Somalia: Political Fragmentation, Electoral Disputes, and Intensifying Extremist Activity Ahead of AUSSOM Reauthorization

1. Expected Security Council Action

The Security Council is expected to reauthorise the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) before its mandate expires at the end of December. In parallel, the Council will also review the renewal of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, including the maritime interdiction component, which lapses on 13 December. A decision concerning the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2713 Sanctions Committee—set to expire on 13 January 2026—will also be required.

These deliberations occur amid intensifying domestic political tensions in Somalia, persistent extremist violence, and ongoing resource constraints affecting both AUSSOM and the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS).

2. Domestic Political Developments

2.1 Contentious Electoral Preparations for 2026

Somalia’s internal political landscape continues to be defined by disagreements over the electoral model for the 2026 national elections. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the federal government advocate a “one person, one vote” system. However, federal member states remain divided.

The Banadir region—covering Mogadishu and surrounding districts—had initially been expected to hold municipal polls on 30 November, with over one million voters registered. Media reporting suggests that these elections have now been rescheduled for 25 December, reflecting logistical and political concerns.

Opposition to the electoral plan is significant. Puntland and Jubaland—both of which suspended formal engagement with Mogadishu—accuse the federal government of attempting to centralise authority without achieving national consensus. They argue that Somalia lacks sufficient institutional, logistical, and security preparedness for universal suffrage elections. Some federal member states and political leaders favour maintaining the clan-based formula, asserting it preserves power-sharing among major clans.

President Mohamud travelled to Kismayo in October in an attempt to ease tensions with Jubaland. Despite the visit, political relations remain tense and unresolved.

2.2 Emergence of Opposition Alliances

In November, a major political coalition—the Somali Future Council—met in Nairobi. Comprising the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, as well as prominent figures from the Somalia Salvation Forum (including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Ministers Hassan Ali Khaire, Mohamed Hussein Roble, and Abdi Farah Shirdon), the alliance formally rejected the federal government’s electoral plan absent broad national consensus. The group signalled an intention to convene a national conference within Somalia to determine a unified political approach.

Simultaneously, a new political party, the Union of National Pride, nominated former Prime Minister Shirdon as its candidate for the 2026 presidential elections. Reporting suggests that Fahad Yasin—former national intelligence chief—was instrumental in establishing the party, further reshaping the emerging political field.

3. Security Developments

3.1 Al-Shabaab Operations and Counter-Terrorism Activity

Political tensions have contributed to an increasingly fragile security environment. Al-Shabaab has expanded control across portions of central Somalia and increased pressure on federal and local authorities. Nonetheless, the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), supported by foreign partners, report a series of high-value counter-terrorism successes.

On 9 November, SNAF announced the killing of several senior Al-Shabaab leaders, including Mohamed Abdi Mohamed Nur (Goofoow), during operations in Bay and Bakool. The US Africa Command confirmed that an airstrike conducted on 26 October in coordination with the federal government targeted and killed a senior Al-Shabaab leader, Mahmoud Abdi Hamud (Jaafar Gurey), in Bu’aale, Middle Juba.

3.2 ISIL-Somalia Activity in Puntland

Puntland Security Forces—supported by the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and regional partners—continue operations against an Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) offshoot entrenched in the Bari region. Recent operations have resulted in the killing or capture of ISIL members, including foreign fighters. On 19 November, US Africa Command announced coordinated airstrikes targeting ISIL-Somalia positions.

These developments indicate the presence of multiple, simultaneously active extremist threats across Somalia, adding complexity to AUSSOM’s operations.

4. AUSSOM Financing and Operational Constraints

4.1 AU Push for Sustainable Funding

During its 3 July session, the African Union Peace and Security Council underscored the urgent need to secure reliable funding for AUSSOM and directed the AU Commission to engage with the UN and bilateral partners. A high-level funding meeting held in New York on 25 September yielded commitments, but pledges remain significantly below the $196 million required for troop allowances. AUSSOM personnel have now operated for more than a year without allowances, raising concerns about potential attrition and morale.

4.2 UNSOS Liquidity Crisis Impact

UNSOS—responsible for providing logistical, transportation, and operational support to AUSSOM—faces a mandatory 25 percent expenditure reduction due to UN-wide liquidity contingency measures. These reductions stem from delayed payment of assessed contributions by member states and are expected to impact AUSSOM’s operational effectiveness, including supply chains, rotations, and essential support services.

5. Sanctions Regime Developments

5.1 Resolution 2776 and Technical Assessments

On 3 March, the Council adopted resolution 2776, extending the Al-Shabaab sanctions regime until 13 December and renewing the Panel of Experts’ mandate until 13 January 2026. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to provide a technical assessment of the arms embargo by 1 November. This assessment has been circulated to Council members and is expected to inform upcoming negotiations.

5.2 Panel of Experts Final Report

The Panel’s final report, submitted on 13 November, outlines Al-Shabaab’s sustained threat to Somalia and the wider region. The report highlights the group’s territorial expansion into central and southern Somalia, its continued attacks—including an assassination attempt against the president—sophisticated extortion schemes, and smuggling networks used to acquire weapons and materiel. The report also details ISIL-Somalia’s activities and the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters.

6. Key Issues and Options Before the Council

AUSSOM’s reauthorisation will be a central question in December. Resolution 2767 requires regular joint technical assessments by the UN, AU, and Federal Government of Somalia to guide the Council’s decisions regarding future phases. The assessment—initially due by 30 September—was delayed, with the Secretary-General requesting an extension until 30 October. As the report has not yet been published, Council members may seek an informal Secretariat briefing on its key findings.

Council members will also assess possible adjustments to AUSSOM’s mandate, including whether the mission should be reauthorised without change or modified in light of recommendations. Sustainable funding remains a critical challenge. Earlier attempts to trigger financing mechanisms under Security Council resolution 2719 failed due to opposition from the United States. Council members may convene an Informal Interactive Dialogue with AU and EU representatives following the AU-EU Summit in Luanda to address funding shortfalls.

The Council must also consider the fragile financial situation of UNSOS and the broader liquidity crisis impacting UN peacekeeping missions. These constraints risk degrading AUSSOM’s operational capacity.

Renewing the 2713 sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts will require the Council to weigh recent findings and Somalia’s growing insistence that the effectiveness and strategic value of the sanctions be re-evaluated.

7. Council and Wider Dynamics

Most Council members acknowledge the need to sustainably fund AUSSOM, though the United States remains opposed to addressing the issue through resolution 2719. The divergence between Council members and the AU Peace and Security Council was evident during the 18 October annual consultations, which ended without a joint communiqué due to disagreements over financing language.

The UK, as penholder on Somalia, previously explored developing a Council product concerning the transition of the UN Transition Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), but Somalia did not support the proposal.

Council members broadly support Somalia’s counter-terrorism priorities and recognise the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab. However, Somalia—supported by the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana), as well as China, Pakistan, and Russia—has called for a serious reassessment of the sanctions regime’s effectiveness. This issue is expected to recur during negotiations on the extension of the 2713 sanctions regime.