South Sudan – An Election Scheduled on a Dismantled Agreement:
The December 2026 Vote as a Legitimacy Risk

Executive summary

South Sudan is being steered toward a December 2026 election while the political and institutional foundations of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) are being progressively weakened. First Vice President Riek Machar remains under house arrest and faces trial; the principal opposition movement has fractured and declared the agreement defunct; monitoring institutions warn that implementation is stalled and that the country risks renewed large-scale conflict; and the transitional authorities have removed the census and permanent-constitution requirements from the pre-electoral sequence.

The government's position is that these changes remove obstacles to a vote that has already been repeatedly delayed. That argument cannot be dismissed: indefinite postponement would itself deepen public frustration and prolong an unelected transition. Yet an election is not legitimising merely because it occurs on schedule. Its credibility depends on political inclusion, agreed rules, security, voter registration, administrative capacity and meaningful competition. On the present trajectory, those conditions are substantially impaired.

This report therefore assesses that the most likely near-term outcome is not a conclusive democratic transition, but a vote—or a narrowly negotiated postponement—that transfers the legitimacy dispute from the transitional period into the post-election order. The African Union's 26 August briefing is the occasion for this assessment. The central policy question is not simply whether an election can be held, but whether the process can produce authority broadly regarded as lawful, inclusive and sufficiently credible to reduce rather than intensify conflict.

Scope and analytical method: This assessment is based on the political, legal and security developments described in the source report. It distinguishes between documented institutional changes, contested allegations and forward-looking judgments. Because access, reporting and political claims remain contested, scenario rankings should be read as relative assessments for the period through and immediately after December 2026, not as predictions of certainty.

1. The core rupture: Machar's detention and the weakening of the power-sharing premise

The R-ARCSS was not reducible to the personal relationship between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, but its implementation depended heavily on a power-sharing bargain between their respective political and military constituencies. Machar's arrest in March 2025, subsequent house arrest and prosecution therefore represent more than an individual legal case: they remove the leader of the principal opposition movement from the political arena during the final phase of the transition.

The government links the proceedings to alleged treason and killings associated with the White Army's seizure of an army base following confrontation in Nasir, Upper Nile. Machar and senior SPLM-IO figures reject the charges as politically motivated. This report does not adjudicate criminal responsibility. It assesses the political effect: where the principal opposition leader is detained, his movement is divided and senior officials face prosecution, the inclusiveness and competitiveness of the electoral process become substantially harder to demonstrate.

Machar's detention should also not obscure weaknesses within the opposition. The SPLM-IO has suffered internal fractures, uneven institutional capacity and a long record of incomplete implementation. Nor should the transitional crisis be reduced entirely to the Kiir-Machar rivalry; other parties, civil-society organisations, displaced communities, women, youth, local authorities and non-signatory armed actors also have claims to representation. Even so, removing the principal opposition leadership without an agreed replacement mechanism directly weakens the power-sharing framework on which the transition was organised.

2. The amendments: enabling elections while narrowing their foundation

Following Machar's arrest and the SPLM-IO's declaration that the R-ARCSS had become defunct, the transitional authorities announced amendments affecting the final phase of the transition and preparations for elections. The most consequential changes removed the census and permanent constitution from the sequence of prerequisites for the vote.

The government's enabling argument is clear: South Sudan cannot remain indefinitely trapped in an extended transition while technically demanding processes delay citizens' opportunity to vote. In some post-conflict settings, elections have proceeded under interim constitutional arrangements and without a recent census. A census and permanent constitution are therefore not, by themselves, universal preconditions for every valid election.

The problem in South Sudan is contextual. These requirements were part of the negotiated settlement intended to define constituencies, clarify the rules of political competition and establish the constitutional order into which elected authority would be transferred. Removing them unilaterally, after the principal opposition leadership has been detained and the agreement's responsibility-sharing arrangements have weakened, changes not merely the timetable but the bargain itself.

A credible process would consequently need functional substitutes: a transparent and independently reviewable voter-registration system; agreed constituency boundaries; clear rules governing the relationship between interim law and the future constitutional order; an operational election-management body; judicial mechanisms for complaints; and meaningful participation by opposition and civic actors. Without these safeguards, the amendments risk converting an election from the conclusion of a negotiated transition into a ratification of the authority already controlling the state apparatus.

3. The monitors' findings: stalled implementation and rising conflict risk

The agreement's monitoring institutions have reported systematic violations of responsibility-sharing arrangements and warned that elections in December 2026 may be extremely difficult unless urgent corrective measures are taken. The ceasefire-monitoring mechanism has also recorded increases in violations and hostilities involving signatories and warned of possible relapse into full-scale conflict.

These assessments should be treated as operating conditions rather than background commentary. Elections require more than polling stations: candidates must be able to organise, campaign and travel; voters must be able to participate without coercion; security forces must act with restraint; election institutions must operate throughout the country; and disputes must be resolved through accepted procedures.

At the same time, monitoring warnings do not prove that nationwide voting is mechanically impossible. Conditions may vary considerably across states and counties, and limited electoral activity could still occur. The more important distinction is between an election that is administratively held and one that is politically accepted. The evidence described in this report points to a widening gap between those two standards.

4. The recurring cycle—and the limits of a two-person explanation

South Sudan's political crises have repeatedly moved through confrontation, mediation, partial implementation and relapse. The Kiir-Machar rivalry has been central to this pattern, and national political competition has frequently interacted with ethnic and intercommunal violence. However, describing the crisis solely as a personal rivalry can conceal deeper drivers: militarised patronage, weak institutions, fragmented command structures, local land and resource conflicts, elite competition over public revenue, impunity and the exclusion of civilians from decision-making.

The current phase is especially dangerous because several mechanisms intended to interrupt the cycle—power-sharing, ceasefire monitoring, security-sector reform and an agreed constitutional endpoint—have been weakened, delayed or contested at the same time. The transition is therefore losing both its political bargain and its institutional safeguards.

Yet deterioration need not produce only a binary return to national civil war. Another risk is fragmented violence: local conflicts, defections, militia mobilisation and uneven state coercion could intensify without either principal camp achieving coherent national control. This possibility is important because an election could proceed in some areas while insecurity and exclusion make participation impossible in others.

5. Electoral legitimacy: the standards that matter

The central issue is not whether every element of the original agreement must remain unchanged. Peace agreements sometimes require amendment when timelines prove unrealistic. The relevant test is whether changes are negotiated inclusively, legally grounded and accompanied by safeguards that preserve the substance of political competition.

For the December 2026 process to confer more legitimacy than it contests, at least six conditions would need visible progress: an agreed legal framework; a credible voter register and constituency process; space for opposition organisation and media access; security arrangements that reduce intimidation; independent electoral administration and dispute resolution; and a politically inclusive decision on the status of detained opposition leaders and parties.

No single condition guarantees legitimacy, and no election is perfectly inclusive. But the cumulative absence of several conditions would make recognition by domestic constituencies—not merely endorsement by external observers—the decisive problem.

6. Diplomacy: substantial engagement, limited leverage

South Sudan has attracted sustained engagement from IGAD, the African Union, the AU's C5 mechanism, the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the United Nations. International inquiries and missions have warned that the 2018 agreement is being dismantled, that humanitarian conditions are worsening and that renewed hostilities must cease.

The record nevertheless suggests a gap between diplomatic presence and political leverage. External actors have not prevented unilateral changes to the transitional framework, secured full implementation of security arrangements or produced a durable settlement around Machar's status. Multiple diplomatic channels may also allow the parties to engage selectively, delay commitments or seek the forum most compatible with their immediate interests.

This does not make diplomacy irrelevant. It means that the AU and its partners should define achievable objectives and connect them to coordinated incentives and consequences. Near-term priorities could include a common regional position on minimum electoral conditions, protection of civic and opposition space, an agreed mechanism for legal and political treatment of detainees, strengthened monitoring, and a negotiated decision on whether the timetable remains viable.

Alternative interpretation: The government's strongest case is that further delay would reward obstruction, prolong unelected rule and deny citizens an overdue vote. It may also argue that interim legal arrangements and administrative registration can substitute for a census and permanent constitution. This report nevertheless assesses that timing cannot compensate for the cumulative weakening of inclusion, security and agreed rules. A vote conducted under those conditions may create a formal mandate while leaving the underlying conflict over lawful authority unresolved.

7. Indicators to monitor before December 2026

• Machar's legal and political status, and whether any settlement permits meaningful opposition participation.

• Whether amendments and electoral rules are accepted by more than the governing coalition.

• Operational progress on voter registration, constituency delimitation and election-dispute mechanisms.

• The independence, funding and nationwide reach of electoral institutions.

• Ceasefire violations, defections, mobilisation and restrictions on political activity.

• Access for civil society, media, women, youth and displaced communities.

• Whether IGAD, the AU and the UN articulate a common minimum standard for proceeding or postponing.

• Evidence that security forces will protect, rather than direct, the electoral process.

Scenario assessment

Most likely—contested electoral transition

A vote is held in December 2026, or follows a short, negotiated delay, under a modified legal framework and uneven security conditions. The government presents the result as the end of the transition, while significant opposition and civic constituencies reject either the process or its outcome. Formal authority is produced, but the legitimacy dispute is transferred into the post-election period. Localised violence, selective participation and prolonged legal or political contestation remain likely.

Plausible—pre-election breakdown or fragmented violence

Machar's detention, incomplete security arrangements, opposition fragmentation and increasing ceasefire violations trigger renewed confrontation before the vote. This may take the form of large-scale conflict, but a more fragmented pattern is also possible: defections, militia mobilisation and localised fighting disrupt some regions while the authorities continue preparations elsewhere. The national electoral timetable then becomes either unworkable or sharply unequal.

Plausible but less likely—negotiated reset

Coordinated regional and international pressure produces a negotiated adjustment rather than a unilateral postponement. The parties agree on Machar's status or an inclusive opposition mechanism, restore or replace key electoral safeguards, define a limited constitutional and voter-registration roadmap, and establish clearer monitoring. Elections are delayed or sequenced through agreed benchmarks. This would not resolve South Sudan's political crisis, but it could reduce the risk that the vote becomes a direct trigger for renewed conflict.

Low-probability positive outcome—credible election under compressed conditions

The transitional authorities rapidly establish credible administrative substitutes for the removed prerequisites, open political space, secure broad participation, reduce violence and accept meaningful oversight. A competitive vote is held, and its result is sufficiently accepted to begin moving the country beyond the transitional framework. The compressed timetable and current political conditions make this outcome possible but unlikely.

Analytical confidence: High confidence that the original power-sharing and pre-electoral framework has been substantially weakened; moderate confidence that an election held on the current basis would produce a contested mandate; lower confidence regarding whether contestation would generate nationwide war, fragmented violence, negotiated postponement or a mixture of these outcomes.

Closing assessment

South Sudan's December 2026 election is being prepared as the political and institutional foundation of the transition narrows. The principal opposition leader is detained and on trial; responsibility-sharing arrangements have weakened; the permanent-constitution and census requirements have been removed; and monitoring institutions warn of deteriorating security and stalled implementation.

None of these facts proves that an election must be abandoned, and indefinite extension of the transition would carry its own legitimacy costs. The decisive issue is whether credible substitutes and negotiated safeguards can be created before voting begins. On the current trajectory, the process is more likely to manufacture a contested mandate than to settle the question of lawful political authority.

For the AU, the most useful measure of engagement will not be whether it endorses a date, but whether it helps establish common minimum conditions, coordinates leverage among external actors, protects inclusive participation and creates a politically credible route either to elections or to an agreed, benchmarked postponement. Without that work, the election may close the transitional calendar while leaving the transition itself unresolved.

African Security Analysis (ASA) maintains continuous monitoring of the South Sudan transition and remains available for tailored analytical engagement.