Tanzania: Post-Election Unrest, Information Operations, and Elite Powerbrokering

Coverage period: 29 October–5 November 2025

Executive summary

Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 presidential election triggered the most severe domestic unrest in years. The vote proceeded after major opposition leaders and parties were excluded; President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner and sworn in amid protests, curfews, and rolling connectivity disruptions. The UN human rights office has publicly confirmed at least ten deaths; opposition figures and some diplomatic sources allege a significantly higher toll that remains unverified. ASA judges that fatalities are likely underreported but cannot substantiate figures above the UN baseline at this time.

Crucially, ASA now assesses no verified presence of foreign security forces or mercenaries in Tanzania during this period. Reports of masked, unidentified personnel are best explained by domestic units operating in plain clothes and by misattributed or misleading online media. Digital interference—including diaspora-driven mobilization and recycled or fabricated videos—amplified perceptions of external involvement without evidencing foreign force deployment. Where this assessment diverges from earlier ambiguity, the updated judgment should be considered more valid based on expanded sourcing and forensic review.

Political context and drivers

After initially easing restrictions in 2021–2023, authorities narrowed political space ahead of the 2025 vote: opposition figures were detained or disqualified, rallies curtailed, and media pressure increased, leaving a contest widely perceived as predetermined. Insiders and organizers widely believe former president Jakaya Kikwete has exercised decisive behind-the-scenes influence over CCM decision-making; this is plausible within patronage structures but remains unverified in open sources.

Sequence of events

Unrest began on election day (29 Oct) in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha, Dodoma, and other centres. Authorities imposed curfews, surged police and military deployments, and intermittently restricted internet access. Clashes intensified 30–31 Oct; President Hassan’s swearing-in (1–3 Nov) coincided with continued arrests of opposition and civil society actors.

Casualties and detentions

The UN has confirmed at least ten deaths with multiple injuries; opposition and local networks claim much higher numbers based on hospital tallies and community reporting. Movement restrictions, fear of reprisals, and connectivity disruptions impede verification. ASA treats any figure above the UN baseline as unverified pending access to medical and mortuary records.

Targeting dynamics and damage profile

Incidents displayed punitive targeting over opportunistic looting: arson/vandalism reportedly focused on assets perceived as linked to Kikwete-aligned business interests, CCM offices, and select government facilities. Ownership ties in several cases remain unverified and require beneficial-ownership checks.

Use of force and external involvement

Security responses—including live-fire incidents in several cities—were carried out by Tanzanian police, military, and intelligence services. There is no confirmed evidence of foreign military, police, or private contractors deployed in Tanzania during the crisis; government assertions about “foreigners” lack substantiation. Rumours about foreign units are credibly attributable to local forces in plain clothes and to online misinformation. This updated assessment supersedes earlier reporting that treated foreign-force allegations as an open question.

Information operations and mis/disinformation

ASA’s verification and media-forensics review identified:

• viral videos misattributed to Tanzanian locations/events,
• recycled footage from other African contexts, and
• instances of deepfake/AI-generated content.

Parallel diaspora and opposition-aligned digital campaigns on TikTok, Facebook, and X amplified mobilization and shaped perceptions of “foreign interference,” without evidencing physical foreign deployments. These information dynamics intensified tensions and complicated situational awareness.

Alleged removal of bodies

Multiple neighbourhoods reported that masked personnel prevented retrieval of the dead and removed bodies by truck to unknown locations. These accounts remain unverified; if substantiated, they would carry grave legal and humanitarian implications (including potential enforced disappearances). ASA recommends immediate documentation support to hospitals, mortuaries, religious institutions, and local authorities to secure registries and protect records.

Information environment and economic impact

Curfews and connectivity disruptions hindered medical coordination, reporting, and commerce. Several large employers paused operations; transport disruptions and damage to fuel infrastructure raised supply anxieties. Even if acute violence subsides, property damage, business interruption, and short-term risk repricing will weigh on Q4 activity. Mis/disinformation further distorted market and public-safety signals.

Humanitarian concerns

Sustained deployments and sporadic clashes continue to limit safe access to emergency care. Families struggle to locate detained or missing relatives. Civil society has received reports of informal detention sites but cannot verify locations. ASA anticipates elevated trauma-care needs and a surge in protection caseloads (missing-persons tracing, legal aid, psychosocial support) absent credible accountability.

Risk assessment

Short term (days–weeks): High risk of renewed urban protests around funerals, anniversaries, and court dates. Robust security posture likely; where less-lethal capacity is limited, risk of further live fire persists. Assets (rightly or wrongly) associated with elite networks face elevated targeting risk.

Medium term (1–3 months): Without an impartial casualty inquiry and credible political opening, opposition networks likely reorganize into decentralized cells sustaining intermittent disruptions. Elite fractures within CCM could yield selective concessions (detainee releases, limited media reopening) or, conversely, sharper repression if hardliners feel insulated from costs. Prolonged instability raises sovereign/corporate risk premia and could defer investment into 2026.

Cross-border effects: Limited spillover along trade corridors is possible (temporary slowdowns, heightened border policing, short-lived displacement). Wider contagion remains unlikely unless violence escalates markedly.

Indicators to watch

• Mandate and access for an independent casualty inquiry (hospital/mortuary access, protected witness protocols) with public death and arrest rolls.
• Verified evidence for/against foreign security presence (official statements with checkable detail, flight/convoy logs, geolocated imagery); to date, none confirmed.
• Trajectory of targeted arson against elite-linked assets versus drift into opportunistic looting as hardship deepens.
• Curfew and internet restriction easing/persistence and correlation with protest tempo; watch for renewed shutdowns around flashpoints.
• External-pressure dynamics (multilateral statements, démarches, targeted sanctions/conditionality) that could shift hardliner cost-benefit calculations.
• Information-ops signals: coordinated inauthentic behavior, recycled footage spikes, deepfake detection rates, and diaspora-influencer mobilization patterns tied to offline protest events.

ASA confidence statement

• High confidence in baseline facts: election context, curfews/connectivity disruptions, widespread protests.
• Moderate confidence that fatalities exceed the UN-confirmed minimum; low confidence in any precise higher figure pending comprehensive records access.
• High confidence that no foreign security forces were deployed in Tanzania during the crisis; reports to the contrary are best explained by domestic plain-clothes operations and online misinformation. This judgment supersedes earlier ambiguity and should be treated as more valid based on expanded verification.
• Moderate confidence in the existence and impact of coordinated mis/disinformation and diaspora-driven digital mobilization.