to cover up to 75 per cent of the annual budget of eligible, Security Council-authorised AU peace support operations, on a case-by-case basis. It did not create automatic financing. Operation-specific approval, oversight and compliance requirements remain essential, as does securing the balance of funding.

The December 2026 review arrives without a first operation financed under the framework. The October 2024 joint implementation roadmap has advanced preparatory work, but technical preparation has not yet produced the political agreement needed for application. AUSSOM remains the most immediate test of whether the framework can operate under real conditions.

The blockage combines contributor resistance, unresolved financing for the remaining share, and concerns over fiduciary controls, human-rights compliance and operational accountability. US opposition has been especially consequential. These issues require a negotiated package; reaffirming the resolution cannot resolve them individually or collectively.

The A3 and the AU Peace and Security Council are likely to press for a credible first application. Major contributors will seek firmer safeguards and financial clarity. Russian and Chinese support for African ownership can assist negotiations but should not be treated as a substitute for agreement on an operation’s budget and implementation terms.

The most likely December outcome remains a reaffirmation accompanied by conditions and further preparatory work. That would preserve the framework while postponing the decision that gives it strategic value.

ASA Warning: If the review produces no credible route to financing a first operation, African actors will have stronger incentives to seek bilateral or ad hoc support outside the UN framework. Such arrangements may deliver resources faster, but can fragment oversight, deepen dependence on individual sponsors and weaken the connection between continental mandates and operational accountability.

October is a major preparatory opportunity rather than an absolute deadline. The strongest outcome would identify a candidate operation, the outstanding conditions for financing, responsibilities for resolving them and a timetable for decision. Without those elements, the December review risks evaluating preparation while leaving implementation indefinitely deferred.

Natural resources and the politics of accountability

The AU Peace and Security Council’s proposed discussion of natural-resource management has become a dispute over the political framing of conflict. Russia’s proposed emphasis on root causes and exploitation broadens the discussion beyond governance and management. European resistance reflects both concern over that change in scope and the sensitivity of a debate that could reach into international supply chains.

The disagreement matters because framing determines which responsibilities receive scrutiny. A governance approach directs attention toward illicit extraction, revenue capture, traceability, certification and enforcement. An exploitation approach gives greater weight to external actors, unequal commercial relationships and the distribution of benefits. Both contain legitimate questions. Either can also be used selectively to deflect scrutiny from politically inconvenient participants.

For Moscow, an external-exploitation narrative aligns with its wider positioning in Africa, while inviting questions about Russian-linked extractive arrangements. European governments likewise have an interest in established due-diligence frameworks but cannot assume that those frameworks exempt Western corporate supply chains from examination. An effective discussion would apply accountability across actors rather than privilege one geopolitical narrative.

Eastern DRC and Sudan make this debate operationally relevant. Mineral revenues sustain armed networks in eastern Congo and complicate territorial settlements. Sudan’s gold economy supports belligerent financing and relationships with external actors. In both cases, a political agreement that leaves conflict revenues intact may alter diplomatic language without materially changing incentives for violence.

The immediate risk is dilution or deferral of the agenda item. The more serious consequence would be a pattern in which the partnership can discuss conflict economies only when their external connections remain unnamed. For governments and commercial actors, avoidance in a communiqué should not be interpreted as reduced sanctions, legal or reputational exposure.

Country priorities and operational consequences

Somalia

AUSSOM is the clearest test of the financing debate because the mission already exists and must maintain operations against al-Shabaab. Continued uncertainty can affect troop contributors’ willingness to sustain commitments, rotation planning and operational coverage. The consequences emerge in the field even while financing negotiations remain inconclusive.

Somalia also faces an immediate transition issue. The United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia is scheduled to close on 31 October 2026. AUSSOM’s effectiveness continues to depend on logistical support from the United Nations Support Office in Somalia. Political-mission closure must therefore be distinguished from the support requirements of the continuing security operation.

Any adaptation of that support must be sequenced with operational needs. A funding commitment that fails to preserve logistics, medical support and mobility would offer limited protection against a deterioration in security. The October discussions should connect financing decisions with the practical requirements of the transition.

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Washington DRC–Rwanda process and the Doha track involving AFC/M23 provide diplomatic frameworks, but their strategic value depends on implementation, verification and changes in military and economic behaviour. Parallel tracks can sustain engagement while also obscuring where responsibility lies when commitments are not implemented.

MONUSCO’s transition pressures increase the importance of a credible security arrangement. An African-led regional mechanism would require agreement on mandate, command, host-state consent, funding and its relationship with existing UN monitoring and sanctions arrangements. Support in principle should not be confused with agreement on a deployable successor.

The resource question belongs at the centre of this assessment. Security arrangements that leave the financing of armed actors and illicit mineral flows largely intact will struggle to create durable incentives for de-escalation. Diplomatic missions and investors should monitor implementation on the ground, including access and verification, rather than rely on the existence of multiple negotiating formats.

Sudan

Sudan exposes the partnership’s limited ability to translate diplomatic engagement into leverage over belligerents and their external support networks. AU mechanisms operate alongside the Jeddah, Cairo and Quad tracks, while Security Council divisions constrain collective pressure. Multiple processes have not produced a sufficiently coherent enforcement posture.

The humanitarian emergency in Darfur and Kordofan increases the cost of that fragmentation. A general call for a ceasefire offers little operational value unless linked to access arrangements, monitoring and consequences for obstruction. The same applies to commitments that avoid the relationships through which military and financial support sustain the war.

An agreed October paragraph may preserve a common position but should not be treated as evidence of improved protection or access. The useful test is whether the consultations produce coordinated diplomatic follow-through and a clearer allocation of responsibility across mediation efforts.

South Sudan

The deterioration of the 2018 peace agreement’s implementation, the unresolved detention of Riek Machar and pressure on UNMISS create a risk of political exclusion becoming entrenched. Formal commitments to the agreement can conceal a weakening of the arrangements intended to prevent renewed conflict.

The AU’s High-Level Ad Hoc Committee offers a channel for regional engagement, but its effectiveness depends on access, sustained pressure and coordination with the UN. Agreed language may be easier to secure here than on some other files, but international alignment should not be assumed on sanctions, sovereignty or mission authority.

The priority is to connect support for the peace agreement with practical steps to reopen political space and preserve UNMISS’s capacity to implement its mandate. Under current conditions, endorsement of the agreement alone is an inadequate measure of progress.

African representation and Security Council constraints

The three African elected Security Council members remain the main link between continental priorities and Council negotiations. Somalia’s informal facilitation and Greece’s work on the October arrangements have supported preparations despite the absence of an agreed chair for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.

African coordination with Caribbean elected members through the A3 plus one format can strengthen negotiating cohesion and help sustain attention to financing and African ownership. Trinidad and Tobago’s entry in 2027 offers continuity for that cooperation. Incoming members, however, have no vote in the October 2026 consultations and do not change the Council’s present voting arithmetic.

The bloc can influence agendas, negotiate language and make consensus harder to achieve when African priorities are excluded. It cannot remove the permanent members’ veto power or independently secure funding approval. Its leverage is greatest when it presents a specific, defensible implementation proposal rather than a broad demand for solidarity.

The failure to agree a joint communiqué in Addis Ababa in 2025 remains the relevant benchmark. A second failure would suggest that disagreement is becoming structural. Conversely, a communiqué secured by removing the difficult issues would demonstrate diplomatic accommodation without necessarily improving operational cooperation.

Strategic Outlook

The partnership is likely to remain institutionally stable. Both organisations benefit from regular engagement and have reasons to prevent visible breakdown. That mutual interest favours an agreed text but also encourages outcomes that preserve cooperation without settling its hardest questions.

Financing is the immediate decision point. It is not the only determinant of success: political strategy, consent, command arrangements and compliance remain indispensable. Yet without predictable resources, the proposed division of labour between the UN and AU cannot become operationally credible.

The natural-resources dispute points toward a recurring difficulty. As conflict economies become more closely connected to external strategic interests, negotiations over apparently technical agenda items will increasingly involve questions of responsibility and geopolitical positioning. African members will face pressure to reconcile continental priorities with the compromises necessary to maintain Council engagement.

For diplomatic missions and security partners, the practical requirement is contingency planning. Operations and transitions should not be planned on the assumption that December will unlock Resolution 2719 financing. For investors and companies, diplomatic continuity should not be treated as a reduction in conflict-related exposure. The relevant indicators remain territorial control, implementation of agreements, support to armed actors and the enforcement of applicable restrictions.

Scenarios for the 23 October meeting

The following probabilities are ASA judgment estimates for the meeting’s outcome, not statistical forecasts. They distinguish agreement on a text from agreement capable of advancing implementation.

Narrowed joint communiqué 45 per cent

The two Councils agree language on AUSSOM financing options, reaffirm Resolution 2719 and the implementation roadmap, and restate established positions on the principal country files. Natural resources are treated cautiously, moved to a seminar summary or omitted from the final communiqué.

This restores an agreed outcome after 2025 and preserves momentum toward December. It provides little immediate operational change unless accompanied by specific follow-up outside the communiqué. The central indicator is whether the text assigns responsibilities and dates or merely records common aspirations.

Fallback joint press statement 40 per cent

Negotiations fail over resource framing, financing language or sensitive country assessments. The two Councils issue a short statement listing the discussions rather than a negotiated communiqué.

A second consecutive failure would weaken confidence in the partnership’s ability to reach political agreement on implementation. It would not terminate cooperation but would make the December financing debate more difficult by exposing divisions before an operation-specific package is agreed.

Substantive communiqué with implementation commitments 15 per cent

The outcome identifies a credible candidate or decision pathway for Resolution 2719, establishes practical coordination between the two reform reviews and agrees resource language that permits meaningful scrutiny without becoming a geopolitical contest over attribution.

This requires movement from the United States on financing, compromise on the resource item and an African proposal with sufficient operational and compliance detail to reassure contributors. Anniversary incentives can encourage accommodation but cannot supply that package by themselves. This remains the least likely scenario, although its consequences would be significantly more important than an agreement confined to general language.

Early warning indicators

• Agenda agreement and resource framing. Retention of a meaningful resource item would indicate space for substantive negotiation; deletion or dilution would signal a narrower outcome.
• Circulation of the draft communiqué. A draft shared after mid-October would reduce negotiating time and increase the risk of a fallback statement. This is a warning threshold, not a fixed predictor.
• Operation-specific financing language. Naming a candidate, outstanding conditions and a decision timetable would be more significant than reaffirming Resolution 2719.
• US contributor positioning. Movement on assessed financing or the remaining funding share would materially improve prospects for implementation.
• Somalia transition arrangements. Confirmed continuity of essential logistical support would distinguish a managed transition from a potentially damaging reduction in capacity.
• Alignment of the two reform processes. Joint planning responsibilities and follow-up dates would carry more weight than a general reference to complementarity.
• African negotiating cohesion. Public divergence between the A3 and the AU Peace and Security Council would indicate pressure on the bloc’s capacity to sustain a common position.
• Preparation for the December review. An operation-specific assessment agreed consideration date and defined financing package would signal a transition from preparatory work to a decision process.

ASA Final Assessment

The October consultations will test whether an established UN–AU relationship can produce operational consequences. A communiqué matters if it advances that task. If Resolution 2719 reaches its December review without a credible path to financing a first operation, the partnership risks retaining its institutional structure while African security actors increasingly seek resources and political backing elsewhere. The decisive measure is whether the two organisations can turn shared commitments into a funded, accountable and politically coherent operation.