Niger Ends Intelligence Ties with Russia and Turkey Amid Security Failures and Strategic Realignment

Niger’s military-led government has abruptly ended its intelligence cooperation agreements with Russia and Turkey, signalling a major shift in its security strategy. The move reflects growing frustration within the ruling Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) over the inefficacy of foreign surveillance support, mounting operational setbacks, and intensifying internal pressure that have exposed critical weaknesses in the country’s intelligence and defence systems.

Breakdown of Intelligence Partnerships and the Role of the DGDSE

The termination was spearheaded by the Direction Générale de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGDSE), Niger’s primary external intelligence agency. Military authorities cited poor performance of Russian and Turkish surveillance systems, particularly their failure to effectively intercept telephone and digital communications—capabilities once central to Niger’s counterterrorism strategy.

Discontent also stemmed from the performance of foreign technical teams deployed under post-coup agreements. These teams, and the systems they brought, reportedly suffered from frequent malfunctions and lacked robust encryption, falling far short of operational needs.

To bridge the gap, Niger contracted a Moroccan private firm specializing in cyber-espionage to quickly rebuild its digital surveillance capabilities. The effort was supported by the national telecommunications regulator. However, the initiative was short-lived: it collapsed when it was revealed the Moroccan company had subcontracted technology and expertise from a French firm. Given the severed diplomatic and military ties with France after the July 2023 coup, any association with French actors became politically untenable. The junta swiftly dismantled the system, leaving the country without a functioning surveillance infrastructure.

Emergency Measures to Address Intelligence Gaps

In the absence of foreign-supported surveillance, Niger’s government moved to fill the vacuum by tasking the Presidential Guard with domestic intelligence duties—despite its lack of formal training in this field.

From early April 2025, plainclothes units began nighttime patrols in Niamey’s most politically and diplomatically sensitive areas. Operating on foot and on unmarked motorcycles between midnight and 6:00 a.m., these patrols focus on key locations including the Rond-Point de l’Hôpital, the Ministry of Justice, the Yantala district, the Palais des Congrès, and the western diplomatic enclave.

These measures, while urgent, are seen as inadequate substitutes for structured surveillance systems. Internal observers report a noticeable decline in intelligence personnel morale, and growing factionalism within the security apparatus. Some military units are reportedly displaying disobedience toward central command in Niamey.

A Split Strategy: Intelligence Autonomy vs. Military Dependence

Although intelligence cooperation with Russia and Turkey has ended, Niger continues to expand military-industrial ties with Moscow. In early 2025, Niger signed a regional agreement with Mali and Burkina Faso to access satellite-based telecommunications and surveillance services provided by Russia’s Roscosmos space agency. The agreement includes high-resolution imaging, geolocation, and encrypted communications in regions affected by jihadist violence—especially in the tri-border area.

This development underscores a paradox: while the CNSP seeks greater independence in intelligence operations, it remains reliant on Russian military and aerospace technology for strategic defence and border monitoring.

Additional signs of this divergence include the recent arrival of Russian military instructors and technicians to install and maintain air defence systems, radar networks, and short-range anti-aircraft platforms. These deployments aim to replace Western-backed systems dismantled following the expulsion of French, American, and German forces.

Growing Reliance on the Sahel Alliance

Niger’s pivot also aligns with its deepening cooperation within the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), formed with Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023 after the breakdown with ECOWAS. The alliance aims to establish integrated defence structures, share operational intelligence, and coordinate joint responses to jihadist threats.

AES member states are increasingly conducting cross-border operations—especially in Tillabéri, Oudalan, and Gao—often with Russian technical assistance. New training camps, logistics hubs, and command centres are being established along these frontlines.

However, the alliance faces serious limitations. None of the three countries possesses intelligence capabilities comparable to those formerly provided by Western partners. Consequently, their joint surveillance and counter-insurgency efforts remain largely reactive and uncoordinated.

Mounting Economic and Humanitarian Pressures

As Niger’s security challenges grow, so too do its economic and humanitarian crises. Nearly 45.3% of the population lives in extreme poverty, and food insecurity is spreading rapidly. While the government projects that poverty levels could fall to 35.8% by 2027, this is contingent on sustained economic growth and improved security—both of which remain uncertain.

According to the World Bank, 4.8 million people will require humanitarian aid in 2025, with at least 3 million facing emergency food shortages due to crop failures, displacement, and disrupted markets. The withdrawal of international aid after the coup has worsened the situation, with humanitarian organizations facing bureaucratic hurdles and security risks in volatile areas.

Niger is currently hosting nearly one million displaced persons and refugees, particularly in conflict-prone regions such as Tillabéri (where Islamic State factions operate), Diffa (a Boko Haram stronghold), and Tahoua. Many of these zones are inaccessible to aid due to ongoing violence and the lack of secure humanitarian corridors.

Conclusion: A Strategic Crossroads

Niger’s decision to cut intelligence ties with Russia and Turkey reflects deep-rooted weaknesses in its security apparatus and its increasing diplomatic isolation. While the military junta aims to develop a self-sufficient intelligence system and strengthen regional military cooperation through the AES, the country currently lacks the technology and institutional stability to secure its borders and cities effectively.

The reliance on ad hoc internal patrols, the collapse of alternative intelligence arrangements, and continued dependence on Russian military technology highlight a strategic contradiction: a desire for autonomy, yet an enduring dependence on foreign support.

Without significant institutional reform, stronger coordination among security forces, and a coherent long-term vision, Niger risks further destabilization—exposed to both internal unrest and external threats. The current crisis underscores not only the failures of foreign partnerships but also the unresolved question of how Niger can assert sovereignty and security in a deeply fractured Sahelian context.