Libya – The Oil-for-Unity Bargain:
A US-Brokered Elite Settlement, the UN Framework, and the Choice Facing the Security Council

Executive summary

Libya's five-year institutional stalemate is being acted upon by a new variable: a reported United States mediation effort centred on a specific redistribution of executive power. Beneath the continuing division between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern Government of National Stability (GNS), reporting indicates that an arrangement is being explored under which Abdul Hamid Dbeibah would remain prime minister while Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the Libyan National Army and son of Khalifa Haftar, would assume an executive presidency during a transitional period preceding elections.

The stated logic is stabilisation, institutional unification and the return of major energy investment. That logic deserves serious consideration. Libya's existing process has repeatedly failed to produce elections, unify institutions or alter the incentives of the actors who benefit from the status quo. A negotiated bargain among the principal powerholders could therefore unlock decisions that an inclusive but leverage-poor multilateral process has been unable to secure.

The central risk is that such a bargain would entrench the political and military actors whose dominance has contributed to the stalemate, while bypassing or reshaping the UN-endorsed framework without broad Libyan consent. The decisive tension is thus not simply between Tripoli and Benghazi, but between two theories of transition: an inclusive, rules-based process with limited coercive leverage, and a transactional elite settlement backed by external power and economic incentives. The August UN briefing is the occasion for this assessment. Its central question is whether these approaches can be reconciled—or whether the Security Council will eventually be forced to choose between them.

Scope and analytical method: This assessment is based on the reported political architecture described in the source report. Because the US initiative has not been formally published or endorsed by the Security Council, references to its terms should be treated as reported rather than definitive. The report distinguishes documented institutional positions, attributed reporting, political interpretation and forward-looking scenarios. Scenario rankings describe relative plausibility over the near term, not certainty.

1. The structural deadlock the initiative is trying to bypass

Libya's division is institutional and increasingly self-reinforcing. The GNU in Tripoli under Dbeibah, supported in part by the High State Council, faces the eastern GNS under Osama Hamad, backed by the House of Representatives and Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. The parties remain divided over electoral legislation and over whether a new unified interim government should be formed before elections. The dispute has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the December 2021 vote.

The stalemate is not simply an accident of personalities. Rival institutions derive access to revenue, appointments, external relationships and coercive power from the existing division. Neither side has a clear incentive to enter a process that could dissolve its position unless the expected benefits of settlement exceed the benefits of continued fragmentation.

Any credible initiative must therefore do at least one of three things: change incentives, impose costs for obstruction, or broker an elite bargain that redistributes enough power to make compromise rational. The reported US initiative appears to emphasise the third path. Its attraction is speed and leverage; its danger is that it may stabilise the existing elite balance without resolving the legitimacy deficit beneath it.

2. The UN track: broad legitimacy, limited leverage

UNSMIL's roadmap has pursued a more inclusive and procedurally grounded approach. Its three tracks address the electoral framework, institutional unification under a new government, and structured dialogue on governance, economics, security and reconciliation. The dialogue reportedly generated hundreds of recommendations and involved both direct participants and a much wider consultation process.

The strength of this approach is breadth. It recognises that Libya's transition cannot be reduced to a bargain among officeholders and military commanders. Its weakness is that consultation does not automatically produce compliance by actors who control territory, revenue and armed force. Efforts to convene smaller groups from the rival governments have so far struggled to translate broad legitimacy into binding decisions.

This limitation should not be treated as proof that inclusion is irrelevant. Rather, it demonstrates that inclusion and leverage must be combined. A process without societal buy-in risks instability; a process without pressure on the principals risks permanent delay.

3. The reported US plan: potential breakthrough and structural risk

The reported American initiative, associated with US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos, appears intended to unify executive authority, reduce institutional duplication and create conditions for renewed investment in Libya's energy sector. Its reported core is continuity for Dbeibah as prime minister, an executive presidency for Saddam Haftar, and a transitional period before elections.

The strongest argument for such an arrangement is practical. Dbeibah and the Haftar camp command substantial institutional, economic and coercive resources. A bargain between them could unlock a unified budget, administrative coordination, security arrangements and investment decisions that have remained blocked under the current framework. It could also create a transitional authority capable of preparing elections if the agreement includes a binding timetable and enforceable safeguards.

The structural concern is that the bargain may pre-select the winners of the transition before the public has voted. If the arrangement guarantees continuity at the top, concentrates executive power and leaves electoral sequencing open-ended, it could convert a temporary settlement into a durable distribution of authority. The issue is not that transactional diplomacy is inherently illegitimate; most peace settlements involve transactions. The issue is whether the transaction creates a pathway out of elite domination or merely reorganises it.

4. Legal and institutional compatibility with the UN framework

The 2015 Libyan Political Agreement remains the internationally recognised foundation for the transitional architecture, including a collective Presidential Council and procedures governing government legitimacy. UNSMIL's roadmap operates within or alongside that framework. A reported arrangement centred on a single executive president and a pre-selected prime minister would therefore raise significant compatibility questions.

Those questions should be stated carefully. Political agreements can be amended or superseded if Libyan actors reach a sufficiently broad and lawful consensus and if the Security Council adjusts its position. The existence of a new architecture would not automatically make it illegitimate. The decisive issues are who consents, through what legal process, with what guarantees, and whether the arrangement preserves a credible route to elections.

A stronger assessment should therefore distinguish three possibilities: a plan negotiated entirely outside the LPA; a political bargain later incorporated into the UN framework; or a new Libyan agreement formally endorsed as a successor framework. The legitimacy implications differ substantially across these pathways.

5. Libyan society is not a passive object of settlement

A recurring weakness of externally designed settlements is the assumption that agreement among dominant elites equals national consent. Libya's political and security landscape is more dispersed. Municipal leaders, armed constituencies, civil society, business networks, tribes, communities affected by conflict, women, youth and displaced populations all have the capacity either to support or obstruct implementation.

Reported opposition in Misrata to arrangements that preserve the status quo or rehabilitate figures accused of corruption or abuse illustrates this problem. Misrata's political and military weight means that its position is operationally significant, not merely symbolic. A settlement perceived as consolidating eastern military ascendancy could mobilise resistance among western armed actors that have historically opposed such an outcome.

At the same time, resistance by local constituencies should not automatically be treated as democratic legitimacy. Armed groups and municipal elites may also defend narrow interests. A balanced process must therefore test elite bargains against wider public acceptance without romanticising every excluded actor.

6. The energy dimension: incentive, leverage and risk

Energy is central to the reported initiative because Libya's oil sector is both the country's main economic asset and a source of political leverage. Increased investment, production stability and institutional coordination could generate tangible benefits for Libyans and create incentives for compromise.

The risk is that energy access becomes the organising logic of the political settlement rather than one component of it. If external commercial interests are perceived to drive the architecture, the agreement may appear designed to secure production and contracts while postponing accountability and representation. That perception could undermine legitimacy even if the arrangement improves short-term economic performance.

A credible settlement would therefore require transparency around oil revenues, investment contracts, budget allocation and the role of national institutions. The test is whether energy becomes a shared national dividend or a transactional reward for elite accommodation.

7. Regional and great-power alignment

The initiative is reportedly being advanced through a diplomatic network involving the United States and several regional states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Engagement with officials from both the GNU and the Haftar camp suggests an attempt to construct a coalition capable of supporting institutional unification.

Such coordination could be an asset if it reduces external competition and aligns pressure behind a common Libyan process. It could become a liability if regional actors seek to protect preferred clients or if the settlement is perceived as externally allocated among sponsors.

At the Security Council, members are likely to approach the issue through different emphases: some prioritise the UN's central role and procedural legitimacy; others stress sovereignty, existing institutions and a Libyan-led settlement. Russia and China may resist an architecture perceived as designed primarily by Washington, but neither opposition nor support should be assumed in advance. Their positions will depend on the agreement's legal form, regional backing, protection of interests and degree of Libyan consent.

Alternative interpretation: The reported US effort may not be intended to displace the UN process. It could instead be an exercise in leverage: using bilateral pressure and incentives to secure a political understanding that is later channelled through UNSMIL and endorsed by Libyan institutions. If so, the apparent conflict between the two tracks may be overstated. The key indicator will be whether US diplomacy strengthens a time-bound electoral framework and broader participation, or whether it seeks recognition for a closed agreement whose main terms have already been allocated.

8. The choice facing the Security Council

No Council member has formally endorsed the reported political architecture described in this report. The Council therefore does not yet face a binary legal choice. However, if a Dbeibah-Haftar arrangement gains sufficient US and regional backing, members may be asked to decide whether to incorporate it into the UN framework, tolerate it without formal endorsement, or withhold recognition.

Each option carries costs. Formal endorsement could weaken the credibility of previously agreed procedures if the bargain lacks broad consent. Non-recognition could leave the UN process detached from the operative balance of power. Ambiguous acceptance could preserve Council unity in the short term while creating uncertainty over legal authority and electoral sequencing.

The most constructive Council position would be conditional rather than binary: support any Libyan agreement that demonstrates broad political inclusion, a lawful adoption process, safeguards against indefinite incumbency, transparent economic governance and a verifiable electoral timetable. This would preserve flexibility without granting automatic legitimacy to either the existing roadmap or the reported elite bargain.

9. Indicators to monitor

• Whether the terms of the reported US initiative are formally published or acknowledged by the parties.

• Whether Dbeibah, Saddam Haftar, the House of Representatives, the High State Council and relevant western constituencies accept a common architecture.

• Whether the arrangement is incorporated into the LPA framework, endorsed as a successor agreement, or implemented outside both.

• Whether a binding electoral timetable, eligibility rules and safeguards against indefinite transition are included.

• Whether Misrata and other western armed and political actors mobilise for or against the settlement.

• Whether oil-revenue management, budget unification and investment agreements are made transparent.

• Whether UNSMIL is given a substantive role or reduced to procedural endorsement.

• Whether Security Council members converge on common conditions for recognition.

Scenario assessment

Most likely - parallel tracks with managed ambiguity

The reported US bargain advances through bilateral and regional diplomacy while the UN roadmap continues formally. Council members welcome discrete achievements such as budgetary coordination, institutional unification or security dialogue without endorsing the full political architecture. The contradiction between the tracks is managed rather than resolved, and Libya remains suspended between an operative elite understanding and an unreformed multilateral framework.

Plausible - conditional convergence

US leverage secures agreement among key principals, but implementation is channelled through UNSMIL and Libyan institutions. The bargain is amended to include a collective or constrained executive structure, a binding electoral timetable, economic transparency and wider consultation. The result remains elite-driven but gains enough procedural legitimacy and societal acceptance to function as a transitional compromise.

Plausible but high risk - consolidation of a closed elite bargain

The Dbeibah-Saddam Haftar arrangement becomes the operative settlement through US and regional backing. The UN process is reduced to providing procedural cover, elections recede and excluded western constituencies mobilise against the new hierarchy. Institutional unification produces short-term stability in some sectors while shifting conflict toward actors and communities outside the bargain.

Lower probability - breakdown of both tracks

The reported arrangement fails to secure sufficient consent, while the UN roadmap remains unable to move the principals. Rival institutions harden, economic disputes intensify and armed confrontations recur. The failure of both approaches reinforces the existing equilibrium rather than producing a new settlement.

Analytical confidence: High confidence that Libya's existing transition remains structurally deadlocked; moderate confidence that US diplomacy is exploring a more transactional power-sharing arrangement; lower confidence regarding its final architecture, legal form and degree of regional acceptance because the reported plan has not been formally published. The risk of exclusion is credible, but its effect will depend on how the arrangement is negotiated and implemented.

Closing assessment

Libya's transition is increasingly contested between two approaches: an inclusive but leverage-poor multilateral process, and a transactional settlement designed to align the actors who control the country's principal institutions, armed forces and economic assets. The first risks extending stalemate; the second risks entrenching the elites whose dominance has sustained it.

The choice need not be absolute. Bilateral leverage can be useful if it is employed to move the principals into a lawful, inclusive and time-bound framework rather than to allocate power permanently outside it. The central test is not whether the initiative is American or UN-led, but whether it converts elite accommodation into a credible transition with wider Libyan consent.

For the Security Council, the most defensible approach is conditional support: no automatic rejection of a new Libyan bargain, but no recognition without legal clarity, broad participation, transparent economic arrangements and enforceable electoral sequencing. Silence may preserve flexibility while the initiative remains unformed. As the architecture becomes clearer, however, ambiguity will itself shape the balance of legitimacy.

African Security Analysis (ASA) maintains continuous monitoring of the Libyan file, including the trajectory of US mediation, the energy-sector dimension and western Libyan armed constituencies, and remains available for tailored analytical engagement.