JNIM Renews Threats in Burkina Faso

Monthly Summary (December 2025)

Overview

Throughout December, extremist armed group activity remained concentrated in Burkina Faso’s Est, Sahel, and Centre-Nord regions. Reporting highlighted recurrent attacks on Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDP) positions and continued incursions into rural communities, sustaining pressure on local security structures and civilian populations. The period was also marked by continued friction between Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP), alongside renewed propaganda messaging attributed to JNIM, including threats of intensified violence.

Situation Update

The Est, Sahel, and Centre-Nord regions continued to serve as key theatres for extremist operations, with repeated reports of attacks against VDP positions and raids or incursions affecting rural communities. The persistence of this activity reflects a continuing trend of armed groups seeking to erode local defence capacity, expand freedom of movement, and exert coercive control over isolated areas.

Humanitarian operations were directly affected during the reporting period. On 24 December, during a food distribution conducted by a UN partner in Pama, Kompienga Province (Est Region), armed elements attempted to employ a drone to drop explosive devices onto the distribution site. The device was intercepted by the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) before detonation, and the aid activity was temporarily suspended as a precautionary measure.

Clashes between JNIM and ISSP were also reported, notably in the Est Region on 28 December and in the Sahel Region on 30 December. These confrontations align with the ongoing rivalry between the two organizations and contribute to the deterioration of the security environment in areas where both operate in parallel.

Propaganda and Threat Messaging

During the reporting period, a video attributed to JNIM circulated on open sources, depicting what was presented as a graduation ceremony for trainees at the so-called “Abou Adam Camp” in Burkina Faso. The footage included statements delivered in local languages, reportedly Fulani and Mooré, declaring that attacks inside Burkina Faso would intensify. The content appears designed to signal operational continuity, reinforce intimidation, and support recruitment narratives, particularly targeting youth audiences.

Assessment

Extremist armed group activity continues to follow established patterns across the Est, Sahel, and Centre-Nord regions, with persistent targeting of VDP positions and pressure on rural communities. These dynamics are likely to continue in the coming months, particularly in areas bordering Mali and Niger, where armed group presence and mobility remain structurally entrenched and show no indication of slowing.

The attempted drone attack during humanitarian food distribution in Pama highlights an acute operational concern for aid actors. While the incident does not constitute a new method in the Burkina Faso context—armed groups have previously used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including during a food aid offloading in Sollé on 12 August 2025—it reinforces the operational reality that humanitarian activities can be directly targeted even when delivery mechanisms involve air transport. The attempted strike in Pama occurred after aid was delivered by air, indicating that distribution points remain vulnerable once operations transition from logistical delivery to ground activity.

Even unsuccessful UAV attempts can have disproportionate effects. Such incidents often trigger temporary suspensions, delays, and heightened threat perceptions among humanitarian partners, potentially restricting humanitarian access and increasing the indirect costs of operations through additional security measures and planning requirements.

The reported JNIM–ISSP clashes in late December remain consistent with the broader competitive dynamic between the two groups. These confrontations tend to deepen insecurity in contested areas, increase volatility for surrounding communities, and contribute to displacement pressures, which can in turn expand humanitarian needs and complicate access planning.

Finally, the circulation of the JNIM-attributed training camp video fits within a broader trend of propaganda dissemination aimed at intimidation and recruitment. Similar messaging has been observed not only in Burkina Faso but across neighbouring contexts, suggesting continued investment by JNIM in psychological influence operations designed to project strength, sustain recruitment pipelines, and normalize long-term insurgent presence.