DRC–Rwanda: Washington Talks Continue Amid Stalled Peace Process and Strategic Distrust

Washington Round: Dialogue Without Breakthrough

Between October 21–22, 2025, representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, the United States, Qatar, and the African Union Commission met in Washington, D.C. for the third session of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM).

The talks aimed to review the implementation of the June 27 Peace Agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali. While both sides reaffirmed their commitment to “continue discussions,” the outcome remains largely procedural.
Despite coordination on paper, little has changed on the ground: the M23/AFC continues to consolidate territorial control, while trust between the two capitals remains fractured.

The FDLR Paradox: A Waning Threat, a Persistent Pretext

The FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda) remains the cornerstone of Rwanda’s official security narrative — yet, operational evidence increasingly challenges its relevance.
Once a structured insurgency, the FDLR is now an aging, fragmented network with little combat capacity. Kigali’s insistence on its continued threat serves a dual function: maintaining a legitimate pretext for cross-border action and safeguarding strategic access to eastern Congo’s mineral corridors (3Ts and gold).

For Kinshasa, this narrative has become a political trap. The DRC has publicly demanded the disclosure of verifiable FDLR positions, arguing that the label is used to justify foreign intervention rather than to address an actual security risk.

The Failed Angola–Doha–Washington Triangle

The path toward a peace accord has been marked by contradictions and reversals.
Earlier in 2025, Angolan President João Lourenço’s mediation led to a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) agreement outlining the neutralization of FDLR elements within 30 days, to be carried out by the DRC. Kigali, in turn, was to lift its defensive deployments near the border.

However, when the time came to formalize the document, President Félix Tshisekedi refused to sign, rejecting the clause that required direct dialogue with the M23/AFC. For him, negotiating with the M23 would amount to legitimizing Rwandan military influence in Congolese territory.
Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, frustrated by these shifts, withdrew from further sessions until Kinshasa agreed to face the M23 directly — a condition now backed by Washington and Doha.

U.S. Economic Leverage and the Alphamines Trigger

The turning point for U.S. involvement came in March 2025, when fighting reached Walikale, forcing the closure of Alphamines, a mine producing 10% of global tin output.
The shutdown alarmed Washington and Ottawa, whose investors held over 328,000 shares in the company. Within days, the U.S. pushed, through Qatar, for a face-to-face meeting between Kagame and Tshisekedi, which took place in Doha on March 18, 2025.

Doha’s mediation led to a two-step plan:

1. Rwanda and the DRC to rebuild bilateral trust and neutralize the FDLR.

2. Kinshasa and the M23/AFC to address internal grievances through direct negotiation.

On April 9, 2025, Kinshasa and M23 delegates met in Doha under U.S.-Qatari facilitation.
As a goodwill gesture, M23 withdrew from Walikale, allowing Alphamines to resume operations by April 10. In return, Kinshasa was to release 700 detainees accused of links with the movement — a promise that remains unfulfilled.

Field intelligence suggests that many of these prisoners may have died in custody due to torture, malnutrition, or neglect, further eroding trust between the parties.

Strategic Shifts and American Disengagement

Shortly after Alphamines resumed operations, U.S. and Canadian investors sold their stakes to Emirati entities, signalling a strategic withdrawal from the mining equation and diminishing Washington’s economic motivation to sustain diplomatic pressure.

Meanwhile, President Tshisekedi sought to revive U.S. engagement by hiring lobbying firms to arrange a private meeting with Donald Trump, promising mineral access in exchange for stronger U.S. mediation. Trump, pursuing symbolic peace initiatives across Ukraine, Gaza, and the Great Lakes, viewed the DRC–Rwanda crisis as a potential diplomatic success.

However, the breakdown of the June Washington signing attempt and Kinshasa’s new preconditions for prisoner exchanges derailed momentum.
By mid-October, U.S. interest had waned once again — mirroring its earlier disengagement following the Alphamines divestment.

The Missed October Signature

The October 23, 2025 session in Washington was expected to formalize the final DRC–Rwanda accord under the supervision of U.S. and AU representatives.
Yet, President Tshisekedi refused to attend, citing the lack of progress on the ground — particularly M23’s continued presence in Goma and Bukavu.

The Congolese delegation introduced new conditions, demanding the release of captured FARDC and police personnel and a reciprocal exchange of prisoners, which were not included in the original framework.
The move effectively froze the process, leading one AU official to describe the talks as “a peace process suspended between two mirrors — each reflecting the other’s mistrust.”

Strategic Assessment: Peace Deferred, War Reignited

African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses that the Washington process remains politically fragile and operationally hollow.
The JSCM framework has produced statements but no verifiable field progress.
Key trust-building measures — FDLR demobilization, M23 territorial disengagement, and detainee releases — are all stalled or unfulfilled.

Both Kigali and Kinshasa now view the negotiations as a tactical pause rather than a pathway to peace.
In the absence of sustained mediation pressure, the resumption of large-scale hostilities in North Kivu and Ituri appears increasingly inevitable.

The current alignment suggests three dynamics:

• Kigali seeks to maintain leverage through the M23 and economic corridors.
• Kinshasa aims to buy time ahead of the electoral cycle and diplomatic reshuffling.
• Washington and Doha are recalibrating engagement after diminishing returns.

ASA Analysis: The Return of “Economic Peacekeeping”

The DRC–Rwanda dispute has evolved beyond security rhetoric.
At its core lies control over trade, minerals, and logistics routes — not ideology.
The FDLR narrative, once used as a counterterrorism pretext, has transformed into a strategic fiction masking competition for resource sovereignty.

Peace negotiations now function as economic negotiations:
Each “confidence measure” — from Alphamines reopening to prisoner exchanges — translates into material and commercial leverage.

ASA anticipates that without a credible enforcement mechanism, the peace process will devolve into localized ceasefires shaped by economic interests, not political reconciliation.

ASA Advisory and Forward View

African Security Analysis (ASA) continues to monitor developments within the JSCM framework and field dynamics in North Kivu.
ASA’s regional intelligence networks — spanning Kigali, Kinshasa, Goma, and Doha — provide verified, non-partisan situational updates to partners and investors.

Should negotiations collapse, ASA expects:

• Renewed M23 offensives toward Sake and Rutshuru within 60 days.
• Targeted strikes against logistics routes supporting MONUSCO withdrawal.
• Economic disruption in the tin and coltan sectors, with regional implications for supply chains.

For institutions, investors, and diplomatic missions seeking early-warning intelligence, mediation mapping, or risk assessments related to the DRC–Rwanda axis, ASA stands ready to assist.
Our analysts maintain direct coordination channels with field actors and regional envoys, ensuring continuous insight into the shifting balance of power in the Great Lakes.

Conclusion

The DRC–Rwanda peace process remains caught between diplomacy and duplicity.
What began as a security negotiation has evolved into an economic chessboard — where trust is transactional and time favours escalation.
Unless a breakthrough occurs before mid-November, the “peace window” will close, paving the way for a renewed cycle of confrontation.

DRC crisis has entered a phase of managed instability, where war is not ended — merely redefined.