South Sudan: Collapsing Transition, Militarised Politics, and the Unraveling of the Revitalised Peace Deal

Political & Security Analysis | November 2025 Based on UNSC briefings

Overview and Expected UN Action

The UN Security Council will convene in November 2025 for a briefing and consultations on South Sudan, alongside the presentation of the Secretary-General’s 90-day report. The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)—the UN’s largest peacekeeping presence in East Africa—remains valid until 30 April 2026.

The briefing takes place amid rising political repression, a deteriorating security climate, and the near-collapse of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS). Clashes between government forces and opposition factions have become more frequent and deadly, while the political transition envisioned under the peace framework appears to be breaking down under unilateral power consolidation by President Salva Kiir.

Political Power Struggle: The Erosion of the Revitalised Peace Agreement

South Sudan’s fragile political compact is crumbling under the weight of unilateral governance.

• President Salva Kiir Mayardit continues to sideline opposition figures through arbitrary reshuffles, concentrating authority within his Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) faction.
• In October, Kiir reinstated Paul Nang Majok as Chief of Defence Forces, replacing Dau Aturjong Nyuol, while promoting Benjamin Bol Mel to General within the National Security Service and First Deputy Chair of the SPLM—moves widely perceived as strategic loyalty placements ahead of 2026 elections.

The erosion of institutional checks is mirrored by a collapse in the R-ARCSS power-sharing mechanism. Force integration has failed, defections have surged, and opposition structures have fragmented under sustained military and political pressure.

The Trial of Riek Machar: A Politicised Reckoning

On 11 September, the government formally charged First Vice-President Riek Machar, leader of the SPLA-IO, and several allies with murder, treason, and crimes against humanity—marking an unprecedented escalation in political confrontation.
The prosecution alleges Machar directed White Army militias in attacks on the SSPDF garrison in Nasir, killing over 250 soldiers.

Machar, under house arrest since March, denounced the charges as politically motivated and demanded referral to the AU Hybrid Court, as mandated under the 2018 peace accord. His appeal was denied, as the Special Court in Juba upheld jurisdiction—effectively turning the proceedings into a test of judicial independence versus regime control.

These developments signal the end of power-sharing as a viable instrument of governance, with the peace agreement reduced to a legal fiction amid renewed hostilities and mutual recrimination.

Security Dynamics: Fragmented Battlefronts and Collapsing Ceasefire

The ceasefire enshrined in the R-ARCSS has effectively collapsed. Fighting between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and SPLA-IO now extends across Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Central Equatoria, involving aerial bombardments and scorched-earth operations.

The force unification process, once the cornerstone of the peace framework, has disintegrated. SSPDF offensives against opposition bases have triggered new cycles of revenge attacks and ethnic mobilisation, particularly among Nuer and Shilluk communities.

UNMISS reporting confirms that aerial attacks and ground assaults have driven tens of thousands from their homes. The White Army, once demobilised, has re-emerged as a communal militia, exploiting power vacuums left by stalled disarmament.

Meanwhile, the political-military fragmentation has created an environment where armed groups operate autonomously, often funded through illicit taxation, oil theft, or local resource control—accelerating the militarisation of South Sudan’s economy.

Human Rights and Corruption: Systemic Impunity and Elite Capture

The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (September 2025) documented state-embedded corruption as a structural driver of human rights violations. The report exposed a pattern of elite enrichment—systematic theft of oil revenues, misuse of public funds, and diversion of aid—that fuels instability by sustaining patronage networks within the security sector.

The Commission noted that officials implicated in graft and human rights abuses continue to occupy senior government posts, often rewarded with promotions.

UNMISS’s Human Rights Division (HRD) reported 334 incidents of violence affecting 1,518 civilians between April and June 2025, including 30 cases of conflict-related sexual violence and 65 incidents of gender-based abuse.
Investigators warned that actual figures are likely far higher, given the mission’s restricted access to zones affected by airstrikes and heavy fighting.

This convergence of corruption, militarisation, and impunity has eroded any pretence of a rights-based transition.

Regional Dynamics: The Sudan Spillover and IGAD’s Waning Influence

The conflict in Sudan has spilled across the border, destabilising South Sudan’s northern regions and disrupting trade routes. Cross-border arms flow, and refugee inflows have intensified local competition for resources, while Juba’s limited capacity has left border regions vulnerable to external militia infiltration.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) remain the primary mediators, but with diminishing leverage. During an AUPSC field mission to Juba (10–12 August), delegates pressed for full implementation of the R-ARCSS, a permanent ceasefire, and elections in December 2026. However, IGAD’s credibility is undercut by Kiir’s manipulation of regional alliances and Machar’s political isolation.

Without external enforcement or political guarantees, regional mediation has become procedural rather than transformative, unable to alter the trajectory toward renewed civil conflict.

UNMISS Under Pressure: Budget Cuts and Operational Retrenchment

The UN’s global liquidity crisis has forced all peacekeeping missions to reduce expenditures by 15%, with 25% of uniformed personnel slated for repatriation in coming months.
For UNMISS, this translates into:

• Closure of several forward bases in conflict-prone areas.
• Reduced airlift and troop mobility capacity.
• Diminished civilian protection patrols, especially in Unity and Upper Nile states.

During his October visit, Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed Juba’s leadership on austerity measures and their impact on operational reach. The mission now faces a dual crisis of mandate and means—tasked with stabilising a failing peace process under conditions of fiscal austerity and political obstruction.

Council Considerations: Managing a Transition in Freefall

The Security Council’s central dilemma is how to prevent a total relapse into war while maintaining political neutrality amid Kiir’s consolidation of power and Machar’s marginalisation.

Key issues before the Council include:

• Collapse of the ceasefire and political process.
• Accountability for human rights violations.
• Protection of civilians amid mission downsizing.
• Spillover risks from Sudan’s war and regional destabilisation.

Possible Council actions include:

• Reaffirming support for the AU Hybrid Court, to restore credibility to transitional justice.
• Requesting a special briefing on UNMISS austerity impacts.
• Considering a Council visit to Juba (first since 2019) to assess the viability of the transition and press parties to recommit to peace.

However, deep divisions persist. The United States has accused Juba of “abandoning the 2018 peace accord,” while Russia and China urge “strategic patience” and oppose “excessive external pressure.” African members (Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Algeria) call for sustained engagement and resource protection, warning against premature mission contraction.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Assessment

South Sudan stands on the brink of renewed civil war. The political system has reverted to military dominance, while economic collapse and elite corruption have hollowed out governance. The R-ARCSS framework—once a blueprint for recovery—is now functionally defunct.

ASA assesses that:

• The Kiir–Machar dynamic has transitioned from political rivalry to institutional hostage-taking, each faction instrumentalising the state to survive.
• The security sector is fragmenting along ethnic and economic lines, increasing the likelihood of regionalized conflict.
• UNMISS drawdowns will create security vacuums in key population centres, exposing civilians to retaliatory attacks.
• Without international pressure and financial stabilization, the December 2026 elections risk triggering widespread violence rather than legitimizing governance.

Outlook (Q1–Q3 2026)

• Short-term: Renewed hostilities between SSPDF and SPLA-IO; politically motivated arrests and trials; further erosion of the ceasefire.
• Medium-term: Shrinking UNMISS footprint; risk of retaliatory violence in Jonglei and Upper Nile; deterioration of humanitarian access.
• Long-term: Institutional collapse of the R-ARCSS, leading to a fragmented, militarised state, sustained through external patronage and informal economies.

ASA Conclusion:

South Sudan’s transition has entered terminal fragility. The architecture of peace, justice, and reform envisioned in 2018 is collapsing under the twin pressures of personalized rule and militarized governance. UNMISS remains a stabilizing shell around a disintegrating state—its presence delaying, but no longer preventing, renewed war.
Without decisive regional coordination, financial reinforcement, and political conditionality, South Sudan risks becoming an archetype of managed decay: a state neither failed nor functioning, but indefinitely suspended between the two.