Jihadist Violence and Chinese Kidnappings in Mali

Strategic, Security, and Economic Impacts

Introduction

The Kayes region in western Mali—and its surrounding areas—has become the stage for an unprecedented escalation in the targeting of economic sites by jihadist groups. This development carries significant strategic implications regarding the conflict’s nature and its regional and international scope. In just three weeks, several foreign companies have been directly attacked, resulting in kidnappings and the systematic destruction of equipment. These actions go beyond conventional violence, taking on clear geopolitical dimensions.

Chronology and Analysis of Operations

Operation 1 – May 4, 2025, Context: At “Lagamani,” two Chinese workers were kidnapped. Details: The operation, carried out by an armed group believed to be affiliated with the “Nasr al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen” movement—according to local sources—occurred amid China’s expanding involvement in the gold mining sector in the region.

Operation 2 – May 17, 2025, Context: A convoy belonging to a mining company, connecting Gima to Sandari, was attacked by armed assailants. Details: The assault resulted in the burning of equipment and the theft of vehicles, reflecting the group’s growing logistical capability and highlighting deficiencies in local security coordination.

Operation 3 – May 24, 2025 (Operation A) Context: The site of the Chinese company COVEC—engaged in the rehabilitation project of RN1—was directly targeted. Details: Cranes and warehouses were destroyed in a clear attempt to disrupt strategic projects in the region and send a strong message to Beijing.

New Attack – May 24, 2025 (Operation B) Context: Near the city of Kayes, an unidentified armed commando launched an attack on construction machinery and trucks belonging to a Chinese construction company specializing in BTP.

Details

Several earthmoving machines were set on fire and heavy equipment components were sabotaged, leading to an immediate suspension of work on site. No injuries were reported, as the attackers operated swiftly before disappearing into the bush.

Response

The Malian armed forces deployed to investigate, while the company announced the strengthening of its security measures and the opening of a dialogue with local authorities.

Media as a Negotiation and Threat Tool

The Masarat Centre has obtained exclusive images depicting kidnapped Chinese workers, along with other shots of Chinese hostages in Niger. This media strategy is part of a systematic psychological campaign by the group, aimed at:

• Demonstrating their ability to maintain long-term control.
• Exerting indirect pressure on the Chinese government.
• Opening secret negotiation channels or imposing conditions in exchange for the hostages' release. Exclusive images obtained from Malian sources regarding the kidnapped Chinese have also circulated widely.

Geopolitical Analysis: Signals to China and Its Partners

The escalation of attacks coincides with official Chinese visits to Mali and neighbouring countries, reinforcing the hypothesis that the group aims to influence Sino-African relations. Observers also suggest that Russian and Turkish interests may be targeted in the future, as jihadist groups now view these powers as part of a security coalition opposed to their ideology.

Weaknesses in the State Response: The Fragility of Deterrence

The lack of a rapid military response—particularly following the attack in Sandari (located only 140 km from Kaïs)—reveals significant structural flaws in Mali’s security strategy. The withdrawal of Western forces and an overreliance on militias or private security companies have created a security void that these jihadist groups are exploiting.

Potential Consequences

• Economic: Chinese companies operating in the region may be forced to curtail or even freeze their activities and projects.
• Security: The escalation in targeted attacks could further exacerbate the already critical security vacuum.
• Political: Beijing might be compelled to re-evaluate its relationships with regional regimes or even impose new security conditions, possibly leading to direct intervention.
• Media: The events and images will serve as potent propaganda tools for jihadist recruiters, mobilizing public opinion against foreign presence.

Conclusion

These attacks mark a significant transformation in jihadist tactics in the Sahel, transitioning from localized wear-and-tear operations to the direct targeting of internationally significant economic infrastructure. In response, governments, companies, and the international community must:

• Strengthen regional intelligence cooperation.
• Reassess the presence of foreign enterprises in conflict zones.
• Develop proactive and adaptive security strategies that account for the evolving methods of jihadist groups.

A coordinated, dynamic approach is essential to contain this expanding threat and preserve regional stability amid a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.