The Role of Uganda in the Recent M23 Insurrection in Eastern DRC

Facing the advance of the M23 towards Uganda’s zone of influence in eastern DRC, Kampala oscillates between fear and rapprochement with the M23. The resurgence of the March 23 Movement occurred following a violation of Rwanda’s zone of influence in eastern DRC. In 2020, amid tensions with Kigali, Kampala began constructing a road between Goma and Bunagana. Both states thus maintain a zone of influence in eastern DRC, supporting local armed groups, exploiting minerals, and conducting military operations.

Uganda’s discrete support of M23

Uganda has been criticized by the UN Group of Experts for its complicity in the return of the M23. The group found a safe rear base in Uganda after 2013, allowing its return between 2017 and 2021. The 2021 resurgence was encouraged by Kigali, which views Uganda’s exploitation in its zone of influence unfavorably. Kampala initially prevented the capture of Bunagana but withdrew during the second attempt in 2022. Since then, Uganda has discreetly supported the M23, allowing the group to traverse its territory, recruit in refugee camps, and stay in Kampala.

To understand the relationship between the M23 and Uganda, one must consider the relationship between Rwanda and Uganda. Museveni supported Kagame’s RPF, launching numerous offensives against the Rwandan army. During the 1994 genocide, the RPF took power in Rwanda, marking a victory for Uganda. However, during the Second Congo War, the interests of the two countries diverged, leading to clashes. Since then, the relationship has deteriorated, marked by suspicions of coups and interference.

In 2022, the presidents reconciled, and the M23 rebellion launched a vast offensive, capturing part of the Ugandan border. Since then, the bilateral relationship has improved, particularly as Rwanda is in tension with Burundi, which supports Kinshasa. Uganda and Rwanda now collaborate, as evidenced by the latest statement from the Ugandan army on the situation in Goma.

M23 aiming for Ituri

The Ugandan army has been present in Ituri since the start of Operation Shujaa, aimed at combating the ADF, a Ugandan rebel group affiliated with ISIS. The operation has reduced the presence of jihadists, but they have relocated. Since June 2024, more than 650 people have been killed in ADF attacks in eastern Congo. The FARDC, mobilized against the M23, engage Wazalendo auxiliaries on the ground.

Operation Shujaa has extended south and west, coinciding with the M23's advance towards northern North Kivu. The Ugandan army is present around Beni and Butembo, while Rwandan special forces support the M23 against the FDLR. Both countries seek to protect their zones of influence.

In Ituri, the "Zaïre-ADCVI" self-defense group has allied with the M23, forming thousands of fighters and preparing to attack the FARDC. Uganda acts as an intermediary between the M23 and several armed groups in Ituri. If there is fear of an M23 offensive in South Kivu, it is towards Ituri that attention should be directed. Thousands of fighters await the M23’s progress in Lubero and the maintenance of the status quo by the Ugandan army.

The ball is in Kampala’s court, which has not been indifferent to the looting of its embassy and accusations of complicity in the capture of Goma. Despite joint operations with Shujaa, a local organization reported that a total of 1,322 people were killed in ADF attacks in Ituri in 2024, with 103 people missing and at least 36 houses burned. The Ugandan army has deployed several military trucks, tanks, and armored vehicles, but the ADF/ISCAP move in small groups, making it difficult to combat them in the forests of Lubero territory. This military arsenal seems more intended to facilitate the M23's access to the area and avoid damage to Butembo. The Ugandan army could withdraw, claiming not to interfere in Congo's internal conflicts. Some observers estimate that the number of Ugandan soldiers exceeds that of the FARDC in the territories of Beni-Lubero in North Kivu and Irumu in Ituri.