Libya Dossier – UN Security Council – August 2025 Forecast

Prepared by African Security Analysis (ASA)

Expected Council Action

The Council will convene its bimonthly meeting on Libya in August. Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report and on UNSMIL’s activities, after which the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee will present the committee’s work. Closed consultations will follow.

Political and Security Landscape (May–July 2025)

Libya remains caught between two rival executives. In the west, the Government of National Unity (GNU) under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah governs Tripoli with the backing of parts of the High State Council (HSC). In the east, the Government of National Stability (GNS) under Osama Hamad, supported by the House of Representatives (HoR) and General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), retains control.

The core sticking-point—whether a single interim authority should oversee long-delayed elections—has paralysed legislative negotiations. Egyptian-Turkish back-channel contacts collapsed in June, ASA diplomatic sources report, when neither camp could agree on security guarantees for Tripoli. The 12-13 May gun battles between the SSA and the 444 Brigade underscored the capital’s volatility: although a cease-fire has held since 14 May, UNSMIL and African Security Analysis (ASA) imagery indicate that heavy weapons have merely been repositioned to suburban depots, not withdrawn.

Humanitarian and Migration Outlook

Western Libya has witnessed a 36 percent jump in irregular Mediterranean departures since April, sending most boats toward Greece. The 8 July expulsion of an EU migration delegation from Benghazi—ordered by eastern authorities—demonstrated the HoR/LNA’s capacity to obstruct external migration frameworks that exclude them. Coupled with continuing fuel and food-price spikes, ASA anticipates heightened population outflows through the third quarter.

Human-Rights Snapshot

OHCHR revelations on 4 June confirmed torture devices, extrajudicial killings and clandestine burials at Stability Support Authority (SSA) sites in Tripoli. ASA have noted that forensic analysts have geolocated four probable mass-grave zones on the capital’s outskirts; GNU consent for unrestricted UN access remains partial, suggesting continued evidence-tampering.

UNSMIL Road-Map Initiative

UNSMIL’s Advisory Committee submitted its election-options paper on 6 May. Tetteh has since toured every region, gathering feedback to craft a time-bound, “politically pragmatic” road map aimed at closing the transition. ASA polling of twenty-two municipal councils finds cautious western support, but Cyrenaican leaders insist the HoR must ratify any plan before it is put before the Security Council. Tetteh intends to table the final text for Council endorsement in August.

Council Dynamics – ASA Reading

All Council members endorse a Libyan-led process culminating in elections, yet they diverge sharply on tactics. The US, UK, France, Japan and Slovenia favour explicit deadlines and hint at additional listings under the 1970 regime should spoilers block the UNSMIL road-map. Russia insists that no plan be “imposed from outside” and questions the domestic legitimacy of UNSMIL’s Advisory Committee; Moscow continues to highlight Western arms-embargo breaches in Tripoli. China emphasises sovereignty but may back the road-map if framed clearly as Libyan-owned. Algeria, Mozambique and Sierra Leone prefer AU-IGAD mediation and warn that new sanctions could cement the country’s de facto partition. ASA expects contentious drafting sessions if a presidential statement is pursued.

Council Options Going Forward

Council members could choose to issue a carefully balanced presidential statement that welcomes UNSMIL’s forthcoming road map, urges all Libyan factions to adopt it without preconditions, and demands restraint in the deployment of heavy weapons inside Tripoli. To underpin such language with tangible measures, the Council might also request a dedicated embargo-monitoring annex from UNSMIL and the 1970 Panel—drawing on vessel-tracking data—to map recent arms deliveries to militia warehouses. Members inclined toward stronger leverage could signal readiness to expand targeted sanctions to commanders obstructing UN access to mass-grave sites or orchestrating militia build-ups. At the same time, the Council may instruct UNSMIL to establish a joint GNU-GNS technical committee that would address security “red lines” surrounding polling day logistics, thereby linking political progress to verifiable confidence-building steps. Finally, informal civil-society briefings—facilitated by ASA’s Libyan partner network—could keep the Council apprised of grassroots attitudes and ensure that any UN-endorsed timetable reflects ground realities.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Bottom Line

Libya stands in a precarious equilibrium: Tripoli’s surface calm masks an unprecedented concentration of heavy armour, migration flows are spiking, and revelations of SSA atrocities erode public trust. If UNSMIL’s road map secures only partial endorsement, ASA projects renewed militia jockeying in the west alongside intensified HoR/LNA efforts to win parallel legitimacy through early 2026. A unified, incentive-backed Council message in August represents the best chance of nudging all actors toward a single, credible electoral trajectory.

ASA will maintain continuous monitoring throughout the August Council cycle, alerting clients to any sudden militia redeployments, embargo violations, or diplomatic realignments.