Chad and Cameroon Deepen Military Cooperation Amid Persistent Regional Threats

Security & Regional Cooperation

Strategic Context

The Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon are seeking to intensify their bilateral defence cooperation in response to persistent cross-border security threats. During a high-level meeting in Yaoundé, Chadian Minister of the Armed Forces Issakha Maloua Djamouss, alongside his Cameroonian counterpart and senior officers, reaffirmed the strong ties between N’Djamena and Yaoundé, under the leadership of President Paul Biya and Marshal Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno.

This renewed focus on military cooperation comes at a time when both states face recurring insurgent attacks, criminal incursions, and hostage-taking along their porous borders.

Persistent Security Challenges

Minister Djamouss emphasized that “security is the indispensable condition for development.” He pointed to:

• Boko Haram/ISWAP activity around the Lake Chad Basin.
• Armed incursions and banditry along the Chad–Cameroon frontier.
• Kidnapping operations targeting civilians and traders in cross-border zones.

The urgency of these threats, combined with shifting regional dynamics, has convinced both governments that closer coordination is no longer optional but necessary.

Toward a Formal Defence Partnership

The Chadian delegation invoked the precedent of Operation Logone (2015), a joint campaign against Boko Haram, as evidence of the value of coordinated action. Building on this, Djamouss proposed the adoption of a formal defence partnership agreement, offering:

• A clear legal framework for military cooperation.
• Streamlined joint operations and intelligence sharing.
• More effective border security deployments.

If enacted, such a partnership could represent a step-change in how Chad and Cameroon operationalize their long-standing defence relationship.

Regional Dimension: Expanding Cooperation

Chad has already advanced joint border security mechanisms with the Central African Republic (CAR) through a mixed force. Minister Djamouss suggested that this model be extended to Cameroon, creating a tripartite defence mechanism (Chad–CAR–Cameroon) to address challenges in the “three-borders zone.”

Such an arrangement could:

• Harden the most vulnerable frontier corridors, particularly against transnational armed groups.
• Provide a platform for intelligence fusion across multiple theatres.
• Reinforce regional solidarity, essential for stabilizing the Central African security arc.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Outlook

• Best Case: A formal Chad–Cameroon defence agreement materializes, backed by operational coordination and possible expansion into a tripartite arrangement with CAR. This provides a deterrent effect against non-state actors.
• Most Likely: Tactical cooperation improves along the frontier, but full legal institutionalization remains slow due to bureaucratic and political hurdles.
• Risk Case: Persisting insecurity (Boko Haram/ISWAP, armed banditry) outpaces coordination gains, and asymmetric actors exploit gaps between N’Djamena and Yaoundé.

Conclusion
The Yaoundé meeting underscores both the urgency and opportunity for Chad and Cameroon to institutionalize their military cooperation. With Boko Haram, ISWAP, and cross-border armed groups continuing to threaten regional stability, the adoption of a formal defence pact and expansion into tripartite frameworks will be decisive in shaping the security landscape of Central Africa.