South Sudan’s Fragile Peace at a Crossroads: Security Council to Review Escalating Violence and Stalled Reforms
Prepared by African Security Analysis (ASA) based on UN Security Council deliberations august forecast.
Anticipated Council Action
In August, the Council will receive a briefing—followed by closed consultations—on South Sudan. Special Representative Nicholas Haysom will present the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on UNMISS. The mission’s mandate is set to expire 30 April 2026.
1 ▸ High-Risk Trajectory toward National Relapse
African Security Analysis (ASA) field reporting indicates that formerly localised violence is hardening into a country-wide conflict architecture. Three converging drivers create a high-impact risk window between now and Q1 2026:
Escalating Government Air-Ground Operations
- Since April, ASA has geo-verified 21 fixed-wing or rotary strikes in Jonglei and Unity. SSPDF munitions have struck civilian clusters inside Fangak, Ayod and Panyijiar Counties—areas previously spared from airpower.
- ASA models project a 50 % probability of retaliatory SPLA-IO offensives in at least three states (Upper Nile, Unity, Central Equatoria) before end-Q3 2025.
External Force Multipliers
- Ugandan attack-helicopter detachments—first filmed by drones on 24 March—have extended Juba’s strike radius by roughly 300 km.
- No regional de-confliction framework exists; the risk of proxy escalation is therefore acute.
Political Vacuum
- First Vice-President Riek Machar’s March detention destroyed the fragile power-sharing equilibrium underpinning the Revitalised Agreement (R-ARCSS).
- ASA interlocutors confirm SPLA-IO commanders have suspended back-channel talks; intelligence intercepts reveal active mobilisation orders for youth militias in Upper Nile.
Unless Machar’s status is resolved rapidly and external aviation assets are re-scaled, ASA anticipates a transition from fragmented skirmishing to multi-front operations by early 2026.
Options Before the Council
- Public Signal – Issue a presidential or press statement condemning recent air-strikes and demanding unconditional release of political detainees.
- Include Civil-Society & RJMEC Voices – Invite a South Sudanese rights advocate plus Maj-Gen (Ret.) George Aggrey Owinow (RJMEC) to brief on ceasefire monitoring gaps.
- Sanctions Calibration – Request the 2206 Panel, with data support, to map supply chains for Ugandan rotary assets and recommend targeted measures.
- Council Visiting Mission – First trip since 2019 would restore diplomatic visibility and test parties’ readiness for 2026 elections.
Humanitarian and Public-Health Outlook (May–July 2025)
Humanitarian indicators tracked by UN’s Crisis Metrics Desk show a steep, multidimensional deterioration. Food-security data compiled from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and ASA’s own field spot-checks confirm that 7.7 million South Sudanese—well over half the population—are now in IPC Phase 3 or worse. Of that number, roughly 83 000 people in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area and in Nasir, Ulang and Malakal counties have slipped into famine-like (Phase 5) conditions. A further 39 000 returnees fleeing the Sudan conflict arrived in Upper Nile and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal between May and July; assessments carried out by clinics in Renk and Pariang show Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates exceeding the emergency threshold by 8-10 percentage points.
Public-health pressures compound the food crisis. South Sudan’s Ministry of Health, supported by the WHO cholera taskforce, has reported ≈80 000 suspected cholera cases and more than 1 400 deaths since the end of September 2024. Epidemiologists warn that the peak of the rainy season in September-November could double the weekly caseload unless chlorine supplies and oral rehydration points reach Fangak, Pigi Canal, Ulang and Nasir—areas currently cut off by insecurity and flooding. In June alone, 53 security incidents against aid operations were logged: machete assaults on boat convoys along the White Nile, the hijacking of two WFP trucks on the Juba-Bor road, and nine separate “tax” levies imposed on relief vehicles in Nasir County. Each incident translates into pipeline breaks that leave nutrition and cholera-mitigation programmes under-stocked for weeks at a time. Taken together, there is a forecast of a 9–12 percent increase in severe acute malnutrition caseloads and a possible cholera reproduction number above 1.5 by October if access restrictions persist.
Systemic Impediments to UNMISS: Field Reality and Strategic Consequences
UNMISS’ ability to execute its protection-of-civilians mandate is being progressively throttled by an orchestrated mix of physical blockades, bureaucratic harassment and digital interference—a pattern meticulously logged by Incident-Tracking Matrix. From April to June, peacekeepers were turned back or immobilised at 21 unauthorised checkpoints, the vast majority manned by SSPDF or allied militias. A representative case occurred on 22 May at Waat Bridge (Jonglei) when armed youth affiliated with the SPLA-IO halted a UNMISS medical evacuation convoy, disarmed its escort and detained four peacekeepers for fourteen hours. The delay meant that eleven wounded civilians—two in critical condition—were stranded without surgical care until the following day.
Air-mobility constraints are equally corrosive. Six flight-clearance refusals were issued by the Juba Air Operations Centre during the quarter, the most consequential on 3 June, when a routine Mi-8 rotation to Old Fangak base was denied at the last minute. The cancellation forced UNMISS to stretch an already thin company of peacekeepers for an additional nine days and caused medical stocks to fall below the minimum “F-level” for trauma cases. Remote-sensing unit has also documented four distinct GPS-spoofing episodes emanating from a military compound near Bor; one ninety-minute disruption in late June diverted a UNMISS medevac flight and delayed a post-partum haemorrhage case until visibility allowed manual navigation.
Financial and administrative obstruction is rising in parallel. Since May, local authorities in Nasir, Fangak and Leer have introduced nine new “escort fees” and ad-hoc taxes averaging 500 South Sudanese Pounds per aid vehicle. These charges siphon roughly US $15 000 a month from UNMISS and NGO operating budgets, funds that would otherwise procure cholera kits or high-energy biscuits. Worse, refusal to pay can invite retaliation: on 12 June, SSPDF troops in Pigi Canal opened fire on a resupply convoy after drivers questioned the legality of a checkpoint levy; two peacekeepers were wounded, and the lead vehicle was later torched.
The cumulative effect is stark: ASA calculates a 30 percent reduction in UNMISS patrol-days across Jonglei and Upper Nile compared with the same quarter in 2024. If these impediments remain unchallenged, approximately 400 000 civilians—many already facing famine-level food shortages—will be left without a regular protective presence by November 2025.
For the Security Council, the implication is clear. A coordinated response—ranging from public “name-and-shame” annexes that list specific SOFA breaches to targeted sanctions against commanders orchestrating road-blocks—could quickly raise the cost of obstruction. ASA stands ready to supply evidentiary dossiers, including geospatial overlays and testimonial affidavits, to support any accountability mechanism the Council chooses to deploy.
Council Dynamics
Council members share broad concern over the deteriorating security-humanitarian picture, yet they remain divided on how forcefully to pressure Juba. The US, UK and France—backed by several likeminded elected members—argue that the government’s continued detention of First Vice-President Riek Machar and its reliance on Ugandan air assets warrant sharper public condemnation and the possibility of additional targeted sanctions. A middle group, led by Ghana, Algeria and Sierra Leone, endorses stronger regional diplomacy through IGAD and the AU but cautions that new punitive measures could drive the parties further apart; these states favour calibrated incentives tied to concrete benchmarks under the Revitalised Agreement. At the other end of the spectrum, Russia and China insist that “the situation remains under government control”, stressing that the Council should prioritise technical and economic support for stabilisation rather than what they see as disproportionate pressure. Non-permanent members such as Brazil, Switzerland and Japan have signalled alarm over rising civilian casualties and shrinking humanitarian access; while still uncommitted on fresh sanctions, they are likely to support tougher language on human-rights abuses and SOFA violations. ASA judges that, absent a major shift on the ground, the penholder (US) will test the Council’s tolerance for a more robust statement in August—but any language perceived as accusing the government of orchestrating a “proxy air campaign” will almost certainly meet resistance from Moscow and Beijing, keeping the final product relatively cautious.
ASA Bottom-Line Assessment
South Sudan is entering a decisive six-month interval. Government offensives, foreign aviation support, and the Machar detention form a combustible mix that could unravel the R-ARCSS. Simultaneously, layered impediments are shrinking UNMISS’ protection radius just as food-security and cholera indicators worsen.
Without a coherent regional-international push—backed by measurable incentives and penalties—African Security Analysis (ASA) projects a marked escalation in both organised hostilities and humanitarian need by early 2026. ASA will deliver rolling intelligence updates to clients throughout the August Council cycle, highlighting any shifts in mandate language, sanctions posture, or external military involvement.
Discover More
Al-Shabaab Resurgence in Somalia – Strategic Shifts and Implications
ASA has observed a renewed surge in Al-Shabaab’s operational tempo and territorial consolidation in Somalia between July 1 and August 5, 2025. The militant group, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, continues to exploit political disunity, weakened military capacity, and humanitarian vulnerabilities to extend its influence across strategic corridors in central and southern Somalia.
West Africa & the Sahel – Integrated Situation Report
The Security Council will take up the West Africa and Sahel file in mid-August under Panama’s presidency. The open briefing—followed by closed consultations—will feature Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão (UNOWAS), UN-Women Executive Director Sima Sami Bahous, and a Sahelian civil-society advocate still to be confirmed. Panama has requested all briefers to treat Women, Peace and Security (WPS) as a cross-cutting lens, linking women’s protection and participation to counterterrorism, governance and humanitarian policy.
Contact us to find out how our security services can support you.
We operate in almost all countries in Africa, including high-risk environments, monitoring and analyze ongoing conflicts, the hotspots and the potential upcoming threats on the continent. Every day. Around the clock.