Libya — Between Sovereignty and Supervision: The UN’s Containment Strategy Under Strain

Based on UNSC briefings and consultations

Expected Council Action

In November 2025, the UN Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution renewing the authorization for maritime inspections off the coast of Libya, allowing member states – individually or through regional organizations – to intercept and inspect vessels suspected of violating the arms embargo. The current authorization, granted under Resolution 2780 (May 2025), expires on 28 November 2025.

Simultaneously, the Council will receive the semi-annual briefing on the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning ongoing judicial proceedings related to crimes committed in Libya since 2011.

Political and Security Context

Maritime Inspections and Operation IRINI

The European Union Naval Operation EUNAVFOR Med IRINI remains the sole international mechanism implementing the arms embargo inspection regime. The operation conducts hailing’s, consensual vessel visits, and enforcement inspections to disrupt arms flows and monitor oil smuggling networks supporting Libyan factions.

This November’s deliberations mark a critical inflection point: the Council is divided on whether to extend the authorization for one year or maintain a six-month renewal cycle, a reflection of broader geopolitical rifts. France and Greece, as co-penholders, are expected to advocate a one-year extension, restoring the pre-2023 precedent, while Russia and China are likely to abstain or challenge the mandate’s transparency.

Moscow has repeatedly accused Operation IRINI of being selective and politically motivated, claiming it targets certain factions while overlooking violations by Western-aligned actors. Libya’s interim authorities have also expressed discomfort with foreign maritime enforcement, viewing it as an infringement on national sovereignty. The compromise six-month renewal in May 2025 reflected these tensions.

At the 14 October Council briefing, UNSMIL Chief Hanna Tetteh warned that political paralysis and fragmented security governance continue to enable arms proliferation and smuggling networks across Libya’s coastline. She urged renewed cooperation on unifying security institutions, emphasizing that without maritime interdiction, external arms inflows risk reigniting conflict between rival forces in Tripoli, Misrata, and Cyrenaica.

Political Roadmap and UN Engagement

UNSMIL’s mandate was extended until October 2026 under Resolution 2796. However, the mission continues to face limited political traction in facilitating a unified electoral framework. The political roadmap toward national elections remains stalled amid entrenched rivalries between the House of Representatives in Tobruk, the High State Council in Tripoli, and competing armed factions controlling oil terminals and airbases.

Tetteh’s October briefing highlighted persistent obstruction by political elites and militias benefiting from the status quo. The UN-backed dialogue on constitutional arrangements has yet to yield consensus, with both eastern and western blocs manoeuvring to maintain territorial control and access to state revenues.

European members — France, Greece, Slovenia — reiterated support for the continuation of Operation IRINI as a stabilizing tool and emphasized that any political settlement must include security sector reform and disarmament enforcement mechanisms.

ICC Proceedings and Judicial Accountability

The Council will also hear updates from a Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, as Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan remains on administrative leave. The ICC continues to exercise jurisdiction under Resolution 1970 (2011), which referred Libya’s situation to the Court and requested biannual briefings.

There is one active case — against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, charged in 2011 with crimes against humanity (murder, persecution, imprisonment, and torture). Despite a standing arrest warrant, Qaddafi remains at large and politically active in southern Libya, where his network still commands limited tribal loyalty.

Recent ICC developments include:

• 16 July 2025: Arrest of Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri in Germany, a senior commander of the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), implicated in crimes against humanity and war crimes at Mitiga Prison between 2015 and 2020. He remains detained in Germany pending transfer to The Hague.
• 18 January 2025: Issuance of an arrest warrant for Osama Elmasry Njeem, accused of overseeing mass executions, torture, and sexual violence in Tripoli’s detention facilities. Although initially arrested in Italy, he was returned to Libya due to procedural complications. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has since ruled that Italy failed to comply with cooperation obligations under the Rome Statute and may refer the matter to the Security Council under Article 87(7).

These incidents underscore the growing friction between the ICC and national jurisdictions, particularly regarding extradition procedures and competing sovereignty claims.

Human Rights and Transitional Justice

On 8 October, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted Resolution 60/32 calling for sustained technical assistance and capacity-building to Libya and requesting a follow-up report at the HRC’s 64th session.

In a statement earlier that month, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif noted the persistence of grave human rights violations and the absence of credible accountability mechanisms. She cited torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and impunity among armed groups, warning that Libya’s transitional institutions risk losing legitimacy without visible justice reforms.

The UN human rights office continues to advocate embedding justice and human rights benchmarks within Libya’s political roadmap, arguing that any sustainable peace must be anchored in accountability rather than transactional power-sharing.

Key Issues and Policy Options

Renewal of Maritime Inspection Mandate

• Option A: One-year renewal, restoring predictability for Operation IRINI and signalling continued Council commitment to the arms embargo.
• Option B: Six-month renewal as a compromise to accommodate Libyan and Russian concerns over sovereignty and transparency.
• Option C: Mandate revision introducing enhanced reporting requirements and quarterly operational transparency by the EU to improve Council oversight.

Accountability and ICC Cooperation
Council members may consider:

• A joint press statement reaffirming support for the ICC’s work in Libya.
• Encouraging Libyan judicial institutions to cooperate with international investigators.
• Requesting an updated ICC-UNSMIL coordination framework to strengthen evidence collection and witness protection in-country.

Political Transition and Governance
The Council could press for:

• A UN-led verification mechanism for political roadmap milestones.
• Greater regional involvement — particularly from the African Union and Arab League — to bridge divisions between Libyan factions.
• Expanded UN sanctions monitoring to deter obstruction by elites financing parallel administrations.

Council Dynamics

Council unity on Libya has eroded since 2022:

• Russia and China regularly abstain on maritime authorizations, citing selectivity in Operation IRINI and concerns over Western overreach.
• France, the UK, and the US remain firmly supportive of the EU-led inspections, viewing them as a containment measure against renewed arms inflows and destabilization.
• African members express concern that Libya’s transition remains externally driven, with minimal African agency in mediation.
• Libya itself continues to resist external oversight while failing to enforce the embargo domestically, leaving the UN framework as the only functional control mechanism.

Regarding the ICC, divisions persist:

• Western and ICC State Parties (France, Greece, Denmark, UK, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Panama, Guyana, South Korea) continue to champion the Court’s work.
• Russia and China view the ICC as politicized, while some African members question its perceived disproportionate focus on the continent.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Assessment

Libya remains stuck between fragile sovereignty and international management. The arms embargo enforcement regime functions as a symbolic deterrent but cannot substitute for the absence of unified command, effective border control, and political legitimacy. The UNSMIL–Operation IRINI–ICC triad illustrates an externally sustained framework keeping the Libyan file active but not advancing toward resolution.

ASA assesses that:

• The fragmentation of Libya’s power centres and the erosion of international consensus increase the risk of localized escalation along the western coastline and southern corridors.
• Arms smuggling and militia entrenchment continue to undermine the embargo’s efficacy.
• Accountability fatigue within the ICC process threatens to reduce deterrence against future atrocity crimes.

Outlook (Q1 2026)

• Short-term: Renewal of Operation IRINI likely for six to twelve months amid abstentions; continued stalemate in election preparations.
• Medium-term: Potential ICC-Security Council confrontation over Italy’s non-cooperation; heightened scrutiny of European enforcement operations.
• Long-term: Without a credible political breakthrough, Libya risks consolidating into a de facto tripartite division — western (Tripoli), eastern (Cyrenaica), and southern (Fezzan) — each sustained by distinct security patrons.

ASA Conclusion:
Libya’s stabilization process remains externally anchored and internally paralyzed. The UN and ICC mechanisms sustain international oversight without political traction, while maritime inspections preserve a controlled equilibrium that prevents escalation but not fragmentation. In the absence of domestic consensus or international unity, Libya’s conflict remains suspended — neither at war nor at peace, but in perpetual containment.