Libya’s Crisis in 2025: Fragmentation, Foreign Influence, and Prospects for Stability

An African Security Analysis (ASA)

Introduction

Libya enters 2025 trapped in a long transition failure that began after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country’s conflict has evolved from open civil war into a durable stalemate: rival authorities persist, armed groups are embedded in state structures, and foreign powers deter decisive military outcomes while deepening Libya’s loss of sovereignty. This condition—often described as a frozen conflict—functions more precisely as managed fragmentation: a political and security order in which division is stabilized enough to prevent nationwide war, but unstable enough to generate periodic crises, service collapse, and chronic insecurity.

This analysis examines Libya’s strategic landscape through five linked arenas: (1) institutional fragmentation and rival administrations, (2) militia-patronage politics and security sector pluralization, (3) foreign interference and proxy balancing—especially the Turkey–Russia dynamic, (4) oil and economic governance as both lifeline and conflict fuel, and (5) the stalled peace process and the risks of prolonged fragmentation. It concludes with a forward-looking assessment of how African-led initiatives could contribute to shifting incentives away from obstruction and toward a sustainable settlement.

1) Political Landscape: Institutional Fragmentation and Rival Administrations

Rival executives and competing legitimacy

Libya remains effectively split between two political poles. In the west, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s Government of National Unity (GNU) continues operating beyond its original mandate after elections planned for December 2021 collapsed. In the east, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar wields decisive influence through the Libyan National Army (LNA/LAAF) and a parallel governance structure backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk.

Neither side can decisively overcome the other militarily or politically. Yet each retains enough resources, armed force, and external patronage to block or spoil any national agreement that threatens its interests. This is the central logic of Libya’s stalemate: mutual denial of victory combined with mutual capacity to obstruct.

Institutions as contested terrain

The division runs through core organs of state. Over the past decade, key bodies—including ministries, the judiciary, the Central Bank, and security institutions—have been bifurcated into western and eastern branches, or pressured into informal compromises. Even nominally “national” institutions are frequently drawn into political bargaining. Leadership shifts within the National Oil Corporation (NOC), and repeated disputes around financial governance, demonstrate how institutional control is treated as a strategic asset rather than a technocratic necessity.

“Reunification” initiatives—such as attempts to harmonize financial administration or unify appointments—rarely resolve the underlying contest. In a context where public finance underwrites patronage and security coalitions, institutional consolidation is interpreted by rivals as a vehicle for capture. As a result, national governance remains weak not only because institutions are split, but because they are politicized as leverage points.

Patronage governance and elite veto power

Libya’s political paralysis has fostered patronage and clientelism as the operating system of governance. In the west, the GNU sustains itself by bargaining with armed groups, distributing funds, and managing coalitional balances in Tripoli and allied cities. In the east, Haftar’s security architecture and aligned authorities maintain cohesion through centralized control, appointments of loyalists, and the creation of parallel governance mechanisms.

This produces a durable incentive problem: elections or genuine reunification introduce uncertainty and threaten entrenched networks that profit from the status quo. Libya’s political impasse is therefore not merely the absence of a roadmap—it is a system in which key actors hold effective veto power over national outcomes and have material reasons to delay any transition that could remove them.

2) Security Landscape: Militias, Patronage, and Military Fragmentation

A hybrid security order

Libya’s security sector is best understood as a hybrid: armed groups hold official titles and state salaries, but frequently remain autonomous in decision-making and revenue generation. Successive interim authorities have tried to co-opt militias by integrating them into defense and interior structures. In practice, this has often institutionalized militia power rather than subordinated it to civilian control. For many Libyans, the distinction between “militia” and “state” has blurred; armed coalitions are frequently the primary providers—and extractors—of security.

Western Libya: Tripoli’s militia equilibrium and its volatility

In western Libya, especially in and around Tripoli, political authority depends on negotiated arrangements among dominant armed networks that control strategic infrastructure, government facilities, and detention sites. After 2016, Tripoli saw a consolidation of militia influence. The 2019–2020 war further empowered units that fought effectively against Haftar’s offensive, increasing their prestige, access to weapons, and bargaining power within the state.

The 2022 contest between rival governments again polarized armed groups and led to major clashes in Tripoli. Forces aligned with Dbeibeh ultimately prevailed, pushing out or subordinating rivals. Since then, parts of the capital have been dominated by large armed formations formally linked to state bodies yet operating with substantial autonomy. Their leaders benefit from state salaries, influence over appointments, control of key facilities, and access to illicit revenue streams tied to smuggling and informal taxation.

Tripoli’s fragility is best illustrated by the way political disputes translate quickly into armed confrontation. In 2025, the killing of a major militia leader triggered severe fighting in the capital, demonstrating how leadership shocks can destabilize the equilibrium. Later in 2025, clashes linked to disputes over senior security appointments again showed that the capital’s “order” is not rooted in rule-bound institutions but in a managed balance among armed actors. Any attempt to restructure the security sector or redistribute power among armed groups risks immediate escalation.

Eastern Libya: centralized coalition under Haftar

In eastern Libya, Haftar’s LNA is presented as a conventional army, but functions as a coalition of armed components—tribal forces, local militias, Salafist units, and foreign fighters—bound together by a centralized command structure, patronage, and coercive discipline. Since 2014, Haftar has consolidated control through promotions, sidelining of rivals, and reliance on loyalist networks. A key feature of this consolidation is the entrenchment of the Haftar family and close affiliates in elite commands and revenue-sensitive roles. This strengthens cohesion around Haftar but reinforces perceptions that the LNA operates as a political-military enterprise rather than a national institution.

Eastern areas have often appeared calmer than the militia-saturated west, but this calm is maintained through authoritarian practices and suppression of dissent. Selective autonomy is permitted for local forces as long as loyalty is maintained. The resilience of this model depends heavily on continuing access to revenue and external support; a weakening of Haftar’s authority or a sharp contraction in resources could expose internal fractures.

Mercenaries and cross-border armed economies

Libya’s conflict has been deeply intertwined with regional armed economies. Fighters from Sudan’s Darfur, Chadian rebel movements, and other cross-border networks have participated as mercenaries, often guarding strategic infrastructure. These flows export weapons, combat experience, and destabilizing networks into neighbouring states, linking Libya’s fragmentation to insecurity in the Sahel and surrounding regions. Libya has also functioned as a logistical and financial hub for non-state actors, reinforcing the need to treat it as a regional security issue, not merely a domestic governance crisis.

Professionalization without civilian control

Some armed groups have rebranded and improved discipline, and foreign training has enhanced certain units’ tactical capabilities. In some cases, armed formations seek public legitimacy by presenting themselves as anti-crime forces or providers of order. However, these developments do not constitute structural reform. The decisive constraint remains the absence of credible civilian authority able to appoint, remove, and oversee commanders without provoking violence. Without a political settlement that changes incentives and provides credible guarantees, security sector reform will remain limited to tactical improvements, not the construction of a unified national chain of command.

3) Foreign Interference and Proxy Involvement

External actors as pillars of the stalemate

Foreign involvement is central to Libya’s conflict architecture. External actors provide arms, funding, mercenaries, training, diplomatic cover, and economic leverage. While many claim to support stabilization, competing agendas frequently deepen fragmentation. Libyan factions in turn use foreign threats as justification for retaining their own external patrons. This creates a self-reinforcing loop: the presence of one foreign patron is cited to legitimize the presence of another.

Turkey and Russia: rival patrons, shared interest in freezing the conflict

Turkey and Russia remain the most consequential external actors because their interventions reshaped the war’s outcome and produced a durable deterrence structure.

Turkey intervened decisively in late 2019 and early 2020 to prevent Tripoli’s fall during Haftar’s offensive. By deploying drones, electronic warfare systems, advisors, and facilitating the transfer of Syrian fighters, Ankara shifted the battlefield balance, broke the siege of Tripoli, and pushed LNA forces back to the Sirte line. Turkey secured strategic leverage through military access, training partnerships, and broader maritime and economic agreements tied to its Eastern Mediterranean agenda. In the post-ceasefire period, Turkey maintained a lower-profile presence while expanding influence through training and institutional relationships, and began hedging by opening channels to eastern actors to protect its interests regardless of political outcomes.

Russia’s involvement has been more deniable but strategically significant. Through Wagner-linked deployments and associated military support, Moscow strengthened the LNA’s operational capacity and entrenched personnel in strategic locations around Sirte, Jufra, and the oil crescent. Libya offers Russia leverage on Europe’s southern flank and a platform into North Africa and the Sahel.

The combined effect of Turkish and Russian presence is a tripwire balance: neither Libyan side can relaunch a major offensive without risking escalation with the opposing patron. This has reduced the likelihood of a nationwide war since 2020, but at the cost of sovereignty, national cohesion, and meaningful demobilization. Calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces are politically popular and frequently reiterated in international forums, but remain unlikely to be implemented absent a comprehensive deal that addresses each patron’s interests and provides credible security guarantees.

Other regional and international actors

Beyond Turkey and Russia, several states shape Libya through distinct mechanisms:

• Egypt views eastern Libya’s stability as a border security imperative and supports Haftar-aligned structures through training, advisory support, and political backing, prioritizing containment of militant threats and opposition to Islamist factions.
• The UAE has historically provided significant military and financial support to Haftar, driven by an anti-Islamist regional agenda and a desire to project influence, while also engaging diplomatically to shape political outcomes.
• Qatar played a more visible role earlier in the conflict supporting certain western factions, though its influence has been more subdued in recent years.
• Italy prioritizes energy interests and irregular migration management, engaging pragmatically and often favoring western authorities as partners on these issues.
• France has been shaped by counterterrorism priorities linked to Sahel security and has faced controversy over past engagement with Haftar, though its official posture aligns with UN tracks and concern over hostile foreign influence.
• The United States has largely limited itself to diplomacy and counterterrorism, seeking to prevent Libya from becoming a terrorist safe haven and to counter adversarial foreign entrenchment, but without major new commitments.

African neighbours and spillover dynamics

Libya’s instability directly affects Tunisia and Algeria through economic disruption, refugee flows, arms trafficking, and security threats. Algeria in particular has emphasized non-intervention and inclusive dialogue. Southern neighbours—Sudan, Chad, and Niger—are entangled through mercenary flows and cross-border armed networks that use Libya as a recruitment, financing, and transit zone. These spillovers reinforce the argument that Africa has a strong stake in the Libyan file and that African diplomacy should not be peripheral to mediation frameworks.

4) Oil and Economic Stakes: Wealth as Lifeline and Conflict Fuel

Oil as the backbone of state finance

Libya’s hydrocarbons remain the backbone of its economy and the central prize in elite competition. In formal design, oil exports are conducted through the NOC, revenues are channelled to the Central Bank, and state spending finances salaries, subsidies, and nationwide services. This architecture is one of the few remaining mechanisms that still reflects national unity on paper.

In practice, oil revenue distribution is the core political contest. Control over payments is control over patronage: funding armed groups, maintaining loyalty, and sustaining administrative authority.

Shutdowns and revenue bargaining

Because rival factions cannot reliably secure national legitimacy, oil infrastructure becomes leverage. The recurring tactic has been the threat or implementation of production and export shutdowns to force political or financial concessions. Such disruptions reduce output, damage the economy, and intensify public hardship, yet can be politically rational for actors seeking bargaining power. Libya’s oil sector is therefore simultaneously resilient in technical capacity and structurally vulnerable to political coercion.

Corruption and the war economy

Even during periods of high oil revenue, governance dysfunction often prevents broad-based public benefit. Patronage hiring inflates payrolls; import financing mechanisms are vulnerable to capture; subsidies create incentives for smuggling; and opaque contracting enables rent extraction by well-connected actors. Fragmentation provides cover for corruption: rival authorities accuse one another while oversight remains weak. The longer this persists, the more corruption becomes self-reinforcing and resistant to future reform, even if political consolidation were achieved.

Investment constraints

Libya’s energy potential remains significant, and international firms maintain interest. However, long-horizon investment is constrained by legal uncertainty over who can sign contracts, risk that future governments contest agreements, insecurity around infrastructure, and the recurring possibility of shutdowns. Without political consolidation and predictable revenue governance, energy expansion will remain below potential and vulnerable to political shocks.

5) Peace Process Dynamics: Stalled Transitions and Limited Openings

A pattern of agreements without implementation

Libya has experienced repeated peace initiatives over the past decade: the 2015 Skhirat agreement, subsequent international conferences, the aborted 2019 national conference, the 2020 ceasefire, and the 2021 GNU roadmap to elections. The recurring pattern is that agreements emerge when actors are exhausted or pressured, but stall when implementation threatens entrenched interests.

2020–2021 as the last major opening

The October 2020 ceasefire froze front lines and created limited military dialogue mechanisms. The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum then selected interim leadership tasked with holding elections in December 2021. For much of 2021, optimism grew: institutions appeared to inch toward reunification, diplomatic engagement increased, and economic stabilization seemed possible. Yet as elections approached, disputes over candidate eligibility and election laws reactivated factional mistrust. The December 2021 elections collapsed, and legitimacy fractures deepened.

Return to dual governance and weakened mediation

From 2022 onward, rival executive claims and armed contests reinforced renewed bifurcation. UN mediation attempted to break deadlock, including proposals to broaden participation beyond entrenched legislative bodies, but sustained progress proved elusive. In 2024, the resignation of the UN envoy reflected a wider problem: key power centers repeatedly endorsed elections rhetorically while acting to preserve their position in practice.

Residual foundations

Despite political paralysis, certain foundations remain: the ceasefire line has largely held since 2020, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission offers limited but real dialogue, popular demand for elections remains strong, and oil revenue creates an inescapable shared dependency even amid contestations. These factors keep the door open to renewed diplomacy, but do not by themselves change elite incentives.

6) The Perils of Managed Fragmentation

Managed fragmentation reduces the probability of immediate nationwide war, but it is not stable peace. Its risks grow over time:

1. Entrenchment of de facto partition: parallel administrations normalize separate governance, external relationships, and patronage systems, making reunification increasingly difficult.

2. Spoiler-driven relapse: assassinations, militia disputes, appointment crises, or oil-revenue shocks can rapidly trigger violence, especially in Tripoli.

3. Chronic governance failure: service collapse, banking instability, infrastructure decay, and absence of accountability deepen citizen alienation and grievance.

4. Criminal economies and trafficking: weak rule of law enables arms smuggling, human trafficking, migrant exploitation, and illicit markets that fuel regional instability.

5. Extremist opportunity space: ungoverned areas can enable extremist remnants to regroup and conduct attacks, while fragmented security responses remain uncoordinated.

6. Kleptocratic entrenchment: corruption becomes systemic and self-protecting, resisting reform and hollowing out institutions.

7. Erosion of social cohesion: regional narratives of distrust harden, grievances fester without reconciliation, and national identity weakens across a generation.

In short, managed fragmentation is a high-risk equilibrium: it prevents decisive collapse yet steadily erodes state capacity and social cohesion, raising the long-term probability of either renewed war or chronic state failure.

7) Prospects for Stability and the Role of African-Led Initiatives

No external actor can impose a sustainable settlement. A durable outcome requires Libyan agreement on governance, revenue distribution, and security arrangements. However, African-led initiatives can add value if they focus on changing incentives and reducing the ability of elites to exploit fragmented mediation.

Realistic African contributions

1. Coherent mediation architecture: push for tighter coordination among the AU, UN, Arab League, and relevant partners to reduce forum-shopping and competing tracks.

2. Regional security compacts: strengthen cross-border cooperation on arms flows, trafficking corridors, and mercenary circulation that link Libya to Sahel instability.

3. Revenue transparency support: back monitored, Libyan-owned mechanisms that reduce shutdown leverage by making revenue distribution more predictable and auditable.

4. Sequenced security steps: prioritize protecting key infrastructure, strengthening de-escalation mechanisms, and improving detention oversight before ambitious nationwide security-sector restructuring.

5. Spoiler management tools: coordinate targeted sanctions and travel restrictions on chronic spoilers while offering credible political off-ramps.

Strategic warning

A peace plan built solely on elections risks repeating past failures if it does not address coercive realities and incentive structures. Elections are necessary for legitimacy, but without security guarantees, accepted rules, and a credible revenue governance formula, they can become triggers for renewed contestation.

Conclusion

Libya in 2025 is not in full-scale civil war, but it is not at peace. The country remains trapped in managed fragmentation sustained by militia patronage, contested institutions, oil-revenue bargaining, and foreign deterrence. This equilibrium reduces the likelihood of decisive war yet steadily degrades governance, deepens corruption, and exports insecurity across borders.

The central challenge is to convert the ceasefire and the shared dependency on oil revenues into a political process that changes incentives: making unified institutions more valuable than factional capture, and making compliance with a credible roadmap more profitable than obstruction. African diplomacy can contribute most effectively by organizing regional security interests, tightening mediation coherence, and supporting mechanisms that reduce oil shutdown leverage and cross-border destabilization. Without such shifts, Libya’s “managed” fragmentation risks hardening into permanent division or erupting into renewed conflict with consequences far beyond Libya’s borders.