DRC’s Critique of the AU and the Shift to External Mediation

An African Security Analysis (ASA) Special Report

Executive Summary

The war in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has evolved into more than a battlefield crisis—it has become a public test of Africa’s peace and security system. Kinshasa has increasingly accused the African Union (AU) of failing to respond with urgency or force, while simultaneously investing in mediation efforts outside Africa, particularly in Doha and Washington. This report explains why the DRC chose to confront the AU so openly, why it sought external brokers despite existing African mechanisms, and what this means for regional stability and the credibility of “African-led solutions.” The core finding is uncomfortable but clear: when African processes appear slow, fragmented, or constrained by political sensitivities, affected states will seek leverage elsewhere. The opportunity—if seized—is that this episode can become a trigger for African institutional renewal, shifting the AU from managing processes to delivering results.

1) Introduction

Eastern DRC’s conflict—especially in North and South Kivu—has long been treated as a complex, chronic security emergency. What has changed is the political temperature around it. As violence persisted and displacement deepened, Kinshasa’s frustration with the AU moved from private disappointment to public confrontation. Congolese officials began framing the AU as passive, too cautious, and unable to translate meetings and communiqués into protection for civilians.

At the same time, President Félix Tshisekedi’s government started to pursue diplomatic pathways that sit outside the continent’s traditional crisis-management channels. Doha and Washington became prominent arenas for dialogue and pressure, while African-led tracks such as the Luanda Process lost momentum and centrality. The result is a strategic and symbolic shift: the DRC is not only demanding more from Africa’s institutions—it is signalling that if Africa cannot deliver quickly, the DRC will look elsewhere.

This report follows that logic from cause to consequence: first, why Kinshasa is targeting the AU; second, why it turned outward; third, what this means for stability and Africa’s peace architecture; and finally, what the AU and regional bodies can do to regain credibility in a way that feels practical rather than rhetorical.

2) Why Kinshasa Is Targeting the AU

Kinshasa’s critique is driven by a straightforward perception: the AU has been visible in diplomatic language but less visible in outcomes. From the Congolese government’s point of view, the continental response has often sounded like crisis management at a distance—calls for restraint, encouragement of dialogue, and endorsement of regional initiatives—while the war’s human consequences intensified.

This perception is not only about the AU’s actual actions; it is also about what the Congolese public expects the AU to represent. The AU is meant to embody the promise of collective African responsibility—especially when a member state is facing a prolonged humanitarian catastrophe. When that promise feels unfulfilled, frustration becomes politically combustible.

There is also a domestic political dimension. Governments under security pressure need to show they are fighting for solutions, not merely tolerating stalemate. Publicly blaming the AU helps Kinshasa explain why the crisis continues despite years of diplomatic activity. It also signals to Congolese audiences that the government will not remain trapped in slow-moving processes if those processes appear to produce little.

Behind all of this is a structural constraint the AU often faces in member-state disputes. The eastern DRC crisis is deeply entangled with regional accusations and competing narratives. In such situations, the AU’s instinct—shaped by consensus politics and the desire to preserve unity—can lead to careful language and gradual diplomacy. That approach may be institutionally understandable, but in a fast-moving war it can look like hesitation. For communities living under threat, the gap between “AU engagement” and “felt protection” becomes the gap between legitimacy and irrelevance.

3) Why the DRC Turned to External Brokers

The DRC’s pivot to Doha and Washington can be read as a gamble on two things African mechanisms often struggle to provide at scale: speed and leverage. By late 2024, African-led tracks were widely perceived as struggling to convert dialogue into durable de-escalation. Ceasefire announcements came and went, trust eroded further, and violence remained stubbornly resilient to political declarations. In that context, Kinshasa began searching for a different kind of mediation—less bound by regional sensitivities, more capable of applying pressure, and more likely to generate momentum quickly.

Doha offered a venue that felt neutral and distant from Great Lakes rivalries. Its value was not simply in hosting talks; it was in changing the rhythm of diplomacy. A high-profile external mediator can create urgency, raise reputational stakes, and put leaders under pressure to show movement. For Kinshasa, Doha also carried the promise of an “impartial room,” where the process is not shaped by neighbouring interests or regional competition.

Washington represented a different asset: power. When disputes involve interstate dimensions—real or perceived—external actors with significant diplomatic and economic influence can create incentives and costs that continental bodies may find harder to mobilise. For Kinshasa, U.S. engagement signalled global attention and the possibility of firmer leverage on the region’s key state actors.

The significance of this shift is not that external mediators are automatically better. The significance is that Kinshasa believed African channels were not delivering quickly enough—and that external channels could break the deadlock. That belief alone, regardless of whether it proves correct, is what reshapes the political landscape around Africa’s peace architecture.

4) What This Means for Stability and for Africa’s Peace Architecture

In the short term, external mediation can generate hope because it can accelerate elite-level engagement and reduce immediate interstate temperature. But eastern DRC has taught a hard lesson repeatedly: peace announcements are easier than peace implementation. Agreements often fail not at the moment of declaration, but in the weeks that follow—when verification is weak, sequencing is contested, and actors return to the battlefield to improve their negotiating positions.

This fragility matters for regional stability. Neighbouring states carry the consequences of the Kivu crisis through refugee flows, cross-border insecurity, economic disruption, and the persistent risk of escalation. If external mediation is perceived as excluding key regional stakeholders—or as prioritising quick fixes over deeper regional bargains—then implementation risks becoming politicised and contested even when the paper deal looks promising.

The larger issue is institutional. The DRC crisis has exposed a familiar pattern in African conflict management: multiple processes operating at once, unclear hierarchy, and competing centres of gravity. Over time, such parallelism invites forum-shopping. Armed actors can pick the venue that offers the best terms. States can shift allegiance between tracks depending on convenience. The result is often not healthy competition, but dilution: diluted pressure, diluted accountability, and diluted strategic direction.

When a major member state like the DRC publicly sidelines the AU, the reputational effect spreads beyond the immediate crisis. Other states may conclude—fairly or unfairly—that the AU is a convening platform rather than an action platform. If that becomes the norm, Africa’s collective security system risks sliding into a reactive posture, where African institutions are invited to endorse outcomes negotiated elsewhere rather than shaping the strategy from the start.

External involvement, however, is not inherently a threat. It becomes a threat when it replaces African ownership rather than reinforcing it. If the AU is structurally integrated into implementation—verification, monitoring, dispute resolution, and post-conflict stabilisation—external mediation can become a leverage multiplier rather than an institutional bypass.

5) Does the Pivot Undermine African Solutions—or Force Them to Improve?

Kinshasa’s pivot clearly weakens the idea that African institutions are the default home for African conflict resolution. It signals that when processes stall, turning outward is acceptable—and that signal may encourage future bypassing. It also risks shifting agenda-setting power toward actors whose strategic priorities may not fully align with regional realities or long-term stability needs.

At the same time, the pivot could become a catalyst if it forces institutional learning. The AU and regional bodies now face a credibility challenge they cannot solve with statements alone. If they respond by improving speed, clarifying responsibility across regional blocs, and building credible enforcement and verification tools, this episode can become a turning point rather than a humiliation.

The real question, then, is not whether Doha or Washington can “solve” eastern DRC. The deeper question is whether Africa’s institutions will treat this moment as proof of failure—or as a mandate to adapt.

6) What the AU and Regional Bodies Should Do Now

A more credible African response does not require grand rhetoric. It requires a visible shift from process management to practical delivery. The first priority is coherence. The AU, the EAC, SADC, and ICGLR need to present one strategic frame for the DRC crisis—one roadmap that clarifies who does what, how political tracks relate to security measures, and how implementation will be monitored. Without that clarity, parallel initiatives will keep competing, and spoilers will keep exploiting the confusion.

The second priority is implementation presence. Even if external actors broker key understandings, the AU must anchor itself in the machinery that makes agreements real: verification teams, monitoring arrangements, reporting lines, and dispute-resolution procedures when violations occur. The AU does not need to “own the headline” to own the outcome. It needs to be structurally embedded where compliance is tested.

The third priority is speed. The AU’s credibility problem in this case is not that it lacked concern; it is that it struggled to match the pace of crisis. The AU and regional bodies should be able to move rapidly on practical measures—mobilising funds, deploying monitors, supporting civilian protection capacity, and setting clear consequences for repeat violators. If every urgent step requires slow consensus-building, the AU will be perpetually outpaced by events.

Finally, any sustainable approach must feel legitimate on the ground. Eastern DRC cannot be stabilised by elite bargains alone. Local grievances, governance gaps, community fears, and civilian protection need have to shape implementation, or agreements will remain politically fragile and socially disconnected. African mechanisms should strengthen channels that connect national-level diplomacy to local realities, so peace is not merely negotiated—it is lived.

7) Conclusion: A Test the AU Cannot Afford to Fail

The DRC’s public challenge to the AU, combined with its turn toward external mediation, is a warning. It shows what happens when a member state feels trapped between a fast-moving humanitarian catastrophe and a slow-moving continental system. If African institutions respond defensively—by insisting on principle without improving performance—the precedent of bypassing will harden. If they respond strategically—by acting faster, coordinating better, and embedding themselves in implementation—this moment can strengthen African leadership rather than erode it.

Eastern Congo’s tragedy is not only a crisis of security; it is a crisis of confidence. The AU and regional bodies can rebuild that confidence, but only by delivering visible, coordinated, and enforceable action that communities can feel—not just speeches they can hear.

Independent Conclusion by African Security Analysis (ASA): A Credibility Moment for African Peace Leadership

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s public rebuke of the African Union—and its growing reliance on mediation in Doha and Washington—should be read as more than diplomatic frustration. It is a signal that Africa’s collective security system is being judged not by its principles, but by its performance. When continental and regional mechanisms are perceived as slow, fragmented, or politically constrained, affected states will pursue alternatives, even when doing so weakens continental coherence.

For African leaders, this is a credibility moment. Eastern DRC demonstrates the limits of consensus diplomacy when confronted with acute humanitarian crisis, active aggression, and rapidly shifting battlefield realities. If Africa’s peace architecture cannot move quickly enough to coordinate strategy, enforce commitments, and protect civilians, it risks being reduced to a forum that validates outcomes negotiated elsewhere.

Yet this need not mark decline. It can mark renewal. If seized seriously, the DRC case can become the catalyst for a sharper, more operational African peace posture—one that matches diplomacy with implementation capacity, links mediation to verification, and raises the cost of spoiler behaviour. The strategic choice now is simple: defend a process-heavy status quo or build a results-driven crisis response model that restores confidence in African-led solutions.

What ASA Can Offer Leaders Now

ASA stands ready to support AU and regional leaders with practical, decision-ready assistance that strengthens African ownership while improving speed and coordination.

ASA can provide real-time conflict mapping and forecasting to strengthen early warning and support rapid political decisions before crises metastasize. ASA can also support mediation architecture and discreet backchannel facilitation, helping special envoys and regional mediators align track I diplomacy with track II engagement so that negotiations connect to realities on the ground.

Where processes are overlapping or stalled, ASA can deliver independent institutional diagnostics—rapid reviews that identify duplication, delays, and operational gaps—paired with tailored recommendations to improve decision agility and implementation design. ASA can further assist leaders with strategic narrative and public diplomacy support, helping restore confidence in African peace frameworks and ensuring African institutions are visible not only in statements, but in measurable progress.

Finally, ASA can convene neutral policy dialogue platforms among key member states and regional actors to build convergence on shared security priorities, while strengthening local peace capacity so implementation is socially anchored and not limited to elite bargains.

In short, African Security Analysis (ASA) offers African leaders an enabling partnership: independent analysis, operational support, and strategic coordination tools that help translate political commitments into enforceable outcomes. The crisis in eastern Congo is a tragedy—but it is also a rare opening to rebuild African peace leadership on a more credible, sovereign, and effective foundation. ASA is prepared to support that shift—directly, discreetly, and constructively.