Strategic Analysis Report – Cross-border Security Threats in West Africa

The Case of Côte d’Ivoire

Recent revelations about recruitment efforts by Sahel-based jihadist groups in Côte d’Ivoire highlight a worrying trend: the extension of the terrorist threat toward the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Among the most active actors is the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM/GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which is leading this strategy of territorial projection beyond the Sahel.

Despite its status as a relatively stable country in the region, Côte d’Ivoire is increasingly exposed to the ambitions of armed terrorist groups (ATGs), due to its geographic location, porous borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, and persistent socio-economic vulnerabilities in the northern regions.

A Structured Network Identified on Ivorian Soil

This analysis draws on a series of recent arrests across various towns, including Daoukro, where several Burkinabe and Malian nationals—former members of active Sahelian Katiba’s—were detained. These individuals were attempting to set up local cells for recruitment and radicalization.

The exploitation of their phones revealed jihadist propaganda materials, encrypted communications via apps such as WhatsApp and Telegram, and evidence of coordination with transnational terrorist networks. Recruits were primarily drawn from the marginalized Fulani community, particularly vulnerable due to rising insecurity and exclusion.

Key Characteristics of the Jihadist Threat in Côte d’Ivoire

1. Regional context: a southward shift
For several years, jihadist groups operating in Mali and Burkina Faso have sought to expand toward coastal West Africa. Their aim is to establish logistical and human footholds outside the traditional Sahelian zone.

2. A nascent cell dismantled
The arrest of Issa D., a Burkinabe national, on February 8, 2025, in Daoukro, marked the launch of a joint investigation led by the Ivorian DST (Territorial Surveillance Directorate) and the Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Centre (CROI). His phone contained numerous pieces of propaganda disseminated in closed WhatsApp groups, indicating attempts to mobilize recruits remotely.

A few weeks later, another individual linked to the Macina Katiba, Abdoulaye S., was also arrested. The investigation uncovered similar material and indications of logistical coordination to transport volunteers to Sahelian combat zones.

3. Methods and recruitment vector
The network relied on disseminating ideological content, encrypted messaging, and emotionally charged narratives rooted in identity-based, religious, and socio-political grievances. Material support, community solidarity, and a spiritual cause were central to their messaging.

A Broader Strategy Targeting Coastal West Africa

The operations observed in Côte d’Ivoire are not isolated incidents but part of a broader expansion strategy. Neighbouring countries such as Togo, Benin, and Ghana are facing similar incursions. This shift marks a structural evolution in the jihadist threat, which is no longer confined to the Sahel but is moving southward.

This expansion entails two major risks:

• A weakening of social cohesion, especially if certain communities are seen—rightly or wrongly—as affiliated with jihadist networks.
• A security spiral, should the State adopt a purely military approach, neglecting preventive and inclusive responses.

Strategic Issues

To prevent the lasting implantation of jihadist networks in Côte d’Ivoire and more broadly across coastal West Africa,

a. Strengthen internal security capacities

• Enhance counter-terrorism training for Ivorian security forces, with a focus on asymmetric threats.
• Increase regional and bilateral cooperation, particularly with G5 Sahel countries, Ghana, and Benin.
• Invest in human intelligence (HUMINT) and digital surveillance, especially in border zones.

b. Community engagement and radicalization prevention

• Implement grassroots programs that build youth resilience to radical ideologies, involving religious leaders, local NGOs, and deradicalized former combatants.
• Promote intercommunal dialogue and awareness campaigns to prevent conflation of religion, ethnicity, and extremism.

c. Address socio-economic vulnerabilities

• Expand access to basic services (education, healthcare, infrastructure) in neglected northern regions.
• Launch microfinance and vocational training initiatives to support youth employment and integration.

d. Counter online propaganda

• Collaborate with tech platforms to detect and remove extremist content.
• Promote alternative narratives through local influencers, moderate religious figures, and former extremists.

Conclusion

The attempt by Sahelian jihadist groups to establish cells in Côte d’Ivoire is not a minor incident—it signals a well-coordinated expansion strategy. While still at an early stage, the threat is real, adaptive, and increasingly diffuse. It seeks to exploit local grievances and structural weaknesses to establish a foothold in the Gulf of Guinea.

The response must be multidimensional—security-focused, yes, but also social, economic, and cultural. The international community, particularly the United Nations and African partners, must support Côte d’Ivoire in building a comprehensive strategy of prevention, resilience, and response. The mistakes made in the Sahel must not be repeated along the coast.