Situational Analysis and Forecast – Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Based on UNSC briefings.

1. Expected Security Council Action

The Security Council is scheduled to hold a briefing and consultations in December on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The meeting takes place during a period of intensified diplomatic engagement, ongoing mediation efforts, and continued insecurity in eastern provinces, where several armed groups—including the M23 and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—remain active. Council members are also beginning deliberations around the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate, expected before the end of the year.

2. Recent Diplomatic Developments

2.1 Washington Track: DRC–Rwanda Peace Effort

On 27 June, the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington aimed at de-escalating tensions following years of mutual accusations of supporting proxy forces in eastern DRC. The agreement established a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism tasked with overseeing a harmonised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for neutralising the FDLR and facilitating phased disengagement and de-escalation measures along the border.

A follow-up meeting of the Mechanism, held on 21–22 October in Washington, brought together representatives of the US, Qatar, and the African Union Commission. Delegates reaffirmed commitment to the Operations Order (OPORD), which outlines technical steps for implementing the CONOPS. The discussion focused on monitoring arrangements, force posture adjustments, and the pace of disengagement.

2.2 Joint Oversight Committee Developments

The Joint Oversight Committee, mandated to resolve implementation disputes, met on 7 November in Washington. Participants included representatives of the US, the DRC, Rwanda, Qatar, Togo (as AU mediator), and the AU Commission. In a joint statement, the parties reiterated commitments to refrain from hostile rhetoric or actions that could undermine the peace agreement. They also initialled a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) to strengthen economic cooperation and recovery in conflict-affected areas. Qatar delivered an update on its parallel mediation efforts between the Congolese government and the M23.

3. Doha Track: Negotiations with the M23

3.1 Ceasefire Commitments and Declaration of Principles

Doha has emerged as the second major mediation hub. On 23 April, government and M23 representatives issued a joint declaration committing to an immediate cessation of hostilities and rejecting hate speech. A more detailed Declaration of Principles followed on 19 July, which included explicit commitments to a ceasefire and respect for civilian protection norms.

3.2 The Doha Framework Agreement

Negotiations continued through mid-2025, resulting in the signing of the Doha Framework Agreement on 15 November. The Agreement commits the parties to structured dialogue, confidence-building measures, and a phased approach to troop disengagement and stabilisation. Qatar indicated that the framework establishes a foundation for a comprehensive peace package, with additional protocols to be negotiated—including modalities for ceasefire verification, troop withdrawals, humanitarian access, reintegration, and national dialogue support.

3.3 Council Informal Interactive Dialogue

On 26 November, Council members held an Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) to assess progress in both the Washington and Doha tracks. Facilitators outlined potential sequencing for next steps, highlighted remaining political obstacles, and explored whether MONUSCO could play a monitoring role in a future ceasefire mechanism.

4. Regional Engagement and International Support

4.1 Great Lakes Conference

On 30 October, France and Togo co-hosted a Great Lakes Conference on the margins of the Paris Peace Forum, aiming to mobilise humanitarian support for eastern DRC and encourage diplomatic backing for ongoing mediation efforts.

4.2 ICGLR Summit

The 9th Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) convened on 15 November in Kinshasa. President Félix Tshisekedi assumed the rotating chairmanship, taking over from Angola's President João Lourenço, who had been central to the Luanda process aimed at reducing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. The summit’s outcomes emphasised political coordination and support for emerging mediation architectures.

5. Human Rights Developments

5.1 Establishment of Independent Commission of Inquiry

On 27 October, the President of the UN Human Rights Council announced the appointment of three independent experts to the newly established Independent Commission of Inquiry on human rights in South and North Kivu. Their mandate includes presenting an oral update and a comprehensive written report under enhanced interactive dialogue, pursuant to HRC resolution 60/22.

5.2 Human Rights Council Actions

The HRC adopted resolution 60/35 on 8 October, calling for strengthened international technical assistance to support transitional justice efforts in the DRC. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also submitted a report covering June 2024 to May 2025, emphasising the need for continued engagement with national authorities and cooperation with international mechanisms.

5.3 Women, Peace and Security Concerns

In a 30 September statement, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders expressed grave concern following the abduction and sexual violence committed against four women human rights defenders in South Kivu. She stressed that the incidents reflect a pattern of systematic targeting of civilians, particularly women defenders, in eastern DRC. The Rapporteur called for immediate investigations and reinforced protection mechanisms.

6. Key Issues for the Security Council

6.1 Renewal of MONUSCO’s Mandate

A central issue is the renewal of MONUSCO’s mandate in December. Council members have requested updated recommendations from the Secretary-General, including adjustments required to adapt to evolving security conditions and improve mission performance. MONUSCO’s core priority tasks—protection of civilians, security sector reform, and DDR—are expected to remain relevant.

6.2 Potential Additional Responsibilities

Given ongoing mediation efforts, Council members may consider assigning MONUSCO an expanded role in monitoring ceasefire compliance, supporting disengagement processes, and assisting humanitarian access mechanisms.

6.3 Operational Constraints

Restrictions on MONUSCO’s freedom of movement, particularly in M23-controlled areas, remain a consistent concern. Council members are expected to call for the removal of such constraints to ensure effective mandate implementation.

6.4 Financial and Structural Stress

The UN’s liquidity crisis continues to affect peacekeeping missions, including MONUSCO. Budget pressures have already led to the repatriation of select contingents. Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed Council members on contingency planning measures aimed at mitigating operational disruptions.

7. Council Dynamics

Security Council members broadly welcomed the progress reflected in the Doha Framework Agreement and ongoing Washington-mediated de-escalation efforts. At the time of writing, members were negotiating a press statement recognising the significance of these developments. However, members remain acutely concerned about the situation on the ground, where M23 advances, localized violence, and humanitarian needs persist.

Several members emphasise the importance of implementing the CONOPS for neutralising the FDLR and of lifting defensive measures imposed by Rwanda. Troop- and police-contributing countries expressed concern about funding cuts. Pakistan argued that MONUSCO must be strengthened rather than weakened, while Russia stressed the need to restore the mission’s civilian protection capabilities. The A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) insisted that any drawdown or reconfiguration must remain strictly conditions-based to avoid creating a security vacuum.

The United States has called for increased efficiency in MONUSCO and reduction of unnecessary expenditures, even as recent reports indicate that the US administration intends to continue funding its assessed contributions to MONUSCO.

THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT SERVICE – TRS